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ABSTRACT 
 
SOCIAL MEANINGS OF MORTALITY:  
THE LANGUAGE OF DEATH AND DISEASE IN 19TH CENTURY MASSACHUSETTS 
 
SEPTEMBER 2011 
 
JEFFREY BEEMER, B.A., MANKATO STATE UNIVERSITY 
 
M.Div., PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY 
 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Douglas L. Anderton 
 
 
This dissertation investigates the emergence and development of cause-of-
death registration in nineteenth-century Massachusetts.  I examine the historical, 
demographic, sociopolitical, and theoretical conditions that gave rise to the first state-
implemented cause-of-death registration system in the United States, Massachusetts's 
vital registration system.  Developments in almost every arena of social life during the 
nineteenth century were shaped in some fashion through disease.  The disease 
ecology changed dramatically during this period shifting from acute infectious to 
chronic degenerative diseases, which marked the beginning of the epidemiological 
transition.  Registration systems were key components in this transitional period, 
providing the raw data on which nineteenth-century public health policy emerged.  
The greatest challenge that public-health reformers faced in implementing and 
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regulating  cause-of-death registration was standardizing the language and practice of 
disease and cause-of-death reporting.  I look closely at issues of implementation and 
regulation and examine the relative impact that standardized nomenclature and 
reporting practices had on cause-of-death registration in Massachusetts from 1850 
through 1912.   
Efforts to standardize disease and cause-of-death terminology in the United 
States and internationally did not, however, successfully emerge until the late 
nineteenth century.  While many disease terms were in common, their diagnostic 
applications were not.  I argue that certain constitutive and regulative features of 
death registration did not match up with the institutional mandate of Massachusetts's 
vital registration system until forty years after its implementation.  The institution-
building process required the alignment of these features as normative practices, 
culminating in the organized efforts of European and American medical professionals 
to instruct physicians in proper nomenclature through explicit references and 
sanctions in the 1900 International Classification of Diseases.  The pragmatic 
conditions out of which both Massachusetts' cause-of-death registration system and 
the International Classification of Diseases emerged did not consist of special 
circumstances or unique cultural practices.  The social meanings of mortality in 
nineteenth-century Massachusetts reflected the public commitments of a diverse set 
of communities and practices that shared similar resources in working out the 
struggles and triumphs of communicating the language of death and disease.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Language exhibits its social significance by drawing distinctions that divide the 
world into manageable pieces.  It reduces complexity by distinguishing one thing from 
another, it provides a shared framework for meaningful discourse, and it regulates our 
interactions in predictable and acceptable ways.  We use language to identify objects 
and events against a backdrop of other objects and events, to coherently express 
ourselves under presumptions of mutual understanding, and to coordinate everyday 
interactions through shared expectations.  Language also functions as a means for 
expressing difference, disagreement, and for generating conflict.  But even within such 
divergent or oppositional modes, language never abandons its integrative role because 
it can never do so.  Using language to mark difference or shatter boundaries can only 
be accomplished by conversely denoting sameness and establishing limits – to exclude 
on the one hand is to include on the other.  Language use, whether integrative or 
oppositional in practice, inherently imposes order on our experiences.  It is the means 
by which we classify ordinary interactions, objects and events as self-evident, invisible 
configurations.  Pierre Bourdieu (1984, 470) speaks of our "sense of limits" and 
"principles of division" as internalized cognitions that are forgotten but nevertheless 
reproduced in our everyday experiences.   
In whatever fashion we use language, we use it from within communities of 
language practitioners where meaning and identities emerge as a result of such 
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communicative, self-evident practices.  Medicine like any other profession defines 
itself through its communicative practices.  The professionals who carry out those 
practices use language to distinguish their activities from other professionals and non-
professionals alike.  Professional identities depend on carving out proprietary 
boundaries that mark distinctions which extend beyond the practitioners themselves, 
e.g., teacher/student, priest/parishioner, doctor/patient, and so on.  Consequently, all 
professions are understandably jealous of their distinctions.  As Paul Starr notes, 
"Doctors and other professionals have a distinctive basis of legitimacy that lends 
strength to their authority.  They claim authority, not as individuals, but as members of 
a community that has objectively validated their competence" (Starr 1985, 12).  
Competency is a feature of collective recognition and validity.  I will return to this idea 
in more detail in a later chapter, but for now I want to highlight Starr's point that 
professional authority rests not on an individual's demonstrated competency per se 
but on the professional community's validation of competency as a collective practice.  
Language functions in the same manner.  Its authority as a medium for communication 
rests not on an individual's demonstrated competency to successfully use it but on a 
community's validation of competency as a collective practice.  Language does its work 
by tying individual experiences, events, and thoughts together into a broader set of 
collective practices. 
For physicians and other health practitioners, using language in a professional 
capacity defines and redefines the authoritative boundaries that demarcate medicine 
as a unique set of practices.  For centuries, the language that has done medicine's 
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work is the language of disease.  Physicians determine their patient's physical or 
mental health by means of diagnostic judgments.  Almost everything that a physician 
does, pre and post diagnosis, is predicated on that diagnostic moment.  Therapeutic 
practice can only begin after a diagnosis has taken place; therapeutic choices are 
dependent on effectively identifying patient ill-health; and if all therapeutic measures 
fail, that diagnostic moment follows the patient in death.  The diagnostic role acts as 
the centerpiece of all medical practice and uniquely defines that activity.  And while 
disease language has always played a defining role in medical practice, how that 
language was used has differed significantly from what we take for granted today.  
Death and disease were intimately tied together up through the nineteenth century.  
The language of disease was effectively synonymous with the language used to 
describe causes of death.  Only recently have we been able to think of death and 
disease as relatively independent of one another.  Even in the early twentieth century 
the close connection between death and disease was not all that removed from the 
therapeutic environment of late-nineteenth-century medicine.  Nevertheless, many of 
the developments in public health and medicine that allow us to increasingly make 
distinctions between death and disease today began in the nineteenth century (see 
e.g., Duffy 1993; Grob 2002; Porter 2003; Preston and Haines 1991; Rosenberg 
1987[1962], 1992; Starr 1982; Szreter 2005; Tomes 1998; Worboys 2000).    
This dissertation examines the institutional challenges of implementing cause-
of-death reporting as a professional practice in nineteenth-century Massachusetts and 
the subsequent shifts in cause-of-death nomenclature during this period.  It looks at 
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the historical, demographic, sociopolitical, and theoretical conditions that gave rise to 
the first state-implemented cause-of-death reporting system in the United States, 
Massachusetts's vital registration system.  Developments in public health, medicine, 
science, industry, immigration, in almost every arena of social life during the 
nineteenth century, were shaped in some fashion through disease.  The disease 
ecology changed dramatically during this period shifting from acute infectious to 
chronic degenerative diseases, which marked the beginning of the epidemiological 
transition (Omran, 1971).  A key component of the epidemiological transition was the 
registration systems that provided the raw data on which nineteenth-century public 
health policy emerged.  The greatest challenge that public-health reformers faced in 
implementing and regulating  cause-of-death registration was standardizing the 
language and practice of disease and cause-of-death reporting.  I look closely at issues 
of implementation, regulation, and standardization in cause-of-death registration.  
Efforts to standardize disease and cause-of-death terminology in the United States and 
internationally did not successfully emerge until the late nineteenth century.  While 
many disease terms were in common, their diagnostic applications were not.  I 
examine the relative impact that standardized nomenclature had on cause-of-death 
reporting in western Massachusetts from 1850 through 1912.  I analyze the effects of 
one specific international influence on late-nineteenth and early twentieth-century 
grammars of death, namely, the organized efforts of European and American medical 
professionals to instruct physicians in proper nomenclature through explicit references 
and sanctions in the 1900 International Classification of Diseases (ICD).   
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My objective is to reconstruct the institutional parameters around which  
Massachusetts's vital registration system evolved and within which individual actors 
participated.  I argue that these parameters reveal certain normative configurations 
that were necessary in the institutional development of cause-of-death registration in 
Massachusetts.  Most accounts that describe the institutional rise of public health and 
medicine in the nineteenth century focus on specific social, political, and historical 
developments that brought about modern health regimes (see e.g., Kett 1968; 
Foucault 1973; Starr 1982; Rothstein 1985[1972]; Cassedy  1986; Haber 1991; King 
1991; Porter 1997; Bonner 2000; Weisz 2006).  My approach is different in that I 
examine this institution-building process at a more fundamental level by targeting 
those processes that allow for the very possibility of social, political, and cultural 
developments to take shape.  I begin this chapter by providing the historical context 
that informed the developments in cause-of-death registration in Massachusetts. 
 
Humors, Miasmas, and Germs 
For the better part of medical history, diseases were not thought of as having 
unique causal properties as we typically think of them today.  Diseases were 
contingent upon the idiosyncrasies of the patient in demonstrating their pathology 
(Bynum, 1993).  In the Hippocratic tradition,  health was defined as the natural balance 
of the body's essential fluids, or the four humors – yellow bile, black bile, phlegm, and 
blood.  Disease was an imbalance or disturbance of one or more of these humors.  The 
therapeutic objective was to bring the humors back into balance and restore the 
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patient's vital energies (Nutton, 1997).  Prior to the nineteenth century, the prevailing 
therapeutic approach drew directly upon this idea of restoring balance to the person 
as a whole.  The Hippocratic tradition had little use for classifying causes of death and 
disease in a taxonomic fashion because disease was not conceived of as a distinct 
phenomenon with its own natural history.  Disease was understood as a deviation 
from the normal function of mind, body, and spirit with little meaning outside the 
dysfunction of an individual's normal state of being (Cohen 1953; Bynum 1993).  
Against the backdrop of such long-held medical traditions it was understandable that 
this new idea of germ theory in the late nineteenth century would meet with 
resistance. 
Most nineteenth-century physicians in the U.S. were hesitant to adopt the idea 
that single microscopic entities (germs) could prove sufficient in explaining disease 
causation (Pelling 1993; Bynum 1994; Carter 2003).  The skepticism rested not so much 
on the size of the causal entities being proposed but on their causal specificity.  The 
conventional understanding during this period was referred to as the zymotic theory of 
disease.  It located disease causation in a plurality of conditions consisting of 
environmental conditions, heredity, individual predispositions, behavioral 
characteristics, including physical contact with those who carried disease (Olby 1993; 
Pelling 1993; Bynum 1994; Carter 2003).  Seasonal changes were often cited as 
contributing factors for a wide variety of diseases, most notably Cholera (Pelling 1978, 
1993; Rosenberg 1987[1962]; Vinten-Johansen et al. 2003).  An individual's 
constitutional or hereditary makeup also provided one of several explanatory 
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candidates for such diseases as tuberculosis, scrofula1 or any disease thought to be 
uniquely characteristic of a particular individual (Olby 1993; Ryan 1993; Dubos 
1996[1952]; Ott 1996).  The span of causal factors responsible for any given disease 
were not only wide but could also be dissimilar in kind depending on conditions and 
circumstances.  For instance, a contributing cause for a particular disease in one 
individual did not ensure that its presence in someone else would produce a similar 
outcome.  Geographical location, seasonal change, atmospheric conditions, individual 
predispositions, and behavioral tendencies, all provided an array of possibilities from 
which physicians diagnosed their patients.  To suggest, therefore, that for each 
infectious disease there was a single corresponding microbial agent as its unique cause 
was completely counter to conventional views (Olby 1993; Pelling 1993; Bynum 1994; 
Carter 2003).  While the idea of a single causal agent responsible for particular 
diseases was not new per se, it was nevertheless an idea that turned prevailing notions 
of disease causation upside down.   
 The resistance to a germ theory of disease rested not only on theoretical 
grounds but on professional grounds as well.  Germs as causal agents had implications 
for clinical practice.  Most therapeutic approaches, as varied as they were during this 
period, were steeped in holistic theories of health and disease (Warner 1986).  As 
noted earlier, a patient's mind, body, spirit, emotions, moral behavior, and 
environment were all part of an interconnected whole that made up the causal matrix 
responsible for wellbeing (Rosenberg 1992, 74-89).  The experienced physician would 
                                                 
1. Scrofula is one of several types of tuberculous infections that affects the lymph 
nodes in the neck. 
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have attended to each of these factors in sussing out the sources for a patient's ill 
health.  As Samuel Tissot (1769, 13-15) noted in his book on ailments of the literary 
and sedentary lifestyle: 
 
The diseases to which the learned are particularly exposed arise from 
two principal causes, the perpetual labours of the mind, and the 
constant inaction of the body.... Metaphysical speculation enquires into 
the causes of the influence of the mind on the body, and that of the 
body on the mind: medicine is engaged in less abstruse, but perhaps in 
less uncertain researches; it does not attempt to display the first causes 
of this reciprocal power in the two distinct parts of which man consists, 
but confines itself to an attentive observation of the phenomena that 
result from it. Experience instructs the physician, that such a peculiar 
state of the body must necessarily produce  a certain correspondent 
exertion of the soul; that such emotions of the soul must unavoidably 
be attended with reciprocal alteration in the body; and that, while the 
soul is absorbed in thought, a part of the brain is kept in a state of 
tension, which becomes fatiguing to it. Thus far only physicians extend 
their enquiries; and this indeed is all that is required for them to know. 
 
Professional Health Structures and Perspectives 
Historians and demographers have long noted the relative unreliability of 
nineteenth-century death records in mapping out disease and cause-of-death trends.   
Some point to the conceptual shortcomings of a pre-germ-theoretic understanding in 
establishing any sort of diagnostic validity.  Others cite inherent inconsistencies within 
death records due to the ways in which death events were reported, recorded, and 
collected.  Many of the problems surrounding cause-of-death data focus in one way or 
another on diagnostic issues.  Can we trust the historical record to provide us with a 
true account of disease events during this period given the rather rudimentary science 
that was in place?  Can we trust death records from registration systems that were in 
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their infancy, often functioning with little authority or regulatory oversight?  Anne 
Hardy (1994, 472-73) expresses such concerns for nineteenth-century cause-of-death 
data in England and Wales, noting that "…registered causes of death often bear only 
an approximation to the truth.  …those who wish to make use of this material cannot 
afford to take the data at face value if they wish to establish historically valid 
conclusions."  Hardy surveys the potential pitfalls of using GRO (General Register 
Office) cause-of-death statistics, lays out the problems and deficiencies in great detail, 
and rightly cautions against simply assuming their reliability and validity.   
Nineteenth-century recorded causes of death were created against a 
theoretical backdrop that differed significantly from contemporary notions of disease.  
In most cases, we lack the requisite physical or archival data needed to accurately 
determine or verify particular nineteenth-century causes of death in light of twenty-
first century standards.  A recorded cause of death is an historical account, one of 
several possible accounts of a particular event.  This is especially true of nineteenth-
century causes of death given the etiological (causal) understanding of the period.  Any 
number of causes could have been, and often were, attributed to a particular ailment 
based upon such factors as an individual's constitution, seasonal variations, heredity, 
age, and so on.  In other words, causation meant something quite different for 
nineteenth-century physicians than it does for physicians today.  A late nineteenth-
century physician would have had a significantly different notion of disease causation 
than a physician practicing only fifty years earlier.  In fact, the late nineteenth-century 
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physician had more in common conceptually speaking with physicians today than with 
their mid-century colleagues.   
The problem here is one of conventional identification.  What are the limits 
necessarily imposed upon us when attempting to historically identify a cause of death 
or disease?  Is it meaningful to construct disease histories that interpret the historical 
record from a contemporary etiological basis or does it make more sense to use the 
categories, nomenclature, and theoretical backdrop of nineteenth-century medical 
science?  Does it make sense to reconstruct past disease histories from a conceptual 
basis rooted in contemporary systems of understanding? Such questions naturally 
arise due to several historical factors pertaining to 1) the manner in which causes of 
death were recorded, 2) the absence of standardized protocols for what was recorded 
(i.e., what counts as a valid cause of death), 3) irregularities and inconsistencies among 
the recording instruments themselves, and 4) the qualifications of those who reported 
and recorded causes of death.  Günter Risse (1997, 175) speaks of a shifting disease 
ecology, which "…presupposes complex interactions between both biological and non-
biological factors which are ultimately responsible for different and changing patterns 
of sickness in time and space."  Historical accuracy plays off all of these types of 
interactions, and rather than reduce the question to particular biological factors, 
important as they are, the focus of this chapter is on the competing institutional 
influences on health, disease, medicine and the emerging scientific discourse on 
causes of death. 
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Changing Medical Perspectives 
Nineteenth-century medicine in the United States did not bestow physicians 
with high professional stature.  Medical practitioners of all stripes were considered 
more as tradesmen than professionals.  American medical culture had yet to fully avail 
itself of the growing "cultural prestige of science" in both theory and practice (Gelfand 
1997, 1139).  The revolutionary changes that Western society experienced during this 
industrializing period extended very little of its celebrated progress to medicine (Duffy 
1993; Starr 1984).  Physicians stumbled along as they had for centuries, burdened with 
a physiological and etiological understanding that only furthered their association with 
a bygone era.  The continued practice of purging, blistering, blood-letting, sweating 
among other methods of expelling "great morbid actions" (purgation) stood in stark 
contrast to the spectacles of a modern, industrializing society.  The promises of the 
Enlightenment were still fresh in the minds of those who ushered in the nineteenth 
century.  Underwritten with the precepts of science and reason, progress on all levels 
of human endeavor were eagerly pursued and anticipated.  The state of medicine in 
the United States as well as Europe during this early period simply failed to meet the 
expectations of a modern scientific era (Bonner 2000; King 1991; Rothstein 
1985[1972]; Starr 1984; Weisz 2006). 
These perceptions quickly changed during the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century.  A little more than a generation later, the institutional, theoretical, social and 
political developments transformed American medicine from an unassuming trade to a 
respected and powerful profession at home and abroad.  One of the more important 
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corollaries associated with this shift concerned changes in the way death and disease 
were understood, not simply in etiological terms but in the social location of sickness 
and health more generally. 
For a better part of this period the province of sickness and health was 
confined to the privacy of the home.  The bedside was literally the setting from which 
physicians conducted their business.  Physicians were entrepreneurs operating 
primarily on contract, seeking and gaining clients primarily through their reputations 
rather than exploiting medical credentials as a sign of their competency.  The privacy 
of the patient’s home served as the physician’s work environment.  What properly 
constituted private versus public was unambiguously marked along gender lines.  The 
private sphere was associated with domestic affairs and functions and assigned 
feminine qualities as a matter of course.  To have one’s vocation located primarily in 
the context of the home was to reduce its status almost by definition.  Insofar as one’s 
work environment determined stature, physicians struggled with the verities of a 
culture mired in highly gendered spheres of influence.  As Steve Sturdy (2002, 5) points 
out, "Though they aspired to be regarded as learned gentlemen, their role as 
attendants of the sick located them in what was still a residual and deprived sphere of 
domestic privacy, remote from the structures of rank and status that centered on the 
public world of court and state, and uncomfortably close to women and servants." 
Consequently, health and medical care were not regarded as a public good but as a 
private good, a personal matter between doctor, patient, and family.   
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Given the domestic locale of sickness and health, it is not surprising that the 
focus on home healthcare and the individual practice of sound health habits was 
commonly advocated.  In the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the popularity 
of health pamphlets and manuals, often referred to as "catechisms of health" or 
"guides to domestic medicine," demonstrated the degree to which medicine remained 
a private and personal matter (Starr 1982; Swedlund 2010).  The most well-known of 
these health pamphlets were Bernhard Faust’s Catechism of Health and William 
Buchan’s Domestic Medicine.  These and other health publications had a relatively 
wide circulation in both Europe and the United States.  They were targeted toward lay 
audiences and offered both moral and practical advice on personal health and well-
being.   
Popular medical advice as a commercial enterprise, coupled with physician 
entrepreneurialism, gave rise to a competitive environment in which various medical 
philosophies contended for a share of the healthcare market.  This was particularly 
salient in the United States.  In the first quarter of the nineteenth century many states 
had licensing requirements for physicians but quickly began rescinding these laws in 
the interest of self-governance and for leveling the medical playing field (ibid.).  
European countries, on the other hand, were far more likely to implement 
comprehensive certification systems and regulate medical practice.  Great Britain 
ratified the 1858 Medical Act, which allowed for the certification of certain types of 
medical practice to the exclusion of others.  This did not mean that only certified 
practitioners could practice medicine.  Homeopaths, naturopaths and others excluded 
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by the Medical Act were allowed to continue practicing but not under the guise of 
official certification (Bynum 1994). The variety of approaches to medicine in Europe 
and the United States were similar, but American medicine was far less regulated and 
did not have the type of official oversight that many European nations enjoyed.  
Healthcare practices in the United States, as a result, remained more divided in terms 
of distinct schools of thought. 
In the United States, the two most common approaches to medicine were  
Allopathic and Homeopathic practices.  Allopathic medicine consisted of various 
purging techniques and therapies, such as bloodletting, induced vomiting, and the use 
of a wide array of purgatives to restore the body's natural balance.  Allopathic 
medicine operated on a principle of opposites.  If, for example, a patient suffered from 
diarrhea the allopathic treatment would be to introduce a substance that caused 
constipation.  Whatever symptomatic ailment the patient suffered, the opposite was 
prescribed to counter the ill-effects and restore balance.  Homeopathic medicine, on 
the other hand, operated on a principle of similitude or "like cures like." In an 
attempted to alleviate a patient’s symptoms, the Homeopath would introduce small 
doses of a remedy that in large doses would produce the very symptoms it was 
attempting to alleviate.  If such remedies were given in small enough doses, the body’s 
"vital energy" would be able to fight off the disease by attacking the "weaker 
dynamic," thus allowing the body to restore itself to harmony and balance.  
Homeopathy began gaining ground during the latter half of nineteenth century but 
faded away by the turn of the twentieth century.  Within each of these approaches, 
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among many others including Thomsonianism, Eclecticism, Hydropathy, the 
practitioner relied upon a loyal and informed constituency.  Establishing a following in 
terms of "brand loyalty" became a professional necessity.  The rise of popular 
healthcare through the dissemination of health pamphlets provided the perfect means 
for establishing a following while at the same time exposing potential clients to 
competing medical philosophies.  Buchan’s Domestic Medicine advocated a do-it-
yourself approach, which emphasized the common sense capacity of individuals to 
care for themselves (Starr 1982). 
Practicing medicine within a competitive, commercially-driven environment fit 
well within American culture during this period.  Paul Starr suggests that a deeper 
impulse of anti-professionalism and faith in the principle of natural reason motivated 
much of the popular resistance to a single, unified medical authority.  The move to 
deregulate medical licensure in the early nineteenth century drew largely upon 
popular sentiment.  The political debates surrounding the licensure issue made strong 
appeals to both public autonomy and reason as well as the public good.  The focus 
here was not so much on the good of the public’s health per se as it was on the good 
of maintaining autonomy and ensuring individual freedoms.  The marketplace acted as 
the best arbiter for the public’s health in the minds of many.  Ultimately the natural 
rights position won the day, and the level of health consciousness during this period 
nevertheless remained within the domain of private and domestic concerns. 
Prevailing notions of health, sickness, and disease were largely confined to the 
individual.  Personal health and well-being stemmed from a behavioral model, which 
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deferred responsibility to the individual.  This provided the basis for an individuated 
conception of disease, best expressed in terms of constitutional predispositions.  The 
constitutional view of disease located mitigating health factors according to certain 
features of an individual’s moral, spiritual and physical makeup.  It tended to follow a 
tautological formulation by assuming that a poor constitution increased one’s 
susceptibility to sickness, while one’s susceptibility to sickness was often a de facto  
indicator of a poor constitution.  This understanding of disease was long standing and 
followed Enlightenment ideals of the individual and the state.  For many 
Enlightenment thinkers, the solution to health related problems lay not at the 
doorstep of society but at the feet of free, self-determined individuals exercising their 
God-given rational capacities.  Human progress depended on certain corrective 
measures that focused on reforming individual behaviors through education.  The role 
of government was not envisioned paternalistically but as a facilitator of individual 
liberties.  The means to well-being depended on various legal guarantees for securing 
individual rights and freedoms, with minimal state intervention.  Individuals were 
given charge of securing their own health and well-being as independent agents but 
from within a context that guaranteed individual autonomy.  The following statement 
by John Locke provides a good example of these sentiments (Some Thoughts 
Concerning Education 1996[1693], p. 10): 
 
A sound mind in a sound body, is a short but full description of a happy 
state in this world: he that has these two, has little more to wish for; 
and he that wants either of them, will be but little the better for 
anything else.  Men's happiness or misery is most part of their own 
making.  He whose mind directs not wisely, will never take the right 
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way; and he whose body is crazy and feeble will never be able to 
advance in it.  I confess there are some men's constitutions of body and 
mind so vigorous and well framed by nature that they need not much 
assistance from others but by the strength of their natural genius they 
are from their cradles carried towards what is excellent and by the 
privilege of their happy constitutions are able to do wonders.  But 
examples of these are but few; and I think I may say that, of all the men 
we meet with, nine parts of ten are what they are, good or evil, useful 
or not, by their education.  'Tis that which makes the great difference in 
mankind.     
 
Emerging Public Health Perspectives 
Individuated perspectives on health and disease began to change during the 
nineteenth century with the emergence of statistical methods that allowed for more 
systematic investigations of health trends across entire populations.  The formation of 
a public health consciousness proved to be an important step in shifting health 
concerns away from the domestic sphere to a broader public good.  The work of Edwin 
Chadwick and William Farr in England and Lemuel Shattuck in Massachusetts lead the 
way in advocating for public health and the need for more proactive and preventative 
health measures (Swedlund 2010).  These and other developments coincided with the 
rise of the sanitation movement, enlisting the voluntary support and cooperation of 
local communities in battling public-health hazards.  While communities were 
concerned with the public health, they were nevertheless concerned with maintaining 
their local sovereignty and preferred to address public health issues locally (Beemer et 
al 2005; Swedlund 2010).  Much of what motivated the rise of public health during this 
period surrounded the social anxieties that accompanied rising industrialization and 
urbanization.  The material conditions for the nineteenth-century public health crisis 
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were forged locally as communities all across the state experience a period of rapid 
economic expansion.  At the same time, we also see state intervention come into play 
fairly quickly with public health regulations and initiatives, which frequently came 
under fire due to the perception that such public health interventions would have a 
negative impact on local economies (Beemer et al, 2005).  
The demographic shift that accompanied industrialization also brought about 
corresponding changes in health practices.  The way the medical community, public 
health officials, and the general public understood disease played a central role in this 
broader health transition.  Preventative and therapeutic responses to rising incidents 
of infectious disease were also governed by broader sociopolitical factors (Alter and 
Carmichael 1996; Beemer et al 2005; Bowker and Star 2000; Meslé and Vallin 1996; 
Porter 1997; Risse 1997; Slater 1993; Starr 1984).  The conventional story attributes a 
heroic role to the discoveries of medical science.  The adoption of diagnostic measures 
based on germ theories of disease, however, did not begin to take hold particularly in 
the United States until the turn of the twentieth century, nearly three decades after its 
establishment in the scientific community.  Advances in bacteriology also took 
considerable time before they filtered into medical and public health practices.  For 
the most part, scientific discoveries in medicine throughout the nineteenth century 
reveal a rather episodic development and did not begin to coalesce in any systematic 
fashion until long after initial discoveries were made (Szreter 1988; Hamlin 1992; 
Barnes 1997).  Consequently, the role of nineteenth-century medical science in curbing 
epidemic diseases, often portrayed triumphantly, is not as obvious as some have 
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suggested.  Indeed, factors other than advances in medical science are now generally 
accepted as playing a more significant role in changing epidemiological patterns during 
this period.  This does not suggest, however, that medical science played only a 
minimal role in improving nineteenth-century health.  What it does suggest is that the 
history of health and medicine during this period is multifaceted, requiring a more 
complex approach (Alter and Carmichael 1996; Barnes 1997; Beemer et al 2005; 
Bowker and Star 2000; Hamlin 1992, 1994, 2002; Meslé and Vallin 1996; Porter 1997; 
Risse 1997; Slater 1993; Starr 1984; Szreter 1988).   
 
American Epidemiological Transition 
The nineteenth-century American epidemiological transition provides the 
backdrop for how prevailing notions of death and disease were diagnostically 
employed.  Assigning a specific cause on a death record entailed a whole host of 
factors, from the recording instrument itself to the individual responsible for recording 
the cause of death.  A long-standing problem in the history of cause-of-death 
classification is identifying the etiological grounds for changes in diagnostic 
terminology.  For some diseases, classification and social bias were tightly intertwined.  
For instance, moral failings were associated with many diseases which were poorly 
understood during the onset of the epidemiological transition and yet were 
prevalently associated with lower classes, e.g., cholera, while positive attributions 
were asserted to others whose impact was more visible in upper classes, e.g., 
pulmonary tuberculosis (Yaukey and Anderton 2001; Dormandy 1999).  The concept of 
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a natural death itself had been challenged by the pathological paradigm, and the 
notion that infant deaths were an acceptable "culling" of the lower classes was only 
gradually replaced over the century with a notion that such diseases were a 
preventable social problem and a quantifiable one as well (Foucault 1973; Swedlund 
1990; Armstrong 1986; Bartley et al. 1997; Hamlin 1995; Anderton 2003, 2004). 
 Historical trends in recorded literal causes of death are intertwined with the 
social history of disease classifications, or nosologies.  These trends reflect the 
longitudinal cause-specific history of the epidemiological transition.  Apart from a 
handful of studies that examine cause-of-death reporting among North America 
populations, the history of changing disease conceptions in the United States has not 
been adequately investigated, and systematic attempts at providing a detailed 
mapping of the changes in literal cause-of-death reporting and subsequent nosologies 
are virtually absent in the literature (Howard-Jones 1974; Gittelsohn 1982; Anderton 
and Hautaniemi Leonard 2004).  Until recently, most studies of North American 
mortality trends were limited to aggregate-level Census data.  With an increased 
availability of individual-level data, more detailed assessments of morbidity and 
mortality trends are now possible.  Moreover, the presence of corresponding archival 
sources satisfies the need for contextualizing the changing etiological landscape in 
terms of examining the institutional conditions in which disease conceptions were 
embedded Condran et al 1982; Condran et al 1984; Crimmins and Condran 1983; 
Meckel 1985).  A clear and accurate accounting of the early American epidemiological 
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transition is fundamentally incomplete without understanding the changing 
nomenclature as reflected in reported causes of death. 
 We are left with the question of how specifically did prevailing notions of 
sickness and health change over this period, and what were the parameters and 
processes by which cause-of-death descriptions and disease classifications evolved? 
What evidence is available showing that particular diseases followed certain 
conceptual, or perhaps etiological, trajectories and what factors contributed to these 
changing perspective-salient causes? For example, if we look at early recorded cases of 
consumption or phthisis, we find that such diagnoses were later identified as 
pulmonary tuberculosis.  What are the contributing factors that lead to these 
diagnostic changes?  Perhaps it is premature to suggest that a change took place at all 
and what we are dealing with here are diagnostic standards that point to entirely 
different diseases?  Is it plausible to suggest that what was recorded as consumption 
or phthisis in the early to mid-nineteenth century was not referring to the same 
disease as what was recorded as pulmonary tuberculosis in the later nineteenth 
century?  As Anderton and Hautaniemi Leonard (2004, 119) note, "…the literal cause 
"tuberculosis" does not appear until after Koch’s discovery of the tuberculosis 
bacterium and availability of a swab test." In hindsight, the temptation is to 
automatically attribute the development of more precise diagnostics techniques and 
understandings in such cases but it is not entirely clear that such attributions are 
always justified.  Anderton and Hautaniemi Leonard continue (Ibid.), "…cases 
diagnosed as consumption and phthisis are prevalently, but not always, examples of 
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pulmonary tuberculosis in these early periods.  Some of these cases would likely not 
have been diagnosed as tuberculosis in more recent periods." The important thing to 
note is that classifying particular diseases and tracing their historical trajectories 
involves more than just a retrospective identification with contemporary classification 
schemes. 
Given the more immediate physiological nature of death and disease, it is not 
surprising that considerable attention is given to risk factors more closely associated 
with disease events themselves.  Medical and epidemiological histories tend to focus 
heavily on more proximate causal factors in identifying shifting disease trends in 
conjunction with individual health practices and their therapeutic responses.  As such, 
etiological accounts have been closely tied with contemporaneous developments in 
medical science.  The shift in the disease ecology during the latter part of the 
nineteenth century has understandably been skewed toward the medical side of the 
equation.  The picture as stated earlier is more complex than that.  Parallel to these 
etiological shifts was the rise of modern systems of disease classification in 
development alongside the first distinctly modern systems for reporting mortality.  
Understanding the complexities that lay beneath these parallel changes requires an 
account that extends beyond the shifting advances of nineteenth-century medicine.  
Massachusetts provides a unique locale for studying the historical processes that 
underlie these shifting trends in mortality and disease.  As Alter and Carmichael (1996), 
Preston and Haines (1991), Anderton and Hautaniemi (2004) and others have pointed 
out, sufficient individual-level data is lacking for studying mortality in North America 
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during this period.  In the following chapters, I provide a more detailed analysis of 
specific diseases, beginning with consumption, phthisis and tuberculosis.  I lay out the 
historical context of Massachusetts's developing registration system and its expanding 
authority and scope as a fundamental component for fully understanding the shifting 
etiological context throughout this period. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE PRAGMATIC IMPERATIVES OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 
  
Social theorists have long used some version of what I call public accountability 
to explain social order and conflict.  Public accountability serves a basic normative role 
in how we constitute and regulate our interactions with one another.  It provides us 
with the practical resources necessary to navigate through the mundane and 
extraordinary complexities of everyday life.  The idea of publically accountable action, 
while not necessarily expressed in those terms, nevertheless does much of the 
theoretical and conceptual work in sociological theory.  Whether the focus is on a 
collective conscience, an integrative subsystem, a generalized other, communicative 
action, intersectional complexity or any number of non-idiosyncratic social processes, 
each of these mechanisms relies on some accountability structure that cannot be 
meaningfully defined outside of public practices.  That any action is regarded  as 
meaningful and justifiable presupposes a wider social context that extends beyond 
particular instances of any action.  Public accountability is that extended social 
context.  It furnishes the pragmatic, pre-theoretical suppositions of what I refer to as 
constitutive and regulative normativity.  I will define these terms in more detail later in 
this chapter, but for now, constitutive normativity refers to practices that are 
necessary in bringing about certain kinds of defining actions or outcomes.  For 
example, the act of making a promise requires sincerity on the part of the promise 
maker to follow through with certain stipulated actions.  To make an insincere promise 
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is by definition not a promise because it violates the constitutive norms of what it 
means to make a promise.  Regulative normativity refers to rules or directives that 
regulate pre-existing practices or actions, thus, requiring an established set of actions 
or practices to do its regulative work (Searle 1997[1969], 33ff.). 
Engaging in publically accountable actions simply means that we interact with 
the world through taken-for-granted knowledge and abilities that define and justify 
the actions we take.  The "know-hows" and "know-thats" of daily life are never 
enacted in cognitive isolation, or as privately understood actions.  If we think of private 
actions as carrying a fundamentally different sort of accountability than their public 
counterpart, at least theoretically speaking, we situate those actions outside the realm 
of public scrutiny and social configuration.  They become uniquely private insofar as 
any appeal to a private action's meaningfulness and justifiability must be found 
outside a publicly accountable framework.  For instance, if I were to act in such a way 
that the meaning of my actions could only be understood by me the actor and no one 
else, we would describe those actions as uniquely private.  Access to such actions 
would be restricted to a set of individual practices that could not extend beyond the 
conceptual space of private accountability.  As we will see, uniquely private actions 
and their accountability conditions are not possible if they are to be meaningful.   
 
Theoretical Underpinnings of Private and Public Action 
The import of these seemingly oblique set of ideas will be clarified and 
extended in this chapter.  They provide the theoretical basis for explaining the 
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constitutive and regulative features of nineteenth-century cause-of-death registration 
in Massachusetts.  In the following chapters, I develop a more general proposition 
stating that successful institution-building requires practices that institute both 
constitutive and regulative normativity as a singular process.  I then apply this 
proposition to the historical cases of Massachusetts' emerging cause-of-death 
registration system and the early development of the International Classification of 
Diseases.  Massachusetts' early struggles with compliance and implementation issues 
in their new registration system illustrate this singular process, or lack thereof, quite 
well.  In order to get to that point I need to clear a theoretical space on which to build 
my case.  I begin at the most fundamental analytical level building the groundwork for 
constitutive and regulative normativity and then gradually move toward the 
institutional level where the practices of cause-of-death reporting in nineteenth-
century Massachusetts developed over this entire period. 
The Issue of public action and meaning has its counterpart in private action and 
meaning.  To better understand the analytic parameters around which public 
accountability rests, it is necessary to delve into its opposite, namely, actions that 
purport to be accountable only with the context of private meaning.  This is familiar 
territory for those engaged in philosophical discussions about the possibility of a 
private language, commonly called the private language argument.  In his work, 
Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein famously set forth the parameters for this 
thought experiment when he stated, "The individual words of this language are to 
refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private 
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sensations. So another person cannot understand the language" (Wittgenstein 1954, § 
243).  Wittgenstein's private language user was a philosophical Robinson Crusoe 
whose linguistic and conceptual resources were confined to the judgments and 
meanings of that individual alone.  The only person capable of understanding this 
private language was the individual who created it.  The question Wittgenstein wanted 
to explore was, is such a private language possible?  He argued that such a private 
language was, in fact, not possible because there was no way of independently 
checking whether the private language user was using the language correctly.  Given 
the parameters, the only person able to make that determination was the private 
language user.  Wittgenstein's argument rested on the idea that If meaning in any 
language is determined through its use, as he argued in the Philosophical 
Investigations, then using a language meaningfully required some way of checking for 
its correct usage independently of any particular instance of its use.  The problem with 
the idea of a private language is that correct usage cannot be determined 
independently of the speaker or hearer.  It was not enough for the private language 
user to claim that in any particular instance she was correctly using the language 
because that was the way she had always used it.  Establishing how she could know 
this without begging the question was the crux of the problem. 
Wittgenstein elaborates this point further by focusing on the practice of rule 
following.  He demonstrated that simply obeying an instruction to follow a particular 
rule was not sufficient for properly following a rule because whatever the rule follower 
deemed correct – the proper next step – could be justified on any grounds as being in 
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accord with that rule.  A rule by itself cannot provide the necessary resources for its 
own application.  Something more is needed beyond the ostensive rule itself to 
provide for its unambiguous following, that is, knowing how to follow a rule depends 
not on the rule itself but on the shared customs and practices of a particular 
community.  On this view, a standard is only a standard against a backdrop of 
agreement and practice, not against another standard.  For Wittgenstein the key to 
understanding the pragmatic significance of rule following was key to disentangling 
how language and action can be meaningful.  Language finds its meaning in the shared 
social practices of a community of language users.  Those same practices are 
meaningful because of the ways in which community members use language in 
defining those practices. 
At first glance, it appears we are being lead into a tautology, or at least into a 
never ending series of justifications.  If on the basis of collective practices we find 
individual actions meaningful because we can collectively recognize them as such, then 
on what basis does such collective recognition find its roots?  It would seem we have 
fallen into the same dilemma that plagued Wittgenstein's private language user.  The 
dilemma has the flavor of a child asking a parent a set of never-ending 'why' questions.  
The child understands all too well that using the word 'why' elicits a response that can 
be met with another use of the word 'why,'  which in turn requires further justification 
and so on until the parent finally says something to the effect, "because that's just the 
way things are."  Despite this seemingly unsatisfying response, the parent has provided 
a perfectly sound answer.  As Wittgenstein points out, justifications must come to an 
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end because that is what justifications do. (Wittgenstein 1954, § 485; 1969, § 204).  
The principle at work here is more intuitive than deliberate.  Competency to use 
language or follow a rule is a demonstrated capacity to follow requisite customs and 
practices.  We become part of a community when we have demonstrated our capacity 
to competently follow community practices.  Fluency in a native language is marked by 
one's ability to freely use it without effort in the company of other native language 
users.  Professional baseball players intuitively exhibit their command of the rules and 
objectives of the game by seamlessly performing within those boundaries.  
Wittgenstein captures this issue of competency when he speaks about the distinction 
between grasping a rule versus interpreting a rule (Wittgenstein 1954, § 201): 
 
It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact 
that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after 
another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we 
thought of yet another one standing behind it. What this shews is that 
there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but 
which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against 
it" in actual cases. 
 
 
The way out of the above dilemma is not to fall into it in the first place.  So how does 
one fall into the dilemma?  According to Wittgenstein, we misunderstand the salience 
of practices qua practices when we force them out of the pragmatic contexts in which 
they have meaning.  In other words, rule following is not simply the application of a set 
of instructions, which presumably stand outside their particular application.  On the 
contrary, their particular application is what constitutes following a rule.  By analogy, 
we can think of it in terms of riding a bicycle.  To successfully ride a bicycle requires a 
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certain level of demonstrated competency that fits within the practice of bicycle riding.  
There are constitutive features to actions, like bicycle riding, that shape their meaning 
and practice.  When those constitutive features are removed, like attempting to ride a 
bicycle while lying on your back, the action loses its meaning as identified and can no 
longer be deemed a practice as such.  Actions are meaningful because we can identify 
them within a repertoire of shared practices – their pragmatic contexts – that meet 
certain expectations of what meaningful actions ought to look like.   
Without going into greater detail,2 the analytical principles underlying 
Wittgenstein's private language argument are identical to those insights suggesting 
that meaningful social action, whether conducted privately or publicly, is always 
publicly accountable action.  Like the private language user, meaningful private actions 
are not possible.  To engage in meaningful behavior is something that can only be 
understood and practiced within a normative framework that is applicable only from a 
publically accountable perspective.  Given that social action is dictated within the 
broader realm of public accountability, social theorists have looked to norm-governed 
actions as a direct resource for solving the problem of social order (Habermas 1998, 
215-55; Heath 2001).  Public sanctions, rules and regulations, shared cultural 
expectations, traditions, values, beliefs, and so on have all served the task of 
explaining the orderliness of social interaction in one form or another.  Talcott 
Parsons's confrontation with the Hobbesian problem of order represents the clearest 
expression of this type of normative solution.  Social actors are integrated into a social 
                                                 
2.  For further discussion of the private language argument, see Wittgenstein 1953;  
Kripke 1982;  Hacker 1990;  Baker 1998. 
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system through internalizing culturally-specific norms and values that serve to 
internally regulate behavior in a constitutive fashion, that is, behavioral expectations 
provide a compositional basis for stable and mutually beneficial interactions.  For 
Parsons and others who sought to explain social order as a function of shared beliefs 
and values, the role of public accountability was a substantive one.  That is, specific 
accountability orientations (values, beliefs, traditions, etc.) served an integrative 
function that constituted a shared set of interactive practices and expectations.   
A significant shortcoming with this approach, however, was in its utilization of 
public accountability orientations as a direct resource in addressing the problem of 
social order (Heath 2001, 18ff.).  The plurality of such orientations presents an 
inherent instability due in part to the differentiated interests and values from which 
they derive; the very thing that is supposed to provide social stability (integration) is 
also the very thing that engenders social conflict.  As such relying on cultural values as 
a resource for explaining social stability, at least within modern social contexts, 
requires their radical simplification and reduction in order to retain any explanatory 
power, but in doing so explanatory power is significantly reduced.  Specific types of 
accountability orientations, therefore, become weak candidates for explaining large-
scale social stability.  Of course, what is problematic for some is paradigmatic for 
others.  Ethnographic research, for instance, approaches social interaction on a smaller 
scale, emphasizing the unique characteristics of particular social groups without 
directly appealing to broader social processes.  The complexities and disjunctions of 
modern cultural orientations are what provide their richness and appeal.  Those same 
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complexities and disjunctions are also what severely restrict their validity beyond their 
local contexts.  Nevertheless, despite the complexities that give voice to local 
configurations, the extension of social order beyond the local persists. 
One way of dealing with such variegated contexts and constraints without 
losing the accountability conditions that allow for meaning and justification is to 
examine the pragmatic conditions that give rise to public accountability.  In Truth and 
Justification, Jürgen Habermas (2003, 220) sets up the problem in the following way: 
  
The role of the first-person plural can be taken on only by concrete 
communities who carry on existing discourses of justification and 
initiate new ones.  Only in these forums is it possible to see which 
arguments are able to withstand criticism in the long run.  This raises 
the question, however, of whether transcendental consciousness, 
having evolved into so many historical forms, splinters into just as many 
fragments of reason or whether the cultural manifold of its public 
employment manifests the same communicative reason. 
 
 
Simply put, given the plurality of cultural norms and the communities in which they 
reside, does it make sense to speak about normativity, justification, and reason 
beyond their local expressions?  Can we speak about justificatory practices in a way 
that transcends the local without ignoring the local?  Habermas answers the dilemma 
by appealing to, "the pragmatic constraint of taking the perspective of the other" 
(ibid., 221).3  The analytical context here is local insofar as justification is always 
worked out within particular communities and normative frameworks, but the act of 
taking on the other-centered perspective is not confined to the local.  It is necessary 
                                                 
3.  Habermas is using Mead's notion of the 'generalized other' to elaborate the 
communicative dependency that exists between speakers and hearers.  See Mead 
1967[1934]. 
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for any justificatory practice regardless of the normative framework in play.  As Mead 
(1967[1934]) has taught us, we take on the perspective of the other in configuring our 
actions, expectations, and self-understandings and anticipate the same sort of 
configuring from those with whom we interact – the classical problem of double 
contingency.  The pragmatic constraint, in slightly different terms, is the ever-present 
expectation that our interactions with one another are met with mutual consideration; 
regardless of the cultural barriers that may be present, we nevertheless presuppose 
that those with whom we are interacting have taken a similar other-centered 
perspective.  The crux of the pragmatic constraint lies, therefore, with a presumption 
of symmetry between actors and the resulting reciprocity that constitutes the 
interactive event.  It decenters the 'I' perspective (ego) as a necessary condition for 
mutual understanding (Habermas 2003, 234-35).  We engage one another in a series of 
performative commitments without which meaningful interaction would be 
impossible.  
So what are the performative commitments that make actions meaningful?  
Specifically, what sort of pragmatic presuppositions must we commit to in order for 
our actions to have any meaning whatsoever?  One way to answer the question is to 
think of it counterfactually.  In the course of our everyday activities, we assume that 
the world around us is unproblematic.  We go to work, eat our meals, walk the dog, 
pay our bills, among countless other routines without worrying about the ways in 
which these activities can be frustrated (Bernstein 2010, 181-85; Habermas 1998, 217-
55).  There are very good practical/functional reasons why this is the case.  Simply 
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getting through the day would be impossible without uncritically acting upon taken-
for-granted assumptions.  Habermas (2003, 253) refers to these taken-for-granted 
assumptions as "performative certainties."  If our routine activities do become 
frustrated, as they often do, we don't abandon our assumptions of certainty.  Rather, 
we actively look for solutions that will restore, or repair, our performative certainties 
in those particular cases, which may or may not be the same certainties we assumed 
before we sought a solution.  We nevertheless actively seek out a stable base from 
which to conduct our daily-to-day activities.  The point here is that in performing our 
everyday activities we do not take a hypothetical point of view.  The world around us 
and our interactions with that world are assumed to be unproblematic until events 
dictate otherwise.  We presuppose that an objective world exists not simply for us but 
for other people as well, that we share this objective world with others, and that our 
interactions with those around us are dependent upon a level of agreement that 
allows for mutual understanding within both an objective and subjective world.  The 
pragmatic perspective takes this practical stance as the point from which it begins and 
to which it ends. 
What then does this tell us about the role that public accountability plays in the 
pragmatic imperatives of everyday life?  From an ordinary language perspective as put 
forth by Wittgenstein, public accountability is an imminent feature of how we use 
language in our communicative, justificatory, and intersubjective practices.  It is not a 
take it or leave it option that may or may not be present in meaningful action.  Rather, 
it is foundational for the constitutive and regulative norms that govern institutional 
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practices because it serves the pre-theoretic suppositions of everyday life.  The taken-
for-granted background knowledge and competencies that get us through our daily 
routines are predicated on a broader set of accountability conditions that transcend 
those routines.  If asked why we acted in a certain manner, the question assumes that 
we can give reasons for our behavior on the assumption that others will understand 
those reasons.  Even if others disagree with our reasons or find them odd or 
unreasonable, they are nevertheless identifiable in a public sense.  Reasons are 
considered reasons because they derive their justifiability independent of the person 
giving them, which applies equally to actions that contravene given social norms 
however radically distinct they may be.  In syllogistic form: 
 
1. Actions are meaningful because they can be justified. 
 
2. To justify an action is to give reasons for that action. 
 
3. Giving reasons for an action presupposes public accountability. 
 
4. Public accountability entails the presence of norm-governed practices that provide 
specific accountability frameworks. 
 
5. Consequently, all meaningful actions are performed within specific accountability 
frameworks that facilitate the normative conditions for justifying particular actions.   
 
Again, it should be noted that this approach brackets the possible meanings that can 
be associated with particular actions.  Winking at an individual across the room, for 
instance, can be interpreted in any number of ways.  That a particular meaning is 
associated with a specific action is dependent on the historical, cultural, and 
situational contexts in which they were received.  Yet the conditions that allow us to 
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associate actions with meaning are what provide the lattice work upon which possible 
meanings are constructed.4  As such, reconstructing publicly accountable actions is 
nothing more than examining the conditions of possibility that must exist in order for 
actions to be meaningful (Heath 2001, 283ff.).   
The analytical task here is to begin unpacking the accountability conditions of 
Massachusetts's cause-of-death registration system as they evolved in an effort to 
understand the rather dramatic institutional changes that took place in the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century.  As we will see, these accountability conditions reveal the 
normative configurations that were necessary in the institutional development of vital 
registration in Massachusetts.  Standard accounts for the institutional rise of public 
health and medicine in the nineteenth century often center on specific social, political, 
and historical developments such as educational and regulatory reforms, advances in 
our scientific understanding, broad public health appeals and surveillance, the 
powerful political and economic influence of professional organizations, and the many 
sectarian struggles in both public health and medicine that helped forge the triumphs 
of modern health regimes (see e.g., Kett 1968; Foucault 1973; Starr 1982; Rothstein 
1985[1972]; Cassedy  1986; Haber 1991; King 1991; Porter 1997; Bonner 2000; Weisz 
2006).  The common thread in all of these accounts is their appeal to social, political, 
and cultural variants as direct resources in explaining the institutional parameters 
                                                 
4.  This point is often misunderstood.  Examining the conditions necessary for 
meaningful action does not offer any commitments on the meaning or validity of any 
particular act or set of actions.  What is deemed meaningful is, as Wittgenstein argues, 
a matter entirely contingent upon the agreement and practices of a community of 
language users.  Community agreement and practice are, nevertheless, necessary for 
meaning and validity to take place. 
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under which public health and medicine emerged.  I approach the institutional 
question at a more fundamental level by focusing on what provides for the conditions 
of possibility that would allow such social, political, and cultural resources to take root.   
 
Rules, Structures, and the Felicity of Social Action 
Rules provide structure by demarcating limits and boundaries.  Social 
structures are often portrayed in this sense as rules writ large, the rails on which 
actions are directed and redirected.  Whether considered at the micro or macro levels, 
structures represent enduring patterns of behavior that remain stable insofar as those 
behavioral patterns are reproduced.  This definition does a poor job, however, of 
getting us where we want to go in understanding social structure.  The question we 
want answered is why some behavioral patterns emerge and endure over time and 
others do not.  What provides the glue that turns behaviors into patterned behavior 
and allows those patterns to stick?    
We are now in a position to extend the above principles more directly in the 
direction of institutional contexts and the actions that define those contexts.  As I have 
argued, all social actions are publically accountable actions and thereby normative.  
The conventional way of speaking about normativity is through regulative concepts, 
those explicit and implicit rules, customs, beliefs, values, expectations and so on that 
instruct, guide, persuade and force behavior.  Often overlooked in discussions of 
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normativity are the constitutive features that meaningful actions require.5  As we have 
seen, explicit instructions to follow a rule, a cultural norm, etc., are not enough to 
satisfy all the normative conditions needed for actions to be felicitous.  Again, we can 
look at this from a counterfactual perspective. What sort of counterfactual conditions 
can we imagine that would reduce otherwise felicitous acts into their infelicitous 
counterparts?  For example, If while mowing your lawn a police officer pulls you over 
on your riding lawnmower and cites you for not properly signaling your right-hand 
turns, you would consider such an act to be more than just a little odd; it would be an 
infelicitous act.  Likewise, If your therapist attempted to hand you a speeding ticket at 
the end of your session because you admitted that you were driving over the speed 
limit, you would likely look for a new therapist.  In the first example, the police officer's 
act of handing out a citation for speeding is not in-and-of-itself infelicitous; this is what 
police officers do.  What made the act infelicitous was the context in which that act 
took place.  There are no regulations that require people who mow their lawns to 
signal their turns.  In the second example, the infelicity was less of a  regulatory issue 
and more constitutive in nature.  The role of a therapist is not to enforce traffic laws 
but to provide therapy.  In this case, expectations of what it means to be a therapist 
were violated.  Actions that make sense do so in terms of context, constituency, and 
competency.  They fit within certain normative expectations as defined through their 
contextual settings, the persons who make up the interactive exchange, and the know-
how that is demonstrated. 
                                                 
5.  In Speech Acts An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, John Searle provides one of 
the clearest critiques of the distinction between constitutive and regulative rules. 
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Constitutive and Regulative Normativity 
In subsequent chapters, I show how context, constituency, and competency 
played a central role in Massachusetts' emergent death registration system.  The 
system's normative expectations, however, split along constitutive and regulative 
lines, which prevented the full implementation of death registration in Massachusetts 
for nearly forty years after the system first came into effect.  As I point out, the 
constitutive and regulative features of death registration did not match up with its 
institutional mandate – the complete and accurate recording of causes of death.  I 
have discussed constitutive and regulative normativity in previous sections but only 
briefly.  The concepts themselves are rather simple to understand.  Fitting them within 
a theoretical framework and empirical setting is not a simple task.  In this last section, I 
flesh out these two concepts more systematically, drawing on the pragmatic 
imperatives that situate their theoretical import. 
 Constitutive and regulative normativity are analytic distinctions that describe 
two distinct properties of social practices.  Constitutive normativity refers to practices 
that are necessary in bringing about certain kinds of defining actions or outcomes.  For 
example, the act of making a promise requires sincerity on the part of the promise 
maker to follow through with certain stipulated actions.  To make an insincere promise 
is by definition not a promise because it violates the constitutive norms of what it 
means to make a promise.  Regulative normativity refers to rules or directives that 
regulate pre-existing practices or actions, thus, requiring pre-existing actions or 
practices in order to do its regulative work (Searle 1997[1969], 33ff.).  Engaging in a 
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practice means that one is acting in a specified manner, under specified expectations, 
which is to say that any norm-governed behavior can be construed as a practice.  
Constitutive and regulative normativity are conceptual tools that provide a way of 
unpacking norm-governed behaviors into distinct analytic objects.  This distinction is 
artificial insofar as normative actions are never bifurcated as such in everyday 
interactions.  We experience and perform them as cohesive units, that is, they come as 
a package.  Why then would we need to make this distinction?  Not all intended 
practices are successfully implemented.  To better understand why some practices 
become institutionalized and other do not, it is useful to examine the relationship 
between what defines a set of practices as normative – their constitutive features – 
and what governs those practices – their regulative features.   Social norms of course 
are not isolated phenomena but are situated in historical, cultural, political, economic 
and various other social contexts.  They are defined in terms of the roles they play 
within these contexts, what I refer to as constituency.  And finally, social norms are 
procedural in that there are correct and incorrect ways of carrying them out, what I 
refer to as competency.  
The challenge here is in elucidating constitutive and regulative normativity 
within the broader outlines of an institutional framework.  The task is made a bit easier 
if we remember that institutions are defined through their practices.  The diagnostic 
moment, as we saw in Chapter 1, defines the physician's role as a medical practitioner.  
Taking diagnostic practices as our point of departure, we see a picture that represents 
both stable and dynamic features.  One the one hand, the dyadic relationship between 
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physician and patient in nineteenth-century medicine is not that much different than it 
is today.  The examination still takes place between physician and patient, the 
physician attempts to get a sense of patient health by asking questions that target 
symptoms, and the diagnosis remains the central event of the visit.  We could extend 
the timeframe back even further and the results would be similar.  One the other 
hand, the level of detail or the degree to which one digs deeper can and will change 
the picture.  Today, examinations rarely take place in the home as they did in the 
nineteenth century, assessing patient health is no longer confined to a battery of 
questions that rely entirely on symptomatic information, and while the diagnosis is still 
the central event it is far more complex and differentiated today than it was in the 
nineteenth century.  Many of the constitutive features of diagnostic practice have 
changed quite dramatically over the past two-hundred years.  The context has shifted 
from the privacy of the patient's home to an examination room in a clinic or hospital.  
Constituency is no longer confined simply between doctor and patient.  The personnel 
who are tied to the diagnostic process has dramatically increased.  Everyone from 
nurse practitioners to laboratory technicians to insurance representatives have a hand 
in the diagnostic process on some level.   
The procedural constraints (competency) are perhaps the most dramatic of all 
the constitutive changes that have taken place since the nineteenth century.  To 
adequately capture this aspect we must speak in terms of competencies rather than 
competency.  Specialization and the emergence of new technologies has been not 
abated since their beginnings in the nineteenth century (Weisz 2006).  The diffusion of 
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medical expertise allowing physicians to competently diagnose patient health is quite 
staggering when compared to the nineteenth-century.  The constitutive features that 
defined diagnostic practice throughout most of the nineteenth century were largely 
confined to the physician.  Even with the rise of new medical technologies, hospitals, 
medical specialization, etc., during the latter half of the nineteenth century, most 
physicians were still by and large self-contained in their diagnostic practices.  Toward 
the end of the century that began to change more rapidly (ibid.).  Today, those 
features are spread across a wide array of medical technologies, clinical and scientific 
practices, reporting technologies, public health agencies (e.g., Centers for Disease 
Control), etc.   
The regulative features that governed diagnostic practices in the nineteenth 
century did not take shape until the end of the century with the introduction of the 
International Classification of Diseases in 1901.  Regulatory statutes governing medical 
practices in Massachusetts were very limited during this period.  The Massachusetts 
Medical Society provided the only potential avenue for regulating their own members, 
but like most medical societies in the United States during this period the only 
sanctions that the Massachusetts Medical Society had at their disposal was expulsion 
from the Society.  The American Medical Association adopted a code of ethics in 1847, 
which was  based largely on Thomas Percival's code published in 1803.  State medical 
societies were quick to follow suit and issue their own codes of conduct, but these 
efforts were for the most part negligible as physicians failed to see the need.  Their 
professional status rested on their reputations and their own informal practice of 
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ethical conduct.  Many of the formal codes of conduct circulating during this period 
focused more on etiquette than anything else, which only added to physicians 
skepticism and reluctance to recognize them  (Rothstein 1985[1972], 80ff.).   
The regulative norms that governed medical practice during this period closely 
followed the constitutive norms.  There were few institutional systems in place to 
regulate physician conduct.  As a community, physicians were still by and large a very 
independent class of professionals, which was reflected in the constitutive and 
regulative norms that guided their everyday practices.  Medicine in Massachusetts was 
still very much practiced as a private profession.  State intervention into this domain 
was treaded lightly.  As we will see in the following chapter, it was not until 1878 that 
physicians finally found themselves under state regulation.  As a community of medical 
practitioners, physicians were not regulated until the 1890s.  The 1878 regulation was 
not a medical statute regulating medical practice.  It was a statute regulating cause-of-
death registration.  The distinction will be important in understanding the regulative 
role that the 1878 legislation played in turning cause-of-death registration into a viable 
set of public health practices.  The net effect of this legislation was the emergence of a 
new community of practitioners whose practices provided the necessary conditions for 
constitutive and regulative normativity to come together at the institutional level.   
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CHAPTER 3 
CLASSIFICATION AND THE CHANGING GRAMMARS OF DEATH 
 
The general shift from acute infectious to chronic degenerative diseases during 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries marked the beginning of what Abdel 
Omran described in 1971 as the  "epidemiological transition."  Subsequent declines in 
mortality over this same period ushered in an era of rising life expectancies that 
continue to define health trends today.  The developments that gave rise to this 
transitional period are often obscured by the lack of common historical criteria during 
this period for diagnosing disease and identifying causes of death.  Our understanding 
of the American epidemiological transition lacks precision and scope due in large part 
to the equivocal nature of the available data.  With an ever shifting etiological 
landscape and lack of uniform standards for recording nineteenth-century causes of 
death, persistent doubts remain vis-à-vis our ability to provide more comprehensive 
conclusions about the mortality transition over this period (Woods 1991; Alter and 
Carmichael 1996, 1999; Risse 1997; Arrizabalaga 1999; and Haines 2003).   
Thomas McKeown’s (1976) nutritional/standard-of-living explanation for 
declining mortality in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries provided an earlier 
generation of historians a compelling basis for rejecting explanations that posited 
medical and public health interventions exclusively.  McKeown’s thesis, nevertheless, 
has come under considerable doubt due to a number of critical reexaminations, not 
the least of which were further historical and demographic studies since the mid-
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seventies that employed more nuanced approaches to existing and new data sources.  
Simon Szreter (1988), for instance, offers an alternative to McKeown’s argument, one 
that places the role of public health in a more substantial explanatory position and 
criticizes McKeown’s method of parsing out nineteenth-century disease categories.  
What Szreter and others have shown is that the ways in which diseases and causes of 
death are identified, grouped, disaggregated, and interpreted plays a significant role in 
isolating the mitigating factors that emerge when telling the story of what is arguably 
the most important development in the history of human health.   
I do not attempt to resolve the ongoing disputes surrounding this debate.  
Rather, I suggest that by examining more closely the everyday conditions that 
reporting personnel faced on the ground, we may be able to disentangle some of the 
broader issues of data reliability and the historical validity of cause-specific mortality 
trends.  By focusing attention on the pragmatic underpinnings that accompanied 
Massachusetts's cause-of-death reporting, we can better understand the institution-
building process.  I do this by first concentrating on reporting issues at the State level, 
analyzing some of the perennial difficulties State officials faced in implementing the 
registration system through the first-half of this period.  I then extend this analysis in 
the next chapter by taking a more localized view of the changing structure of cause-of-
death reporting in Northampton and Holyoke given the broader challenges and 
developments discussed here.  I argue that Massachusetts's new and evolving system 
for reporting deaths had an important impact on the changing death narratives 
through the turn of the century.  This chapter begins by examining the registration 
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history of Massachusetts from the colonial period through the end of the nineteenth 
century.  Much of the data comes from Massachusetts's annual vital registration 
reports (from 1843 through 1912) and Massachusetts's annual State Board of Health 
reports (from 1850 through 1900).   
 
Massachusetts Death Registration 
During the early part of this period, health officials were just beginning to use 
cause-of-death statistics to systematically monitor and report on disease trends and 
epidemic outbreaks.  Acquiring a uniform set of aggregate measures for causes of 
death was not feasible in the early part of the nineteenth century due to the absence 
of civil registration systems in much of Europe and the United States.6 Even after 
establishing Britain’s General Register Office (GRO) in 1837 and Massachusetts’s state 
registration system in 1842 (the first in the U.S.), maintaining a reliable system of 
registration remained an ongoing struggle for registration and public health officials 
throughout much of this period.   
Death registration in North America began with the early settlement of 
Massachusetts.  The practice of recording deaths in Europe began in the sixteenth 
century, when Thomas Cromwell introduced the Parish Registers in 1538 and the 
Council of Trent made the registration of births and marriages a part of ecclesiastical 
law in 1563 (Edge 1928, 355).  It was in the early seventeenth century, however, that 
                                                 
6.  Sweden is an exception, which implemented a registration system in 1749. For a 
thorough overview of Sweden’s registration system, see John Rogers, “Reporting 
Cause of Death in Sweden, 1750-1950.” Journal of the History of Medicine. 
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marked the first time in either Europe or North America that an official governing body 
enacted a law requiring town officials to register deaths as a function of secular rather 
than ecclesiastical authority.  On September 9, 1639 the General Court of the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony ruled that the registration of births, deaths and marriages 
were a matter of public record to be administered through local town officials 
(Gutman, 60-61). 
 
Whereas many judgments have been given in our Courts, whereof no 
records are kept of the evidence and reasons whereupon the verdict 
and judgment did pass,...  it is therefore by this Court ordered and 
decreed that hence forward every judgment, with all the evidence, be 
recorded in a book, to be kept to posterity...  that there be records kept 
of all wills, administrations, and inventories, as also of every marriage, 
birth, and death of every person within this jurisdiction. 
 
 
Prior to this statute, the responsibility of recording marriages, births, and deaths was a 
function of ecclesiastical authority.  This new delegation of authority and responsibility 
was unique in its administrative scope and intent. Secular authority in England and 
elsewhere did not officially assume this responsibility in any sustained sense until the 
early 19th century.7  This difference between colonial America and England was 
significant in terms of the public and civil character that the early colonists accorded to 
vital events.  Deaths, Births, and Marriages were not simply matters of ecclesiastical 
record as in England and elsewhere but also matters of civil record between 
individuals and governing authorities.  The role that civil registration played became an 
                                                 
7.  During the mid to late seventeenth century, England implemented a non-
ecclesiastical system of registration as a substitute for the Parish Registers but 
returned to the old system by the eighteenth century. See Edge 1928, 354ff. 
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important first step in establishing the systematic recording of vital events for 
statistical purposes.  Nevertheless, such statistical objectives did not surface for 
another two hundred years.  For the colonists, vital registration was a matter of legal 
record alone, designed primarily for "the just administration of law and the protection 
of individuals rights" (Hetzel 1997 ,45).  As Kuczynski (1900) notes, "Massachusetts was 
the first state in the world which recorded the dates of the actual facts of births, 
deaths, and marriages rather than the subsequent ecclesiastical ceremonies of 
baptisms, burials, and weddings; and Massachusetts was the first state in the world 
which imposed on the citizen the duty of giving notice to the government of all births, 
beaths [sic], and marriages occurring in his family" (Kuczynski 1900, 9 [73]). 
For over two centuries, this system of vital registration remained relatively 
unchanged in terms of its legal function.  Those changes that were enacted throughout 
this period concerned minor provisions to compensate town clerks for their recording 
duties, penalties for failing to provide such information on the part of informants, and 
expanding the responsibility for reporting births and deaths to include family 
members.  Massachusetts’ early registration system throughout the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries functioned as a proto-census.  The impulse for gathering vital 
statistics, however, waned considerably during the 18th century with very little change 
in the existing laws.  Massachusetts’ registration laws were intended less with the 
public’s health in mind than for cases of probate (Gutman 1956).  It wasn’t until the 
1840s when Lemuel Shattuck took it upon himself to reform the ways in which vital 
statistics were gathered and applied, that death registration became more than just a 
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legal matter of public record but one that specifically focused on the public’s health 
(Swedlund 2010 61ff.).   
Massachusetts was unique for being the first state to provide vital registration 
in 1842 and led the way in public health and sanitation reform in the United States 
throughout this period (Beemer et al, 2005).  Without the use of statistical data, the 
substantive basis for public health reports would not have been possible.  These and 
other measures provided the necessary information to combat growing epidemics and 
create public health initiatives in a more systematic way.  Here, the role of medical 
science in conjunction with state authority opened the door for increased regulatory 
initiatives.  This is but one layer in a multi-layered social, political, and historical 
context, which highlights the need for a more complex approach in understanding the 
changing conceptual landscape of nineteenth-century disease.  Isolating the 
complexities that lay beneath these layers requires an account that extends beyond 
the shifting advances of nineteenth-century medicine.  As Alter and Carmichael (1996) 
note, "[t]he history of cause of death registration cannot be viewed as simply a part of 
the development of medicine; rather it reflects a much more complex interaction 
between the state, the medical community, and the public." 
The Registration Act of March 3, 1842 established the requirements and 
guidelines for implementing a modern system of vital statistic in Massachusetts.  Prior 
to the 1842 Registration Act, the Massachusetts State Legislature in 1835 adopted and 
confirmed without revision an earlier 1796 registration law, which included the 
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following provisions (Massachusetts: The Laws…Passed from the Year 1780 to the End 
of the Year 1800, p. 725; quoted in Gutman 1959, 22 - [page 73 Milbank]): 
 
It shall be the duty of parents to give notice to the clerk of the town or 
district in which they dwell, of all the births and deaths of their children; 
and it shall be the duty of every householder to give notice of every 
birth and death which may happen in his house; and of the eldest 
person next of kin to give such notice of the death of his kindred; and it 
shall be the duty of the master or keeper of any almshouse, workhouse, 
or prison, and of the master or commander of any ship or vessel to give 
notice of every birth or death which may happen in the house or vessel 
under his care or charge, to the clerk of the town or district in which 
such event shall happen. 
 
 
The responsibility for reporting deaths once again expanded in scope but became 
more specific in detail.  More significantly, however, was the added provision that 
each town rather than parents or kin would be required to pay the registration fee 
(Gutman 1959, 23).  The shift from a private to a more public focus began to take 
shape.  Rather than focusing exclusively on issues of probate, vital registration was 
moving away from the domain of private, legal interests and toward the realm of 
public goods.  Four decades later, the registration system of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts effected a more permanent shift toward the public good with the 
Registration Act of 1842. 
The practical significance of the 1842 Act, according to Gutman (1956), was 
negligible as its provisions were already addressed in the 1796 legislation.  
Nevertheless, it established the consolidation of registration requirements into a single 
centralized system, stating that clerks of "several towns and cities in the 
Commonwealth" were required to submit annual reports (in the month of May) of 
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births, marriages, and deaths to the Secretary of the Commonwealth, under a penalty 
of $10.00 for noncompliance.  This systematic centralization of information is what 
Gutman identifies as the beginning of a modern vital statistical regime.  The 1842 Act 
also added the requirement that the Secretary of the Commonwealth "furnish blank 
forms of return" (blanks), with "suitable instructions and explanations; to receive said 
returns; to prepare therefrom such tabular results as will render them of practical 
utility; and make report thereof annually to the Legislature" (Annual Report of Registry 
and Returns of Births, Marriages, and Deaths 1843, 1).  The 1842 Act stipulated that 
the Secretary of the Commonwealth send a blank (see figure 1) and a letter of 
instruction (see figure 2) to every town and city clerk in Massachusetts.8   
 
 
Figure 1.  Massachusetts’ registration blank, 1842. 
 
                                                 
8.  The surviving death records do not include these blanks for Northampton and 
Holyoke. 
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Figure 2.  Letter of instructions for Massachusetts’ registration blank, 1842. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Alternative registration blank suggested by Secretary  John A.  Bolles, 1842. 
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These blanks were changed several times over the years for clarification and in 
response to pressures from the Secretary himself for a more uniform method of 
registration.  For example, Secretary  John A.  Bolles, in the first annual report, 
appealed to the Legislature to adopt a more rigorous system of collecting vital 
statistics similar to that of the "French Code of Registration" (ibid., 37).  Bolles 
suggested an alternative blank providing more detailed information (see figure 3) 
compared to the official form see figure 1).  These appeals continued throughout the 
years and were marked with relative success in making changes to the official 
registration forms.  The 1842 law was repeatedly amended over the years, eventually 
leading to the realization of modern death registration in Massachusetts by 1878.  The 
first amendment of this law in 1844 added sextons or other persons having charge of 
burial grounds or burials to those required to make returns of facts connected with a 
death to the town clerk.  In 1849, the law was revised to include a proviso requiring 
towns with a population of 10,000 or more to appoint a "registrar," whose exclusive 
duty was to supervise registrations.  The shift in responsibility from town clerks to 
registrars as towns grew in size was a less radical change than one might have 
supposed.  Several of the legislative revisions over this period were primarily efforts to 
equalize the compensation and incentives provided to different authorities for 
recording deaths and to maintain equivalent quality in smaller towns and rural areas.  
Both types of reporting authorities were required to report the same information to 
the Commonwealth for review.  In fact, differences in the number and quality of 
undertakers and physicians in different communities were often cited as reasons for 
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differences between submitted reports from clerks and registrars.  Gutman notes that 
many of the revisions between 1842 and 1855 followed changing practices rather than 
vice versa and were due in large part to pressure from town clerks and registrars. 
In 1860 the law was revised again, requiring undertakers to certify all burials 
and give notice to the city clerk.  This amendment also required all physicians to record 
and provide a cause of death certificate but only "if a request was made of him within 
fifteen days after the death occurred" (Eighteenth Report… Related to the Registry and 
Returns of Births, Marriages, and Deaths.  cited in Gutman, 170).  Following the Civil 
War in 1866, a fiscal revision raised the compensation for clerks in smaller towns, who 
often had to collect death information personally rather than simply record what was 
reported by physicians and undertakers.  Within a decade after this legislation, 
however, both Northampton and Holyoke reached a size where a registrar was 
required.  In 1872 town boards of health were empowered to license undertakers and 
limit private burials.  In 1873, a revision again raised fees paid to town clerks for 
recording of deaths.   
It wasn’t until 1878 that death certification moved toward full compliance 
when legislation provided that no body could be buried until the town clerk issued a 
burial certificate indicating the clerk had received all details of the death including a 
record of the cause of death prepared by a physician.  The full language of Public 
Statute 32, section 3, as reported in the 1899 Massachusetts State Board of Health 
Manuals of Statutes Relating to the Public Health reads as follows: 
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A physician who has attended a person during his last illness shall, when 
requested, forthwith furnish for registration, a certificate stating, to the 
best of his knowledge and belief, the name of the deceased, his age, the 
disease of which he died, the duration of his last sickness, and the date 
of his decease; and a physician who has attended at a birth of a child 
dying immediately thereafter, or at the birth of a stillborn child, shall, 
when requested, forthwith furnish for registration a certificate, stating 
to the best of his knowledge and belief the fact that such a child died 
after birth or was born dead.  If a physician neglects or refuses to make 
a certificate as aforesaid, or makes a false statement therein, he shall be 
punished by a fine not exceeding fifty dollars. 
 
The onus nevertheless remained with town clerks and registrars to ensure that 
requests were made of physicians to certify all deaths.  The new law differed from the 
1860 statute in that issuing a permit for legal burial required a physician-certified 
death certificate stating the cause of death, including demographic information and 
length of morbidity, if any.  The latter, interestingly enough, was not included on the 
registration schedules that city and town clerks prepared.  
The last significant change in the registration laws took place in 1889 requiring 
physicians to list a primary and secondary cause of death but only required for Civil 
War veterans.  "A physician...  shall, in case the deceased was a soldier or a sailor who 
served in the war of the rebellion, give both the primary and the secondary or 
immediate cause of death as nearly as he can state the same.  If a physician refuses or 
neglects to make such a certificate he shall forfeit to the treasurer the sum of ten 
dollars for the use of the town in which he resides" (Acts of 1889, 224).  The penalty 
proviso was a regular feature of almost every public statute on death registration since 
its enactment in 1842.  Such penalties applied to almost everyone along the reporting 
chain – clerks, registrars, superintendents of almshouses, undertakers, and even 
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parents.  For example, the 1796 and 1842 registration laws stated that, "Parents shall 
give notice to the clerk of their city or town of the births and deaths of their children...  
Whoever neglects to give such notice for the space of six months after birth or death 
shall forfeit a sum not exceeding five dollars" (Public Statute 32, section 2.) The full 
statute, however, only required giving notice to the town clerk with no requirements 
to provide cause of death. 
 
Reliability and Accuracy 
Although Gutman (1959) does not fully address the quality of Massachusetts's 
cause-of-death reporting, gradual improvement in the general quality of death 
statistics did take place over this period.  The 1860 law not only encouraged registrars 
and clerks to consult physicians as to cause of death but empowered them to obtain 
such reports from physicians if needed.  The problem in implementing this provision, 
however, stemmed largely from its voluntary nature and the reporting practices to 
which clerks had been accustomed.  "Clerks and undertakers did not use the powers 
granted them under the law of 1860, to request physicians to provide a certificate of 
the cause of death of persons to whom they had attended" (ibid.  85).  Town clerks 
and registrars had little incentive to verify the accuracy of reported causes of death 
because verifying reported causes, whatever the source, was not mandated by the 
law.  As they saw it, their primary responsibility in the reporting chain was to record 
causes-of-death details as they received them.  Undertakers were often the first link in 
the reporting chain and were notoriously unreliable in properly certifying deaths.  For 
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their part, town clerks often consolidated their efforts by gathering much of the vital 
registration information on a periodic basis, which involved canvassing their 
communities annually to record births, marriages, and deaths in one fell swoop.  
The lack of complete and accurate reporting was regularly cited in both the 
Massachusetts's annual vital registration reports and the annual State Board of Health 
reports.  Earlier registration reports from 1843 through the 1850s acknowledged the 
insufficiency of their data to allow for specific conclusions about the health of the 
State's population but that the data was, nevertheless, improving and exhibited 
sufficiency with regard to elucidating "general truths" and principles of the "general 
laws of mortality." The tone during this period was optimistic.  The reports expressed 
confidence that the information they were receiving on the ground, while lacking in 
completeness and accuracy, was nevertheless moving toward that goal.   
 
The protracted labor which has necessarily arisen from the 
heterogeneous intermingling of the whole twenty months, in every 
conceivable combination, in the returns, has prevented the elucidation 
of some interesting principles and facts, deducible from the records of 
registration, inasmuch as it would prolong the undesirable delay already 
incurred, concerning this Report. It is confidently believed, however, 
that herein will be found sufficient ground covered, and with sufficient 
faithfulness, to exhibit very reliable and highly important general truths. 
 
By the 1870s, however, the tone had changed.  Concerns surrounding the 
accuracy of death records were by no means confined to Massachusetts.  In 1876, the 
Secretary of Michigan's State Board of Health, Henry B. Baker, commented on the 
issue of accuracy as he believed it stood across the country, "No method has yet been 
found, or at least acted upon, whereby the actual death-rate can be positively 
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ascertained for the United States, or so far as I know, for any single State" 
(Massachusetts 8th Annual Report of the State Board of Health 1877, 233).  In 
response to Baker's rather dim observation, Charles F. Folsom, Secretary of 
Massachusetts's State Board of Health, was not eager to offer a vigorous defense of 
Massachusetts's vital registration system – "It has seemed desirable to ascertain how 
we stand in reference to so sweeping a criticism, and the result of the inquiry has been 
that we can only say that we are a little better than some of our neighbors" (ibid.).  
The inquiry to which Folsom referred was a survey that the Board of Health sent out to 
"medical correspondents of the Board" (physicians) and town clerks throughout the 
State.  The following questions were asked of the physicians and clerks, respectively 
(ibid.). 
 
I. Is the registration of deaths and causes of death complete and 
satisfactory in your town?  If not, please suggest any deficiencies of 
which you are aware, whether all deaths are returned to the 
undertakers, whether the undertakers themselves return them 
promptly and accurately to the clerks, whether causes of death are 
reported by the physicians in all cases, etc., etc.? 
 
II. Will you be so kind enough to inform us whether the registration of 
deaths and causes of death is complete and satisfactory in your town?  
If not, please suggest any deficiencies of which you are aware, whether 
all deaths are returned to the undertakers, whether the undertakers 
themselves return them promptly and accurately to the clerks, in what 
proportion of cases the causes of death are reported by physicians, etc., 
etc.? 
 
 
The State Board of health had regularly included correspondence from physicians and 
clerks in their annual reports in years past, but such notes from the field were typically 
unsolicited letters they had received on a wide variety of health-related issues.  The 
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difference with the 1877 report was the Board's systematic effort to solicit physicians 
and clerks from across the State on the specific issue of accuracy and completeness in 
cause-of-death registration.  The responses were overwhelmingly unflattering and 
demonstrated well the central problem with the current system – the lack of physician 
input and participation.   
Before examining the reported aggregate numbers of those who responded to 
the survey, it will be useful to look at a few examples of the actual responses that both 
physicians and clerks returned to the Board.  Not all of the returned responses were 
included in 1877 report but a sizable selection were nevertheless published.  In 
selecting the responses, the State Board of Health endeavored to highlight those that 
articulated the problems associated with the registration system but to the exclusion 
of those who thought the system was working well.  Here are just a few of the 
statements from physicians and town clerks in response to the State Board of Health 
survey.9 
 
Replies of Medical Correspondents: 
 
7.  The cause of death is invariably returned on the undertaker's 
certificate and is given by the friends of the deceased.  I am never asked 
to make out a physician's certificate. (ibid., 235). 
 
39.  Many times the physician never sees the return at all.  The 
statement of some member of the family is all the authority.  I don't 
think, during my practice, that fifty per cent. of the deaths were 
returned in a proper manner. (ibid., 237). 
                                                 
9.  See Appendix A for the entire set of responses that the Massachusetts State Board 
of Health published in their 1877 annual report.  Please note that the published 
responses were selected by the Board of Health from the total survey responses 
received and were not necessarily a representative sample. 
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57.  I am not called upon in half my cases to give the certificate.  I 
understand that undertakers get them filled by the family, and I know 
that many certificates are wholly false as to cause of death.  Almost any 
cough is reported either "consumption" or "lung fever," and so in other 
diseases. (ibid., 239). 
 
 
Replies of City and Town Clerks: 
 
8.  The custom has been to return the deaths at the end of the year, 
except when the body is carried out of town for burial; then I get a 
return near the date of death.  I seldom get the physician's certificate 
with the return; the cause of death is usually named, also the name of 
the physician; but all in the handwriting of the undertaker, and I think it 
is obtained from some member of the family of the deceased.  I think 
the disease or cause of death is in many cases guessed at, so that my 
return to the department is not accurate as to the prevailing disease. 
(ibid., 250). 
 
31.  The law is in no case complied with, either as regards the 
undertaker,  physician, or by the families themselves.  At the close of 
the year, the births and deaths of the year past are collected by going 
from house to house throughout the town, making the result very 
unsatisfactory and expensive. (ibid., 251). 
 
90.  I have been clerk of the town for six years in succession, and have 
employed a man to gather all the information in regard to births and 
deaths called for in the blanks sent to me for that purpose.  I have never 
received any information from physicians or undertakers. (ibid., 252). 
 
The above responses were just a few of the nearly one hundred and fifty responses 
included in the 1877 report (see Appendix A).  They provide a good representation of 
the general sentiment expressed by both physicians and clerks across the State.  
Overall, around twenty-five percent of physicians and twenty-nine percent of clerks 
who responded felt that registration system was adequate.  Table 1 shows how 
physicians responded to the survey questions.  On the question of accuracy in 
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registered causes of death, over sixty percent of the physicians who responded 
thought that causes of death were not competently reported.10  The completeness of 
registered deaths, that is, without regard to cause, fared only slightly better in their 
estimation.  Twenty-seven percent reported that the number of deaths recorded was 
satisfactory compared with twenty-three percent who reported that the number was 
unsatisfactory.  The majority  of responses, approximately fifty percent, were deemed  
 
Table 1.  Replies from 196 physicians regarding the adequacy of deaths and causes of 
death registered in their city or town. 
 
 Number of Deaths 
Registered 
Causes of Deaths 
Registered 
 
Row Totals 
            Satisfactory 54 44 98 
Unsatisfactory 45 118 163 
Indefinite 97 34 131 
 
 
indefinite, which meant  "...they [did] not answer that particular question, they [had] 
no suggestions, they [did] not know, or the reply [was] so worded as not to convey a 
definite statement" (ibid., 234).  Table 2 shows how clerks responded to the questions.  
On the question of cause-of-death accuracy, the ratio of satisfactory to unsatisfactory 
was similar to that reported by the physicians. Roughly, two out of every five 
physicians and two out of every four clerks thought that causes of death were 
adequately reported.  When comparing the two groups on the question of 
completeness (number of deaths registered), it is not surprising that the clerks were 
                                                 
10.  A response rate cannot be given because the report did not indicate the total 
number of surveys sent out, either to physicians or clerks. 
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more optimistic in that regard.  Accuracy in terms of recorded numbers of deaths 
would have been more reflective of their responsibilities and capabilities as town 
clerks than the actual causes themselves. 
 
Table 2.  Replies from 262 town clerks regarding the adequacy of deaths and causes of 
death registered in their city or town. 
 
 Number of Deaths 
Registered 
Causes of Deaths 
Registered 
 
Row Totals 
            Satisfactory 102 50 152 
Unsatisfactory 43 113 156 
Indefinite 117 99 216 
 
 
 From the time that the registration system was initiated in 1842, the architects 
who implemented the system envisioned physicians' participation to be more 
extensive than it was.  It soon became clear that such participation would not be 
forthcoming.  Public health officials were not naïve, however, and attempted to hedge 
their bets.  Shattuck (1850) among others wanted physician participation in the new 
registration system to be mandatory.  The legislature, however, resisted any move 
toward compulsory participation on the part of physicians and did so for over thirty 
years.  The unsuccessful attempt to maintain legislation supporting licensed physicians 
in the 1830s was still fresh in their minds.  The State's interest to not interfere with the 
free flow of economic opportunity overrode any public health interests.  
Beyond the political obstacles against mandatory physician certification of 
causes of death, there were more mundane obstacles with which to contend.  
Physicians were not always available to determine a cause of death or given adequate 
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notice that a death had occurred.  There were few legal requirements during this 
period for physicians to document patient morbidity, and patient confidentiality was a 
professional necessity.  Nevertheless, had these obstacles not stood in the way of 
accurate and reliable cause of death reporting, the lack of compensation from the 
State provided an additional disincentive for physicians to actively participate in a 
system they felt had no demonstrable benefit to their practice.  The broader public 
health initiative of gathering aggregate statistical data for analyzing state-wide health 
trends was not one that occupied the professional interests of the average physician.  
As such, most physicians were not inclined to actively provide the necessary 
information to properly certify causes of death. 
 
Analysis of Massachusetts's Death Registration System 
 The solution to the reporting problems that persisted for over thirty years 
seems obvious retrospectively.  It certainly did not escape those who were intimately 
involved with the reporting practices.  Calls requiring physicians to certify all deaths 
before a body could be interred were common, even among physicians themselves.  At 
the same time, physician's professional interests often stood in the way of legislation 
requiring cause-of-death certification.  Some of those reasons have already been 
discussed in Chapter 1.  The more pressing reason for this resistance, however, had to 
do with the question of who should be given the authority as a physician to certify a 
cause of death.  Because there were no licensing requirements in the State of 
Massachusetts at the time, the State had no direct legal involvement in legitimizing or 
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de-legitimizing a physician's professional status.  Unlike Great Britain where licensure 
laws made professional distinctions between medical practitioners, in Massachusetts 
physicians operated entirely in an open market, relying on reputation and education as 
a mark of one's medical bona fides,. There were of course two sides to that sword.   
What worried most mainstream physicians, referred to as "regulars," was the 
possibility that homeopaths, eclectics, hydropaths et al, referred to as "irregulars," 
would be granted an undue level of legitimacy by the State through a certification law.  
The Massachusetts Medical Society objected that such a law would provide a backdoor 
for recognizing irregular practitioners as legitimate physicians in the eyes of the State.  
The Massachusetts Medical Society had petitioned the legislature for decades to enact 
a medical licensure law (see chapter 2).  That, however, did not come to pass until 
1894.  Again, professional and economic interests took center stage.  In hindsight, the 
fears associated with mandatory cause-of-death certification were overplayed.  In fact, 
it could be argued that the 1878 certification law ultimately proved useful in helping 
establish the professional distinction that regular physicians had sought after much in 
the same way that physician certification in Great Britain created a two-tiered system 
of medical practitioners.    
What had not taken place during the previous three decades was the 
establishment of a set of normative practices consistent with the institutional mandate 
over which public health officials were given charge.  The process of institution-
building stagnated along the lines of implementation.  The central objective for 
implementing a state-wide system for cause-of-death registration was to gather 
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accurate data on causes of death and not simply record those deaths.  Shattuck and 
other public health reformers were keenly aware of the need for physician 
participation for the system to work as intended.  The authority behind the registration 
system, however, did not rest with the public health officials who oversaw it.  The 
State Board of Health had no direct authority to implement policy or enforce 
compliance.  They were simply an advisory board to the Secretary of the 
Commonwealth and the State legislature.  Efforts to enlist physician participation over 
the years included, among other things, regular appeals by the Board for physician 
cooperation and legislative appeals to require cause-of-death certification, neither of 
which proved to be effective.   
The problems that plagued the early registration system and their solutions 
were fairly clear.  Physician participation in cause-of-death registration was necessary 
for the system to succeed.  But why?  Could it not have been possible for a modern 
cause-of-death registration system to accomplish its goals without physician 
participation?  What unique skills or competencies do physicians bring to the table 
that others do not and are those skills necessary for implementing a modern cause-of-
death registration system?  Finding reasons supporting the necessity for physician 
participation seems fairly straight forward.  Physicians are uniquely qualified to 
diagnose diseases and determine causes of death, and they have the professional 
authority to carry out requisite diagnostic tasks.  But as we have seen, the practice of 
causes-of-death reporting was not at all unique to physicians.  If the results from the 
State Board of Health survey accurately represented reporting practices across the 
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State, physicians were not all that well represented.  This of course ignores the crucial 
reasons why cause-of-death registration in Massachusetts did not initially serve its 
mandate, namely, the need for accuracy.  This brings us to the broader theoretical 
issue of constitutive and regulative practice in institution-building and the necessary 
interaction between the two. 
In chapter 1, I briefly highlighted Paul Starr's observation about how authority 
and legitimacy operate within a professional community.  According to Starr, 
professional authority is not predicated on individual competency but on a 
professional community's validation of competency as a collective practice.  The 
legitimacy that ensue from one's professional status is not a property of the that 
professional practitioner.  Authority is not simply a matter of individually 
demonstrated competency to do the job but is dependent on the broader recognition 
of competency as a member of a professional community.  Nevertheless, as we have 
seen, collective practices must also be demonstrated and that can only be 
accomplished through individual practitioners.  The State had instituted regulative 
statutes that incrementally moved cause-of-death registration toward the 1878 law 
requiring physician certified cause-of-death reporting, but without diagnostic practices 
functioning as the constitutive basis for cause-of-death reporting, the system 
languished.  That the State enacted legislation requiring physicians to certify causes of 
death did not diminish the constitutive nature of their participation.  On the contrary, 
it was a necessary step in solidifying cause-of-death reporting as a practice under 
constitutive and regulative norms.  Physicians were already part of an existing 
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community with constitutive practices that defined who they were as medical 
practitioners.  The practice of cause-of-death reporting did not develop into a 
community of practitioners with a sense of public accountability because it was 
distinct from the constitutive practice of diagnosing disease.  The latter was necessary 
for the former to emerge as set of normative practices consistent with the institutional 
mandate.  Constitutive and regulative normativity was present in the practices of city 
and town clerks regarding the registration of births and marriages because the 
requisite competency for registering births and marriages was purely administrative.  
The requisite competency for registering causes of death consistent with the 
institutional mandate was not purely administrative.  As we will see in the next 
chapter, mandatory physician certification had a demonstrable impact on cause-of-
death reporting not only in Northampton and Holyoke but across the State. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE EPIDEMIOLOGICAL TRANSITION IN PRACTICE 
 
In this chapter, I take a more localized view of the changing structure of cause-
of-death reporting as it developed in Northampton and Holyoke from 1850 to 1912.  I 
analyze the cause-specific trends of consumption, phthisis and tuberculosis.  By the 
end of the nineteenth century consumption and phthisis as diagnostic terms were 
generally replaced with "pulmonary tuberculosis" as the preferred term.  When 
considered either independently or in conjunction with one another, they nevertheless 
represented the  leading cause of death in Northampton and Holyoke throughout this 
period.  The advantage of focusing on these disease terms is that they provide us with 
a comparative window into the changing nomenclature of a disease whose etiology 
narrowed in scope over time.  Additionally, we find that the overall shifts in cause-of-
death reporting for other diseases and disease categories followed a similar pattern.  
The dominant pattern during this period for Northampton and Holyoke was a mortality 
plateau, which began around 1880 and lasted through the first decade of the 
twentieth century.  The reasons for this plateau are not entirely clear and present 
something of an anomaly when compared to declining mortality trends in other 
regions, both nationally and internationally.  By drawing on the registration history laid 
out in chapter three, I connect the developments in Massachusetts's registration 
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system to shifts in Northampton and Holyoke's mortality composition leading up and 
subsequent to the first International Classification of Diseases (ICD) in 1900.11   
Both communities are significant for their comparative advantage in assessing 
the economic, political, and legal impact on health and well-being during this period.  
Both towns experienced the full effects of nineteenth-century industrialization.  The 
stresses of urbanization, rapid population growth, immigration, lagging infrastructures, 
rising mortality, and so on, all contributed to similar sets of circumstances.  While both 
Northampton and Holyoke shared in these stresses, the degree to which these 
changes took place were quite different.  The historical and demographic similarities 
and differences between the two communities allow for a fairly robust comparative 
analysis of changing health trends throughout this period. 
Unlike earlier analyses that relied on a limited sample of death records 
(Anderton and Hautaniemi Leonard 2004; Beemer et al.  2005; Leonard et al.  2006), I 
use the complete set of death records for Northampton and Holyoke along with 
regionally focused archival sources on medical practice and public health discussions 
over the same period.  The death data consist of recorded, literal causes of death12 
made available through the complete set of death records for Holyoke and 
                                                 
11.  The Bertillon Classification of Causes of Death was the forerunner to the 1900 
International Classification of Diseases, released in the United States at the 
International Statistical Institute in Chicago in 1893.  The American Public Health 
Association recommended the adoption of the Bertillon Classification five years later, 
in 1898, along with suggested decennial revisions, which (under a variety of titles) 
were published by the U.S.  federal government soon after discussions at the 
international Bertillon Commission. 
 
12.  A literal cause of death refers to a recorded cause of death as it literally appeared 
in the death records.  
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Northampton from 1850 through 1912.  The number of recorded deaths for both 
towns during this period totaled 48,947, with 15,641 deaths for Northampton and 
33,306 for Holyoke.  I specifically use a method of formal decomposition in which 
recorded literal causes of death are compared and identified through a parsing 
routine, which resolves component parts of principle and secondary causes into a 
classification schema.  The results were then cross-validated to the International 
Classification of Diseases in accordance with ICD cause-of-death coding rules.  The 
overall aim of this formal decomposition and analysis is to document changes in the 
leading causes of death over the study period and provide  quantifiable data from 
which to analyze evolving nineteenth-century conceptions of disease (Anderton and 
Leonard, 2004).  The scope of the data allow for more comprehensive comparisons of 
ICD classifications and common cause-of-death terminology over an entire half century 
of the epidemiological transition.   After providing a brief histories of the two towns of 
Northampton and Holyoke, I compare the ten leading, literal causes of death with the 
ten leading, ICD-coded causes of death for both towns.13  In doing so, I consider the 
following questions: Do we find different or similar pictures of tuberculosis given these 
two distinct ways of organizing causes of death?  What do the differences or 
similarities suggest with regard to Massachusetts’ evolving and increasingly complex 
death registration system? And finally, what effects did changing nineteenth-century 
nomenclature have on the reporting of tuberculosis during the early part of the North 
American epidemiological transition? 
                                                 
13.  An ICD-coded cause of death refers to a literal cause of death as coded according 
to the standards of the International Classification of Diseases (1909). 
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Nineteenth Century Northampton and Holyoke 
The towns of Northampton and Holyoke exemplified the struggles that many 
urban, industrial centers experienced during the late nineteenth century.  Over the 
course of the early mortality transition, both towns changed dramatically with the rise 
of industrial growth and the influx of immigrant populations from their neighbors to 
the north in Canada and across the Atlantic in Europe.  Both communities experienced 
the full impact of industrialization but in different degrees.  Northampton was the 
older of the two communities, having established itself as a permanent settlement 
nearly two centuries before Holyoke.  Northampton transitioned from a rural market 
economy to a robust mix of industry, agriculture and commerce, quadrupling its 
population, from 5,278 in 1850 to 19,431 in 1910 (see Figure 4) (Hautaniemi 2002, 43). 
Industries began developing in neighborhoods along the Mill River with 
associated enclaves of worker housing in areas known as Bay State, Paper Mill Village, 
and Florence.  Northampton’s infrastructure was slow to develop, with severe housing 
shortages and the lack of adequate public works contributing to poor health 
conditions.  The housing shortage quickly became a leading concern for city officials.  
As late as 1881 the local newspaper reported, "Tenements of all descriptions are 
difficult to obtain, and rents will be firm at present prices, if not higher, in the spring" 
(The Hampshire Gazette and Northampton Courier, 22 February 1881).  Housing 
shortages were one of several indicators of Northampton’s strained capacity to 
respond to the demands of local industry during this period of economic expansion.  
There were a small number of industrial mills of moderate size in Northampton, which 
  
72 
 
in 1855 employed approximately 10 percent of the labor force for the surrounding 
region (Hankins 1954).14 Although Northampton never fully recovered to emerge as a 
major industrial center, it did continue to flourish with a mix of farming and 
commercial trade as part of a diverse economy (Hautaniemi 2002).  Like other 
industrializing cities of this period, Northampton experienced the pressures of urban 
growth, lagging infrastructure, and poor sanitation. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Northampton and Holyoke Population Growth, 1850-1910. 
 
Over this same period, Holyoke residents faced similar conditions but on a 
much larger scale.  Holyoke experienced a far greater industrial expansion and 
demographic shift than Northampton.  By comparison, Holyoke’s population grew far 
                                                 
14. A number of these firms were destroyed by the 1874 Mill River Flood, which forced 
many of the larger companies to move their operations to nearby Holyoke (Benson 
1954; Jacob 1999; Green 1939). 
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more rapidly, from 3,249 in 1850 to 59,732 in 1910 (see Figure 4 above) (Hautaniemi 
2002, 54).  Like Northampton, economic opportunity was the driving force underlying 
this growth, but unlike Northampton, Holyoke’s industrial emergence followed a more 
deliberate and focused path.  Holyoke was one of several planned communities in the 
region due to the enterprising vision of the Boston Associates.  This group of venture 
capitalists sought to expand the textile industry at various sites along the Merrimack 
and Connecticut Rivers in Western Massachusetts.  Earlier ventures in Lowell and 
Lawrence, Massachusetts proved lucrative for the Boston Associates, and with the 
natural resources of the Connecticut River, Holyoke held even greater potential as an 
industrial mill town.  The cotton textile industry became Holyoke’s first principal 
economy as a result, serving as a catalyst for its exploding immigrant population.  
Much of Holyoke’s history emerged out of this expanding textile industry which 
exploited the hydraulic power provided by the Connecticut River (Hautaniemi et al.  
1999).  Similarly, the influx of foreign immigrants, which consisted of the Irish, the 
French Canadians and Eastern Europeans, provided local industry with the requisite 
supply of cheap labor.  Immigration peaked during this period of expansion in the 
1870s with the foreign born constituting 52% of Holyoke’s residents (Hautaniemi 2002, 
53).  Two groups in particular comprised the bulk of Holyoke’s labor force, the Irish and 
French Canadians.  
Despite the historical and demographic differences, there were many parallels 
between these two towns.  Both communities experienced intense population 
pressures.  The ensuing strains of urban growth and resulting high mortality 
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environments were ameliorated only by the later development of public works and a 
sanitary infrastructure (Hautaniemi et al.  1999; Beemer et al.  2005).  Waves of 
immigration were transnational in scale and affected the composition of the two 
towns similarly over time.  Moreover, the constant influx of poor immigrant labor, 
fueled by these transnational population movements, sustained remarkable levels of 
inequality in these developing urban-industrial areas.  In such settings of high mortality 
and dramatic inequality, one would expect to find the full impact of misery and 
poverty among the working poor. 
Not surprisingly, Holyoke’s identity as a community in the late 19th century 
owed much to its immigration history.  The first large scale immigrant population were 
the Irish, who began arriving in Holyoke in the late 1840s following the Irish Famine of 
1846.  The Irish were, in large part, responsible for building the infrastructure of 
Holyoke, of which construction of the dam and canals proved to be the most crucial for 
Holyoke’s emerging industrial economy (Hautaniemi 2002, 46).  Given the 
circumstances of their immigration, the Irish were more likely to establish permanent 
roots in the community.  Like Northampton, housing was a major issue for newly 
arriving mill workers as many families were forced to take residence in shanties along 
the Connecticut River.  Holyoke’s population density in 1880 was the third highest in 
the country (ibid., 57).  Not surprisingly, such concentration among Holyoke’s working 
poor conversely reflected a parallel concentration of real and personal wealth among 
the local elite.   
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The second largest immigrant population in Holyoke were the French-
Canadians, who began arriving in large numbers around 1859, shortly after the 
economic crisis ("Panic") of 1857.  The influx of French-Canadians during this period 
was an orchestrated endeavor, as was the case with much of Holyoke’s economic 
designs.  As Hautaniemi (2002) notes, the French-Canadians were "directly recruited 
into Holyoke’s work force" due to the efforts of Nicholas Prue, an agent for the Lyman 
Mills who went to "Quebec with a specially-built wagon resembling a prairie schooner 
to recruit workers, for which he was paid four dollars a head" (47).  Rather than hire 
skilled men as he was instructed, however, Prue hired mostly girls and young women.  
The apparent motivation behind this recruiting effort was the assumption that most of 
the workers would be temporary or seasonal laborers (Ibid.).  This was also the intent 
of many of the newly recruited French-Canadians themselves.  Again, the recruitment 
effort factored into the idea of supplemental employment for Canadian families.  
Green (1939, 69) notes that "Prue went from village to village in Quebec and spoke of 
the prospect of money wages which could be sent home or brought back in a few 
years’ time to set up whole families of business in Canada."  The women who were 
hired in this first migration phase via direct recruitment had year-long contracts and 
whether they actually returned to Canada after their contracts ended or simply 
remitted their earnings is unclear. 
The migration patterns of the French-Canadians, nevertheless, followed the 
economic fluctuations that occurred in Holyoke throughout this period.  Holyoke 
underwent a series of economic crises beginning in the 1850s with periodic Panics 
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occurring through the end of the 19th century.  In 1879, following the Panic of 1873, 
another influx of French-Canadians began arriving in Holyoke (Hautaniemi 2002).  This 
was the largest influx of French-Canadian immigrants into Holyoke up to that point.  
The major difference with this second migration phase was that the immigrants 
consisted primarily of families.  One of the significant contributing factors to this 
massive influx were the depressed economic conditions in Quebec.  As conditions 
became untenable in Quebec, French-Canadians emigrated to the United States, New 
England in particular, looking for economic opportunity and most likely represented 
more of an abandonment of homeland than the earlier recruitment migration in 1859. 
The initial rapid population growth of these towns was fueled by younger 
factory labor immigrants seeking new opportunities in developing sectors.  As 
immigration became a smaller segment of the growing population and population 
growth stabilized, these urban centers began experiencing an aging population.  For 
some ethnic groups, migration also changed from predominantly younger factory 
workers to families.  This combination of trends accelerated the aging of the 
population, generated age differences among social groups, and presumably 
accentuated age-sex-specific changes in mortality over the course of the transition.  
The shifting composition of the population, particularly in Holyoke, brought with it 
changing public health concerns and initiatives.  Other cities in Massachusetts were 
undergoing similar changes due to the same dynamics of industrialization, 
immigration, high population densities, economic opportunity, rising inequality, poor 
living conditions, all of which changed the disease ecology in a relatively short period 
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of time.  State and local officials in Massachusetts responded with a system of 
surveillance capable of monitoring epidemic and endemic diseases, without which the 
charge of public health would not have moved forward. 
New England as a whole had higher child mortality levels than other regions of 
the country, and experienced a mortality plateau throughout the latter half of the 19th 
century.  By the time of sustained mortality decline at the turn of the 20th century, 
Northampton and Holyoke had matured into substantial urban-industrial centers, 
population growth had slowed, public health infrastructures had been initiated, and 
the population aged significantly as mortality and immigration of younger factory 
laborers declined.  The mortality rates for both towns reflected these changes, 
particularly evident in Holyoke, which experienced a more dramatic set of 
demographic changes than Northampton.  Nevertheless, beginning around 1880, both 
towns experienced a very similar shift in mortality (see Figures 5 and 6).  In the earlier 
decades, Holyoke experienced rising mortality due primarily to compositional shifts in 
its population.  This was less evident for Northampton, but for both towns 
compositional shifts coupled with specific disease outbreaks and high child mortality 
account for a large proportion of rising  mortality up through the 1870s.  At the end of 
this decade, however, both towns experienced dramatic declines in their overall 
mortality.  It is at this stage that the mortality plateau becomes evident and we begin 
to see an overall stabilization of mortality develop across most disease categories.  
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Figure 5.  Northampton Standardized Mortality Rates, 1850-1912. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  Holyoke Standardized Mortality Rates, 1850-1912. 
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Analyzing the Grammars of Death 
There are several ways of explaining the mortality plateau, none of which are 
mutually exclusive.  Changes in immigration patterns, an aging population, the 
implementation of public health and sanitation infrastructures, and regulatory 
measures designed to improve accuracy in cause of death reporting were all players 
contributing to this period of mortality stabilization.  Given the history of cause-of-
death registration in Massachusetts, it is reasonable to expect a stabilization as the 
quality of reported causes of death improved.  Again, these developments in 
conjunction with a changing disease ecology are not mutually exclusive. 
To better understand the impact of the epidemiological transition on 
Northampton and Holyoke during this period, I compare the top ten leading, literal 
and ICD-coded causes of death and focus on three particular causes – consumption, 
phthisis and tuberculosis – noting shifts in nomenclature and frequency.  Although it is 
not surprising that overall mortality trends in Northampton and Holyoke reflect similar 
trends among certain leading causes, understanding these trends in light of 
Massachusetts’ history of death registration provides some insight into the reasons 
why these changes took place.  Table 3 shows (see below) the frequency of the ten 
leading, literal and ICD-coded causes of death by decade from 1850 to 1912.  For 
certain diseases we see an evolving nomenclature that  highlights the consolidation of 
several causes into a single cause and the partitioning of others into several distinct 
causes.  For example, consumption is the leading, literal cause of death and 
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tuberculosis is the leading, ICD-coded cause of death for three consecutive decades, 
1850, 1860, and 1870.  
 
Table 3.  Ten leading, parsed-literal and ICD-coded causes of death, Holyoke and 
Northampton, Massachusetts, 1850 – 1912.   
 
     
Decade Frequency  Parsed literal cause   Frequency  ICD 1a-2 code/disease title 
 
1850 312  Consumption    315  028 Tuberculosis of the lungs 
N= 78  Dysentery    78  014 Dysentery 
1,399  74  Fever     67  007 Scarlet fever 
 63  Scarlet fever  66  154 Senility 
 53  Old age   53  092 Pneumonia 
 42  Lung fever    36  001 Typhoid fever 
 36  Typhoid fever    35  064 Cerebral hemorrhage, apoplexy  
35  Dropsy     35  187 Ill-defined organic disease 
31  Fit   34  079 Organic diseases of the heart 
24  Croup     32  104 Diarrhea and enteritis (under 2 years) 
 
1860 465  Consumption    570  028 Tuberculosis of the lungs 
N= 138  Dysentery    205  104 Diarrhea and enteritis (under 2 years) 
3,253 126  Typhoid fever    164  009 Diphtheria and croup 
120  Cholera Infantum  159  092 Pneumonia 
108  Croup     140  014 Dysentery 
 108  Lung fever    132  001 Typhoid fever 
 101  Old age    113  154 Senility 
 88  Scarlet fever  97  007 Scarlet fever 
 80  Phthisis   76  079 Organic diseases of the heart 
65  Heart disease  56  006 Measles 
 
1870 658  Consumption  879  028 Tuberculosis of the lungs 
N= 515  Cholera Infantum  665  104 Diarrhea and enteritis (under 2 years) 
6,431  262  Diphtheria   480  009 Diphtheria and croup 
200  Typhoid fever  347  092 Pneumonia 
 194  Old-age    234  001 Typhoid fever 
191  Smallpox      203  007 Scarlet fever 
 189  Croup   194  154 Senility 
 163  Pneumonia  192  005 Smallpox 
156  Scarlet fever  180  151 Congenital debility, icterus, sclerema 
 147  Lung fever   153  079 Organic diseases of the heart 
     
1880 640  Cholera Infantum  1153  028 Tuberculosis of the lungs 
N= 457  Consumption  1001  104 Diarrhea and enteritis (under 2 years) 
8,578 436  Phthisis Pulmonalis  513  092 Pneumonia 
430  Pneumonia    410  009 Diphtheria and croup 
264  Stillborn   352  001 Typhoid fever 
259  Typhoid fever   249  079 Organic diseases of the heart 
191  Bronchitis   230  061 Simple meningitis 
 184  Enteritis   223  151 Congenital debility, icterus, sclerema 
177  Phthisis   214  154 Senility 
 169  Convulsions     210  064 Cerebral hemorrhage, apoplexy 
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Table 3 .  Continued  
     
Decade Frequency  Parsed literal cause   Frequency  ICD 1a-2 code/disease title 
 
1890 769  Cholera Infantum  1188  028 Tuberculosis of the lungs 
N=  617  Pneumonia  1183  104 Diarrhea and enteritis (under 2 years) 
11,330 490  Stillborn    731  092 Pneumonia 
359  Phthisis Pulmonalis  437  151 Congenital debility, icterus, sclerema 
317  Consumption    434  079 Organic diseases of the heart 
294  Bronchitis     430  061 Simple meningitis 
 294  Meningitis   341  064 Cerebral hemorrhage, apoplexy 
278  Premature birth  338  009 Diphtheria and croup 
221  Apoplexy   336  089 Acute Bronchitis 
211  Convulsions  300  154 Senility 
 
1900 700  Stillborn   1068  104 Diarrhea and enteritis (under 2 years) 
N=  664  Pneumonia  1055  028 Tuberculosis of the lungs 
13,516 629  Cholera Infantum  925  079 Organic diseases of the heart 
414  Pulmonary Tuberculosis 839  092 Pneumonia 
392  Premature birth  539  151 Congenital debility, icterus, sclerema 
369  Malnutrition  517  120 Bright’s disease 
302  Meningitis   513  064 Cerebral hemorrhage, apoplexy 
275  Senility   471  061 Simple meningitis 
269  Bronchopneumonia  448  154 Senility 
267  Gastroenteritis  307  009 Diphtheria and croup 
     
1910-12 216  Pulmonary Tuberculosis 387  104 Diarrhea and enteritis (under 2 years) 
N=  213  Stillborn   322  028 Tuberculosis of the lungs 
4,366 210  Gastroenteritis  312  079 Organic diseases of the heart 
201  Pneumonia  306  092 Pneumonia 
164  Bronchopneumonia  216  120 Bright’s disease 
150  Premature birth  211  064 Cerebral hemorrhage, apoplexy 
132  Senility   180  151 Congenital debility, icterus, sclerema 
119  Cerebral Hemorrhage  165  091 Bronchopneumonia 
116  Cholera Infantum  161  154 Senility 
102  Nephritis   108  061 Simple meningitis 
 
By the 1880s, however, consumption falls to the second leading, literal cause 
with 457 reported cases, the fifth leading, literal cause in the 1890s with 317 reported 
cases, and by the turn of the century, consumption drops off the list entirely as one of 
the top ten causes of death in Holyoke and Northampton.  By contrast, tuberculosis is 
either the first or second leading, ICD-coded cause of death throughout the period.  As 
a literal cause of death, tuberculosis does not appear in the death records until 1875 
but quickly rises as one of the top ten causes by the1900s, and becomes the leading, 
literal cause by 1910.  
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The differences between tuberculosis as a literal cause of death versus 
tuberculosis as an ICD-coded cause of death is due to the way the ICD consolidated 
causes.  The ICD employed a classificatory system that lumped earlier cognates, such 
as phthisis and consumption, under the contemporary nomenclature, "pulmonary 
tuberculosis." Phthisis and consumption were terms used to identify tuberculosis in 
the earlier decades, with consumption as the more common term.  As Anderton and 
Hautaniemi Leonard note, "even at this early time, consumption was a lay equivalent 
to the medically prevalent ‘Phthisis,’ or simply wasting… During the last half of the 
nineteenth century, such deaths were increasingly identified as phthisis in western 
Massachusetts" (Anderton & Hautaniemi Leonard 2004, 122).  Figure 7 shows the 
decline of consumption, the rise and fall of phthisis, and the rise of tuberculosis over 
this period.  Consumption began to lose its currency as a cause-of-death term in the 
mid-1870s, around the same time that tuberculosis began to be recorded as a cause of 
death.  The dramatic decline of consumption, however, cannot be attributed entirely 
to the increasing use of "tuberculosis." As figure 7 shows, phthisis begins its 
ascendency at nearly the same time that consumption begins its descent.  
Tuberculosis, while the leading cause of death throughout this period, was 
nevertheless on the decline (see Figure 8).  If we compare all three of the literal causes 
of death (consumption, phthisis, and tuberculosis) with the ICD-coded tuberculosis, 
the picture we get of tuberculosis as the leading, nineteenth-century cause of death in 
Northampton and Holyoke becomes much more complex and nuanced (see Figure 9). 
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Figure 7.   Disease-specific Mortality Rates: All Ages by Year,  
Northampton & Holyoke, 1850-1912. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.   Disease-specific Mortality Rates: All Ages by Year,  
Northampton & Holyoke, 1850-1912. 
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Figure 9.   Disease-specific Mortality Rates: All Ages by Year,  
Northampton & Holyoke, 1850-1912. 
 
The change in nomenclature was rather dramatic, with reported cases of 
consumption falling nearly 75% of its previous levels and Phthisis increasing twofold.  
This shift may reflect a move toward more diagnostic precision, which would closely 
correspond with the changes taking place in death registration during the mid to late 
1870s, namely, the increased pressure on town clerks and registrars to certify all 
causes of death from a physician, or it may reflect real declines.  As noted earlier, by 
1878, town clerks and registrars were required by law to secure a detailed death 
report from a physician.  The 1878 statute required town clerks and registrars to get a 
physician-certified death report before burial of the deceased could legally take place.  
Moreover, it is not until the early 1860s that phthisis began to be recorded as a cause 
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of death, which was the same period when the registration law was amended 
requiring "…all physicians to record and provide a cause of death certificate, but only 
‘if a request was made of him within fifteen days after the death occurred’" (pg. 9 
above).  It is also important to note that both phthisis and consumption began to 
stabilize and decline at nearly the same time and rates in the early 1880s, which 
corresponds to the overall stabilization of mortality in Northampton and Holyoke 
during this same period (see Figure 7).  Again, such stabilization is suggestive of a more 
uniform method of recording and certifying causes of death, but it could also simply be 
an etiological shift in the overall disease ecology.  It is during this period that 
Northampton and Holyoke are implementing modern public health infrastructures that 
included water filtration and sewerage systems (Beemer et al.  2005).   
This trend was not limited, however, to tuberculosis. In fact, we see it occur in 
almost all cases and in various disease groupings.  While tuberculosis is an endemic 
disease, the same sorts of conditions responsible for reducing the risk factors for 
epidemic diseases, like cholera, typhoid, malaria, small pox, can be responsible for 
reducing risk for certain endemic diseases as well.  But what about noninfectious 
diseases?  In both Northampton and Holyoke, we begin to see an aging of the 
population.  Epidemic mortality is declining toward the end of this period while 
mortality from degenerative diseases is on the rise.  Figure 10 shows causes of death 
due to degenerative  diseases or conditions,15 and again, a similar pattern of 
stabilization emerges after 1880.  As figure 11 shows, highly infectious diseases, such 
                                                 
15.  Degenerative diseases included all cancer related causes of death, senility, and 
heart disease.  
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as cholera, diphtheria, malaria, small pox, and typhoid begin to stabilize after 1880 as 
well.  We would expect to see high variability across time with epidemic mortality but 
not necessarily with degenerative causes.  The stabilization, while evident, is not as 
salient among degenerative causes as it is with infectious causes. This may suggest 
that shifts in the overall disease ecology were more likely etiologically based.  In other 
words, noninfectious diseases should not be subject to the same stabilizing influences 
that affect infectious disease, if the stabilization is simply a result of changing 
etiological conditions.  However, if we look at causes of death that were ill-defined, 
namely, those that did not fit with any other category, we see the same sort of pattern 
emerge here as well (see figure 12).  
 
 
Figure 10.   Mortality Rates for Degenerative Diseases: All Ages by Year,  
Northampton and Holyoke, 1850-1912. 
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Figure 11.  Mortality Rates: All Ages by Year, Northampton and Holyoke, 1850-1912 
(Cholera, Diphtheria, Malaria, Small Pox, Typhoid). 
 
 
Figure 12.  Mortality Rates: All Ages by Year, Northampton and Holyoke, 1850-1912  
(Ill-defined and Unknown Diseases). 
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Answering the question of whether we find differences or similarities with 
tuberculosis given the distinct ways in which causes of death are organized seems 
clear.  Grouping consumption, phthisis and their cognates under the ICD classification 
of tuberculosis (ICD 028), provides us with a picture of steady decline beginning in the 
mid-1870s. Disaggregating the causes reveals a much more complex development of 
nomenclature than is present under the ICD classification schema.  Of course the utility 
of one approach over the other depends on what the research intends to accomplish.  
Using literal, recorded causes of death for historical analyses of nineteenth-century 
epidemiological trends can be problematic in several respects (Maudsley & Williams 
1996 and Risse 1997).  Some of these shortcomings have already been noted, but one 
of the limitations not mentioned concerns the qualitative value of simple cause-of-
death descriptions.  Diagnostic accounts throughout this period were often terse, 
lacking sufficient detail in identifying cases where cause-of-death descriptions (literals) 
were notoriously vague.  The heterogeneous nature of cause-of-death reporting 
coupled with the minimalist style inherent in recorded causes of death certainly 
constrains the scope to which the information can be applied.  Moreover, detailed 
death narratives can be less precise and more ambiguous when attempting to identify 
single or primary causes of death (Anderton & Hautaniemi Leonard 2004).  When 
causes of death are coded in accordance with a particular classification system, like the 
ICD, loss of information is likely to be extensive but more useful for analyzing a 
population’s health. 
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Reporting, Public Health, or Therapeutics 
The expanding authority and scope of Massachusetts's death registration 
system matured alongside Northampton and Holyoke's shifting epidemiological 
environment as it did in other communities all across the State.  Moving from a 
reporting system that relied heavily on lay accounts of causes of death to a system that 
required physician certification of all causes of death will certainly have an impact on 
the quality of data gathered.  How much of an impact relative to changing 
demographics, improvements in public health, as well as changing therapeutic 
practices and technologies, is still an open question.  We have no way of definitively 
identifying the reporting agents, physician or otherwise to verify cause-of-death 
reports; the death records did not contain such information.  We do, however, have 
evidence of the broader outlines influencing reporting trends throughout this period.  
As we saw in chapter 3, the regulatory requirements for reporting causes of death 
became more specific and restrictive in terms of who and what could be reported 
toward the last quarter of the nineteenth century.  Public health initiatives were on 
the rise throughout the state, and the cultural impact of the sanitation movement was 
felt at the local and state levels.  Nevertheless, certain cause-specific trends are 
difficult to explain on demographic or public health grounds alone.  We would expect 
to see high variability across time with epidemic mortality, but not necessarily with ill-
defined or degenerative causes.  Holyoke did experience a small pox epidemic from 
1870 to 1872.  In that decade, small pox was the sixth leading cause of death in 
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Holyoke and the twenty-fourth in Northampton, while tuberculosis and ill-defined 
causes still remained at the top as leading causes of death.  
It is difficult to say with complete certainty what accounts for this contrast 
between high variability in mortality during the earlier decades followed by a pattern 
of stabilization after 1880.  Generally speaking, changes in adult mortality are 
seemingly amplified by patterns of development and population growth in emergent 
urban-industrial centers like Northampton and Holyoke.  Mortality trends are also 
contingent upon sociopolitical and economic contexts in ways that may not directly 
reflect shifting disease ecologies.  Whether improvements in recording and certifying 
causes of death offers a more compelling explanation for Northampton and Holyoke’s 
stabilizing mortality over this period is for the moment undecided.  The more likely 
scenario is one that takes into account a combination of the above factors working 
together to bring about these changes.  In the next chapter, we move into a broader 
international context and specifically examine the mortality trends of puerperal fever 
and inanition in light of international developments in cause-of-death standardization.  
Here the nearly sixty years of development in standardizing Massachusetts's cause-of-
death reporting is tied to similar developments on the international stage.   
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CHAPTER 5 
DIAGNOSTIC PRESCRIPTIONS 
 
The nineteenth-century epidemiological and mortality transitions developed 
out of a plurality of disease perspectives and evolving cause-of-death reporting 
systems.  As we saw in chapter three, Massachusetts's fledgling public-health 
community faced challenges on several fronts in its efforts to secure both compliance 
and uniformity in cause-of-death reporting.  Unlike their European counterparts, the 
United States adopted a more localized approach to death registration, one that relied 
on State and local municipalities to implement and regulate reporting practices.  In 
Massachusetts, lawmakers resisted the more centralized and compulsory approach to 
cause-of-death reporting found in places like Great Britain and Germany.  
Massachusetts instituted a voluntary system of reporting in the late eighteenth 
century that eventually gave way to a more bureaucratic and centralized system 
during the latter half of the nineteenth century.  The intended purpose of 
Massachusetts’s modern registration system was ambitious and could not function 
without a State apparatus regulating the way in which information was gathered.  This 
system did not implement the same degree of centralized bureaucracy as found in 
many Europe countries, but what eventually emerged was a system far more 
dependent on State regulatory oversight and control than anyone had originally 
anticipated. 
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The concern for the originators of the Massachusetts registration system and 
many public health reformers at the time was one of standardization.  It became clear 
that simply recording causes-of-death would not be sufficient in carrying out the goals 
of a modern public health regime.  The extended process of crafting a registration 
system that began in the early part of the century eventually resulted in a reasonably 
accurate and reliable basis for assessing the public’s health.  Such provincial goals were 
caught up in the broader desire to effect a more global foundation on which to identify 
and combat disease.  Standardization was not only a matter of effective bureaucratic 
management but it was also a necessary requisite for demonstrating scientific, 
economic, and cultural progress.  Efforts to standardize disease and cause-of-death 
terminology did not successfully take place on an international level until the late 
nineteenth century.  While many disease terms were in common, their diagnostic 
applications were not.  Conceptions of disease changed radically throughout this 
period, shifting from a miasmatic to a germ-theoretic understanding.   
The lack of a standardized cause-of-death nomenclature poses certain 
challenges for historical and demographic research of nineteenth-century mortality.  
As some researchers have noted, our understanding of the mortality transition itself, 
including such key theories as McKeown’s (1976) central thesis of limited medical and 
public health impacts, is hindered by a false precision in cause-of-death statistics 
(Woods 1991; Alter and Carmichael 1999; and Haines 2003).  This limited 
understanding, particularly regarding the North American epidemiological transition, is 
due in large part to the uneven nature of the available data.  Causes of death were not 
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systematically recorded as an official, governmental function until well into the 
nineteenth century.  The development and use of cause-of-death statistics by public 
health officials and the medical community tended to be regionally determined at 
best, reflecting local variations in disease conceptions, therapeutic practices, 
diagnostic nomenclature, and systems for recording causes of death.  As in Europe, 
such variations in perspective, practice, and procedure can be readily seen in the 
recorded causes of death in Massachusetts over the last half of the nineteenth 
century. 
In this chapter, I examine the relative impact that standardized nomenclature 
had on cause-of-death reporting in Northampton and Holyoke during this period.  
Unlike earlier analyses that relied on a limited sample of death records (Anderton and 
Hautaniemi Leonard 2004; Beemer et al.  2005; Leonard et al.  2006), I make use of the 
complete set of death records for Northampton and Holyoke, Massachusetts, from 
1850 through 1912, in addition to regionally focused archival sources on medical 
practice and public health discussions over the same period.  To determine the impact 
of standardized nomenclature on cause-of-death reporting, I focus on one specific 
international influence on late nineteenth and early twentieth-century grammars of 
death, viz., the organized effort of European and American medical professionals to 
instruct physicians in proper nosological nomenclature through explicit references and 
sanctions (correctives) in the first International Classification of Diseases (ICD) in 1900. 
I analyze specific trends in disease and cause-of-death classification during this 
period in three specific steps.  First, I present an interpretive analysis of early 
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correctives in the initial publications from the first and second International 
Commissions, which are referred to as ICD-1 and ICD-1a/2 (Treasury Department, 
United States Marine-Hospital Service 1900; Bureau of the Census, 1910, respectively).  
Other alternative publications were used at this time in addition to the ICD-1 and ICD-
1a/2, but the Treasury and Census Bureau documents were the most comprehensive.  
The comparative influence of these alternative publications on medical societies, state 
boards of health, registrars, physician training, etc., is outside the scope of this paper 
and needs further investigation.  What is important for this paper is assessing the 
general diffusion of common shifts in disease terminology propagated by the ICD 
revisions (i.e., from ICD-1 to ICD-1a/2) and concurrent changes in medical, diagnostic, 
and nosological practice.  This analysis attempts to characterize the general nature of 
the correctives, whether they reflected underlying differences in medical philosophies, 
theories or cultures, and the orientation toward specific audiences for the correctives.  
Second, I select two correctives from the first step that address contemporaneous 
cause-of-death reporting categories and have particular historical interest to evolving 
medical histories (e.g., changes in therapeutic and etiological perspectives).  I provide a 
brief history of the diagnostic terms addressed by these correctives and then focus on 
their use in Western Massachusetts, viz., the towns of Northampton and Holyoke.  
Finally, I examine the trends in these targeted nomenclature before and after the ICD 
was effectively adopted, and evaluate the practical impact that ICD correctives may or 
may not have had on the application of prevailing terminology.   My analysis will 
indicate the extent to which standardization affected major cause-of-death groupings 
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generally relevant to theories of the nineteenth-century epidemiological transition.  I 
begin with a brief history of disease classification, showing both the continuity and 
discontinuity in the ways in which classification systems were created and used.16 
 
Nomenclature and Classification 
The early development of the ICD followed a long line of disease and cause-of-
death classification systems.  Serious utilization of classification systems as a practical 
means for understanding the nature of disease did not find its place in medical science 
until the eighteenth century (Bynum 1993).  The naming diseases under a particular 
etiological framework, however, is at least as old as Hippocrates, but a systematic 
grouping of diseases for public health reasons is a distinctly modern endeavor.  To 
describe the history of nomenclature and classification as a lineage would be 
inaccurate, as one cannot trace all the nosological threads through a single line of 
descent.  Nevertheless, to draw these multiple lines as distinct pathways independent 
of one another would be equally inaccurate.  One can find commonalities running 
through the various strands, out of which a nosological patchwork emerged; those 
physicians and statisticians who developed nosologies were often well aware of one 
another’s work and sometimes worked together.  The ICD represented this legacy but 
                                                 
16. Although social histories of American medicine acknowledge the influence of 
European medicine on nineteenth-century medical institutions, many of the most 
widely cited histories are surprisingly brief in their treatment of the European 
influence on American diagnostic nomenclature (e.g. Starr 1982; Cassedy 1986). In 
these general histories there is no discussion of the international efforts to explicitly 
guide and shape American medicine through such institutional efforts as the Bertillon 
conferences. 
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also extended it in new directions.  The evolution of nineteenth century conceptions of 
disease owes much to this common if uneven heritage, which culminated in an 
international effort to systematically formulate a set of classification standards from 
which physicians and statisticians could study, report on, diagnose and identify 
pathologies on the one hand and morbidity and mortality trends on the other.   
One of the earliest attempts to systematically classify disease began with John 
Graunt’s mid-seventeenth-century examination of London’s Bills of Mortality 
(1939[1662]).  London’s series of bubonic plague outbreaks in the first half of the 
seventeenth century served as the backdrop for Graunt’s statistical analysis.  His 
primary objective was to develop a more comprehensive picture of London’s mortality 
in order to construct a disease-incident baseline from which to better understand the 
effects of plague, which tended to overshadow other causes of death.  Essential to 
these objectives were the broader concerns for creating "population profiles through a 
study of causes of death" (Alter and Carmichael 1999, 121), which Graunt 
accomplished by estimating London’s population through a geographical analysis, 
allowing him to calculate crude mortality rates. 
Thomas Sydenham, a physician and contemporary of Graunt, is often described 
as the founder of nosology (Temkin 1974, 1987; Bynum 1993; Alter and Carmichael 
1999).  His own classification system employed an ontological rather than a functional 
framework, that is, one which specified diseases as distinct entities but not in a germ-
theoretic sense (Taylor 1979; Bynum 1993; DeLacy 1999; Carter 2003).  Sydenham 
rejected the traditional notion that disease simply manifested itself as an internal 
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dysfunction in the body and proposed the addition of external elements in 
combination with the internal workings of the body.  For a particular disease to 
manifest itself, two separate but dependent conditions needed to be present: 1) a set 
of environmental and seasonal elements that provided a "constitution" common in 
scope but unique in time and location, and 2) a specific humoral response or 
modification in the body.  The combination of these two conditions is what Sydenham 
believed produced particular diseases (ibid.).  Sydenham designed his nosology with 
the needs of the physician rather than those of the statistician in mind.  Accordingly, 
Sydenham and Graunt produced different classification systems based on the distinct 
purposes for which they were intended.  This distinction (clinical vs.  demographic) 
played a more significant role in the nineteenth century, foreshadowing some of the 
tensions and cross-purposes that informed the development of modern classification 
systems.  As Alter and Carmichael (1999, 121) note: "The problematic relationship 
between causes of morbidity and causes of mortality thus presented an ideological 
barrier between the concerns of physicians and the interests of statisticians.  …one 
group were lumpers, the other splitters." 
The eighteenth century saw further expansion of disease classification with the 
"help" of a series of smallpox epidemics and a renewed emphasis on the notion of 
contagion as a mode of transmission (DeLacy 1999).  The most prominent nosologist of 
this period was William Cullen, whose nosology remained true to the pragmatic 
concerns of Sydenham by focusing on more detailed descriptions of symptoms rather 
than pursuing causes (ibid.).  By arranging disease categories symptomatically, the 
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utility of such a classification offered itself more readily to the physician than to the 
statistician.  Alter and Carmichael’s distinction between lumpers and splitters is 
evident in Cullen’s etiological understanding.  Cullen criticized earlier disease 
classifications for employing a top-down approach rather than working from a more 
detailed set of descriptions, which provided the basis for developing broader "classes 
and orders" through a bottom-up approach (ibid.). 
During the second quarter of the nineteenth century, demographic interest in 
disease and cause-of-death classification once again became the focus with William 
Farr’s statistical nosology.  Farr was clear about what he intended for his "uniform 
statistical nomenclature" in contrast to the deficiencies of past nosologies.  Multiple 
terms for the same disease, vague and inconsistent usage of these terms, and a dearth 
of quantifiable precision in characterizing disease were some of the inadequacies that 
Farr observed in both past and present expressions of disease.  In Farr’s (Farr 1885 
[1837]:214) estimation, Sydenham illustrated this vague usage with phrases such as 
"prevailed a little," "more prevalent," and "raged with violence," all of which 
"admit[ted] of no strict comparison with each other," and made it "impossible to 
compare Sydenham’s experience thus expressed with the experience of other writers 
in other places and other ages."17  Farr articulated the need to devise a system of 
classification amenable to a uniform registration of causes of death, which required a 
                                                 
17.  Farr’s approach was more similar to that of Graunt’s in the seventeenth century 
than that of his contemporaries. The connection of Farr’s undertaking with that of 
Graunt was observed by one of Farr’s contemporaries Sir Arthur Newsholme. 
Commenting on Farr’s 1837 essay “Vital Statistics,” Newsholme described it “…as ‘the 
foundation of a new science,’ the alphabet of which had been framed in the 
commentaries of Captain John Graunt (1620-1674)” (cited in Donnelly 2005, 253). 
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broader and more generalized scheme than previously considered.  He deemed 
Cullen’s classification too detailed in its arrangement and thus unsuitable for statistical 
analysis (Farr 1885 [1837]; Pelling 1978).  Farr (1885 [1837]: 232) also criticized 
Cullen’s nosology for not presenting "diseases in their presumed natural relations."  
His own ideas concerning the natural relations of diseases assumed a statistical and 
law-like regularity that one could observe with aggregate population data (Donnelly 
2005).  Farr’s purpose for creating his nosology was thus more universal in scope and 
designed to serve the needs of the statistician and the physician alike.  As John Eyler 
(1979:54) notes: "Farr’s aim was to create a simple and practical classification based 
on sources and authorities familiar to practicing medical men.  The nosology also had 
to serve the administrative needs of the office." 
Farr’s influence, however, went beyond European medical and public health 
circles.  In the United States, Lemuel Shattuck and Edward Jarvis, two of the founders 
of the American Statistical Association, were proponents for a systematic nosology for 
Massachusetts during the mid-1800s.  They petitioned the Massachusetts Medical 
Society and other organizations to establish standardized codes for annual registration 
of births, deaths and marriages.  Shattuck actively promoted this effort in the 
legislature, and successfully lobbied for the passage of the Registration Act of 1842 in 
Massachusetts.  At the same time, he read related texts in the American Statistical 
Association’s library in Boston and corresponded closely with Farr.  Throughout the 
1840s, Shattuck promoted Farr’s classification system and, with Jarvis, introduced it to 
the first National Medical Convention, held in Philadelphia in 1847.   This meeting 
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resulted in the creation of the American Medical Association, which held its first 
Annual Meeting in Baltimore in 1848, and its second meeting in Boston in 1849.   The 
Medical Convention asked all physicians to adopt Shattuck’s version of Farr’s nosology 
and promoted it over the next two years.   While England’s classification system, as 
developed by Farr, was not adopted internationally, it became the basis for 
Massachusetts’s nosology for the rest of the century (Rosenkrantz 1972, 22-25). 
 
Developing the ICD 
During the second half of the nineteenth century, germ theoretic conceptions 
of disease were beginning to take shape.  Public health initiatives were 
institutionalized within local and state boards of health, and the emerging science of 
bacteriology shifted attention away from miasmatic conceptions of disease to those 
that identified disease agents in terms of microbes rather than poisonous vapors or 
putrid atmospheres (Goubert 1984; Melosi 2000;).  It was during this period that 
"nearly all major diseases underwent substantial changes in social conception, 
etiological understanding, and nomenclature" (Anderton and Hautaniemi Leonard 
2004, 112).  The conditions for developing a more consistent method and vocabulary 
for identifying disease and cause of death, whether viewed as opportune or necessary, 
proved favorable for Jacques Bertillon, a French statistician, who was commissioned by 
the International Statistical Institute in 1891 to prepare a "classification of causes of 
death" (World Health Organization 2006, 2).  The Bertillon Classification marked the 
beginning of international efforts to formulate a systematic etiological grammar 
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designed to centralize and regulate common usage of terms.  The forerunner to the 
1900 ICD, it was first released in the United States at the International Statistical 
Institute in Chicago in 1893.  As Eyler (1979: 59) notes, "Until 1893 no two continental 
nations used precisely the same methods of recording and registering the causes of 
death.  In that year, however, Jacques Bertillon . . . drew up the system that became 
the International List of the Causes of Death."  The United States  joined the other 
international participants (26 countries) in shifting to the International Cause of Death 
classification.  The American Public Health Association recommended the adoption of 
the Bertillon Classification in 1898, along with suggested decennial revisions, which 
(under various titles) were published by the U.S.  federal government soon after the 
first International Conference for the Revision of the Bertillon or International List of 
Causes of Death in 1900 (e.g.  ICD-1a/2; see U.D. Department of the Treasury, U.S. 
Marine-Hospital Service 1900; U.S Bureau of the Census 1902, 1908, 1910). 
European medical practice and nomenclature dominated these classifications.  
They specifically excluded the variety of American therapeutic perspectives which 
remained in use by homeopathic, chiropractic, naturopathic, eclectic and hydropathic 
practitioners.  The ICD was introduced as a monolithic nomenclature into a plurality of 
therapeutic perspectives that emerged in the decades surrounding the Civil War, 
resulting in a "cacophony of new-found diseases" (Leonard et al.  2006).  The United 
States adopted these classifications largely due to the rising influence and authority of 
the early American Medical Association.  They also provided the basis for 
Massachusetts’ nosology as they developed.  As Table 4 shows, Massachusetts’ 
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nosology remained relatively unchanged for nearly 50 years, as in Britain.   Only after 
1893, when Bertillon’s classification was first released in the United States, did 
Massachusetts nosology undergo any significant change.  Before then Massachusetts 
followed Farr’s classification system almost verbatim. 
 
Table 4.  Massachusetts’ State Nosology, 1850 – 1900. 
1850 1855 1893 ICD1 1900 
I.  ZYMOTIC DISEASES,  
Sporadic Diseases of I.  ZYMOTIC I.  ZYMOTIC I.  GENERAL DISEASES. 
 
1.  MIASMATIC 1.  MIASMATIC 
 
 
2.  ENTHETIC 2.  ENTHETIC 
 
 
3.  DIETIC 3.  DIETIC 
 
 
4.  PARASITIC 4.  PARASITIC 
 II.  UNCERTAIN SEAT II.  CONSTITUTIONAL II.  CONSTITUTIONAL 
 
 
1.  DIATHETIC 1.  DIATHETIC 
 
 
2.  TUBERCULAR 2.  TUBERCULAR 
 
 
III.  LOCAL III.  LOCAL 
 
III.  NERVOUS ORGANS 1.  OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM 1.  OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM 
II.  DISEASES OF THE NERVOUS 
SYSTEM AND  
THE ORGANS OF SPECIAL SENSE. 
V.  CIRCULATIVE ORGANS 
2.  OF THE ORGANS OF 
CIRCULATION 
2.  OF THE ORGANS OF 
CIRCULATION 
III.  DISEASES OF THE 
CIRCULATORY APPARATUS. 
IV.  RESPIRATIVE ORGANS 
3.  OF THE RESPIRATORY 
ORGANS 
3.  OF THE RESPIRATORY 
ORGANS 
IV.  DISEASES OF THE 
RESPIRATORY APPARATUS. 
VI.  DIGESTIVE ORGANS 
4.  OF THE DIGESTIVE 
ORGANS 
4.  OF THE DIGESTIVE 
ORGANS 
V.  DISEASES OF THE DIGESTIVE 
APPARATUS. 
VII.  URINATIVE ORGANS 5.  OF THE URINARY ORGANS 5.  OF THE URINARY ORGANS 
VI.  DISEASES OF THE GENITO-
URINARY APPARATUS  
AND ITS ADNEXA. 
VIII.  GENERATIVE 
ORGANS 
6.  OF THE GENERATIVE 
ORGANS 
6.  OF THE GENERATIVE 
ORGANS (see VI above and VII below) 
IX.  LOCOMOTIVE 
ORGANS 
7.  OF THE ORGANS OF 
LOCOMOTION 
7.  OF THE ORGANS OF 
LOCOMOTION 
IX.  DISEASES OF THE ORGANS 
OF LOCOMOTION. 
X.  INTEGUMENTIVE 
ORGANS 
8.  OF THE INTEGUMENTARY 
SYSTEM 
8.  OF THE INTEGUMENTARY 
SYSTEM 
VIII.  DISEASES OF THE SKIN AND 
CELLULAR TISSUE. 
 
IV.  DEVELOPMENTAL IV.  DEVELOPMENTAL 
 
 
1.  DISEASES OF CHILDREN 1.  DISEASES OF CHILDREN 
X.  MALFORMATIONS.   XI.  
EARLY INFANCY. 
 
2.  DISEASES OF ADULTS 2.  DISEASES OF ADULTS VII.  PUERPERAL STATE. 
XI.  OLD AGE 3.  DISEASES OF OLD PEOPLE 3.  DISEASES OF OLD PEOPLE XII.  OLD AGE. 
 
4.  DISEASES OF NUTRITION 4.  DISEASES OF NUTRITION 
 
XII.  VIOLENT CAUSES V.  VIOLENT V.  VIOLENT 
XIII.  AFFECTIONS PRODUCED BY 
EXTERNAL CAUSES. 
 
1.  ACCIDENTS 1.  ACCIDENTS 
 
 
2.  BATTLE Omitted sub-category 
 
 
3.  HOMICIDE 3.  HOMICIDE 
 
 
4.  SUICIDE 4.  SUICIDE 
 
 
5.  EXECUTION 5.  EXECUTION 
 
 
6.  OTHER VIOLENT CAUSES 6.  OTHER VIOLENT CAUSES 
 
 
SUDDENLY SUDDENLY 
 
 
NOT STATED NOT STATED XIV.  ILL-DEFINED DISEASES. 
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As the ICD classification came into play, the document’s framers began to 
address the cross purposes that a single, international classification system would 
require to satisfy the needs of the statistician and the physician alike.  In the 
introduction to the American translation, the 1910 ICD-1a/2 specifically mentions the 
efforts to accommodate the purposes of both groups: "The revised Manual, it is 
expected, will be a work of far more useful and authoritative character for the 
purposes of American physicians and registration officials than the old one" (U.S.  
Bureau of the Census 1910: 7).  Additionally, the 1909 International Commission 
addressed the question of whether the ICD should be regarded as a true nomenclature 
or a statistical classification only.  The issue surrounded the "peculiar use of the word 
‘classification’" as it concerned the "practical work of a registration office" and the 
theoretical basis for grouping diseases under certain classes (ibid.: 9): 
 
The process of "classifying" a cause of death under the International 
"Classification," relates only to its assignment to the specific title which 
includes it; it has nothing to do with the theoretical arrangement of 
these titles under the general classes… Such groups of diseases, 
coordinated upon a theoretical basis, are becoming of less and less 
practical importance...  The sole purpose of the so-called "Classification" 
at present is to exhibit a list of uniform and comparable titles of 
diseases, or groups of diseases, and of other causes of death, each with 
a precise inclusion of individual terms as reported by physicians in 
different countries, so that the international statistics of morbidity and 
mortality will be as nearly comparable as possible.  The word 
"nomenclature" will be employed in the translation only as indicating a 
statistical list or "classification" and not a true nomenclature in the 
English sense. 
 
 
A nomenclature in the strict sense is different from a classification.  The former is a 
system of naming through a list or catalogue of accepted terms, which follows a more 
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detailed and discriminating assignment of terms than a classification system.  Disease 
nomenclatures per se were more commonly used by medical practitioners for their 
value in diagnosing a wide range of specific health conditions.  With the ICD we see an 
effort to collapse this distinction, an effort that began with William Farr.18 
 
Analysis of Proscriptions and Prescriptions 
American death records provide a salient test of the ICD’s efficacy in revising 
the nosological conventions of physicians.  The early ICD versions singled out several 
specific causes of death as  imprecise and in need of correction.  These proscriptions 
provide an intervention that can focus inquiry  on specific causes of death, that is, 
those most likely to reflect  the ICD's impact on prevailing nomenclature.  U.S.  
physicians were  singled out for such corrective advice regarding nomenclature.  In 
some cases, the ICD suggested reporting abuses be addressed by returning death 
records to physicians for correction.  The intervention of the ICD, with specific 
instructions to U.S.  physicians on conventional usage, provides a unique opportunity 
to assess both the history of and basis for internationally divergent classifications.  It 
also gives us a more precise view of the European and American medical community's 
corrective efforts, through the ICD, to correct  physicians’ errant ways and the 
longitudinal reporting of mortality. 
                                                 
18.  Histories of the early development of the ICD are lacking. The World Health 
Organization’s “History of the development of the ICD”  and the National Center for 
Health Statistics’ “International Classification of Diseases – 9” provide further and 
more detailed information on the early history of the ICD. 
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All the prescriptions and proscriptions in the 1900 ICD-1 and the 1910 ICD-1a/2 
were identified by examining specific instructions contained within the tabular lists.  
Each disease or disease category that included special remarks or other addenda were 
noted and recorded in a spreadsheet as they appeared in each document, and then 
each set of instructions were compared between the two documents.   Forty diseases 
or disease categories  had specific instructions indicating how these diseases were to 
be recorded and/or qualified.  In most of the identified cases, the disease titles and 
codes did not change from the 1900 ICD-! to the 1910 ICD-1a/2.  The substantive 
content of the ICD-1a/2 instructions, however, typically changed in terms of expanding 
or clarifying the earlier instructions found in ICD-1:  a few  causes of death either 
added to or dropped in the later ICD-1a/2.  For instance, the term Inanition was used 
and coded as a cause of death in ICD-1 but then was changed to starvation in ICD-1a/2 
and given a more explicit set of instructions, namely, to refrain from using the earlier 
term (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1910: 25-26) . 
In both the ICD-1 and the ICD-1a/2 we find several  formulaic sets of 
instructions, which span across many of the disease categories.  The most common 
was the instruction to use certain disease titles for mortality statistics only and others 
(usually subdivisions of these titles) for morbidity statistics only.  For example, 
"syphilis" (ICD-1a/2 code 37) included five different subdivisions:  
 
A.  Chancre: indurated, or infecting, or of the mouth, or of the face.  — 
Primary lesion. 
 
B.  Secondary lesions.  — Mucous patches.— Amygdalitis, or angina; or 
laryngitis, or coryza, or iritis: syphilitic.  — Syphilides. 
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C.  Tertiary lesions.  — Specific symptoms.  — Gummas.  — Ulcerations, 
exostosis, etc., syphilitic.    All other diseases defined as " syphilitic." 
 
D.  Congenital syphilis.  — Syphilis in children, unless otherwise defined. 
 
E.  Period not indicated.  — Syphilis or pox (unqualified).  (In case of 
death classify according to age under titles 37 C or 37 D.) (U.S. Bureau of 
the Census 1910: 34) 
 
 
Physicians were instructed to record and use each of these subdivisions for morbidity 
statistics only and the general title of "syphilis" for mortality statistics only.  In the ICD-
1 the instructions for syphilis did not make an explicit distinction between morbidity 
and mortality reporting.  Rather, physicians were instructed to record these same 
subdivisions for "mortuary statistics alone."(ibid.)19 
Long-standing problems with the underreporting of syphilis may have played a 
role in these distinctions.  The stigma associated with contracting a venereal disease 
invited the practice of not reporting syphilis for a variety of reasons.  For the physician 
it was an economic issue; for the patient it was an issue of humiliation and public 
sanction.  The struggle between public health concerns and physician-patient 
confidentiality created the conditions for increased legislative measures to  ensure full 
and accurate reporting during this period.  The effectiveness, however, of such 
compulsory reporting is doubtful (Baldwin 1999, 355-523).  With physicians strongly 
opposed to including venereal disease in local regulations and national laws on disease 
notification, syphilis remained an underreported disease.  As Peter Baldwin (ibid.: 440) 
                                                 
19.  There is no direct evidence from the ICD itself to suggest why the later ICD-1a/2 
reversed the instructions to record these subdivisions only for morbidity and not 
mortality. 
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points out: "In Britain, after objections from physicians, VD was not included in the 
1889 Notification of Diseases Act.  The Royal Commission on VD, debating the issue 
once again against the background of resistance from medical circles, concluded in 
1916 that the advantages of notification were outweighed by the need for strict 
confidentiality." 
The distinction between morbidity and mortality was not confined to syphilis.  
It also encompassed many other diseases, such as "neuralgia and neuritis," "diseases 
of the eyes and annexa," "diseases of the uterus," and various intestinal disorders 
(ibid.: 42, 48, 56).  These sets of instructions  nearly doubled in the 1910 ICD-1a/2, 
suggesting a need for more refined distinctions of certain diseases in terms of 
mortality and morbidity qualifiers.  Such correctives reflected changing medical 
standards.  The most frequent correctives in the ICD-1a/2, for example, was to return 
cause-of-death certificates for certain diseases to the physician for clarification of 
whether the cause was puerperal.  Some correctives were clear that common 
symptomatic terms in use by U.S.  physicians should be abandoned in favor of more 
precise etiological classifications.  For example, the ICD-1a/2 offers the following 
advice for inanition as a diagnostic term: "When the word is used, as it frequently is in 
the United States, to denote exhaustion from defective nourishment, due to disease or 
congenital or senile debility ...  [t]he term is indefinite and otherwise objectionable, 
and the disease causing inanition should be given" (ibid.:66). The following analysis 
examines both select general correctives, such as encouraging the use of "puerperal" 
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as a qualifier for a number of maternal conditions, and specific correctives to change 
core nomenclative usage, such as discouraging the general use of the term inanition." 
 
Puerperal Fever 
Nineteenth century conceptions of childbirth were closely tied to broader 
conceptions of what constituted a woman’s natural state and the cultural expectations 
that women’s pain, frailty, and suffering were signs of high status and civilization’s 
progress.  Although the expression of pain and frailty carried with it an aura of 
advancement, it also signified the unnatural state in which "civilized women" found 
themselves.  Civilization took on a dual meaning of corrupter and liberator; it removed 
the drudgeries and indignities of primitive life while foisting corruption upon the weak 
and the immoral.  Not surprisingly, in light of such cultural meanings, childbirth played 
a rather paradoxical role for nineteenth-century women.  To be civilized meant bearing 
the obligatory costs that accompanied the advances of a modern world, but doing so 
placed women in childbirth outside the natural course of normal labor, romanticized 
by a short, easy, and painless birth.  The exemplar of natural childbirth was the fabled 
Indian squaw whose delivery was little more than a momentary diversion in an 
otherwise normal day of work, "When she realizes that the hour of delivery is at hand, 
she enters her cabin or betakes herself to some stream or spring, gives birth, washes 
the young ‘injun’ in cold water, straps it on her back, and before she has been scarcely 
missed has returned a full-fledged mother, and resumes her labors" (John H. Dye, 
Painless Childbirth (Buffalo, 1884), pp. 53-54, cited in Wertz and Wertz 1977, 113.). 
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The Indian squaw represented an apocryphal figure, a return to a more natural 
state from which civilized women had apparently strayed (Loudon 1992, 340-50; Wertz 
and Wertz 1977, 109-28).  This of course added to an already stressful set of 
expectations placed upon women in general, but for women in childbirth the very real 
threat of a long and painful death only added to these pressures.  Nineteenth-century 
women were caught between the demands of a society in the midst of 
industrialization, where progress meant advancing beyond the primitive conditions 
and practices of savagery, and the refined sensibilities of Victorian culture, where the 
feminine ideal endeavored to follow a path of genteel domesticity (Wertz and Wertz 
1977, 109-28).  Moral precepts found their "proper expression" within this domain of 
domesticity and were embodied, by extension, in the Victorian ideal of womanhood.  
At the same time, the pain and suffering of childbirth represented a moral failing, 
often attributed to a woman’s aggressiveness, pursuit of masculine roles, and the 
abandonment of domestic submission.20 
Until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, delivering babies was 
for the most part the  provenance of midwives, female relatives, friends or neighbors.  
Giving birth was an occasion that  men seldom attended.  In the late 1700s male 
physicians and "man-midwives" began  to assert themselves more readily in the 
birthing process, in what is commonly described as the medicalization of childbirth 
(Ettinger 2006).  This shift, while gradual, was nonetheless dramatic in both technique 
                                                 
20.  Loudon (1992, 343) suggests that the idea of civilization’s adverse effects on 
women in childbirth was a belief held primarily in the United States, Britain and 
Australia. The widespread and systematic use of analgesics during childbirth was one 
of the consequences of this idea, particularly in the United States. 
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and consequences.  During this period that deaths among childbearing women 
increased significantly.  The most alarming trend in childbirth-related deaths was the 
precipitous rise in puerperal fever.  A streptococcal infection, it spread quickly 
throughout the body, claiming its victims after days and sometimes weeks of 
excruciating pain.  Such unusually high rates of death due to puerperal fever caught 
physicians off guard. Leaving the medical community unable to employ effective 
therapeutic and preventive measures. 
Puerperal fever was not a new or unknown disease.  It was identified as a cause 
of death at least as far back as 1500 BCE, when an ancient set of Hindu books, called 
the Ayur-Vedas, warned midwives of the dangers of childbed fever (Speert 2004, 289-
96).  In the Western Hemisphere, the first recorded epidemic of puerperal fever was at 
the Hôtel Dieu in Paris, in 1646 (ibid., 289).  By the early nineteenth century, such 
localized epidemics were becoming more common and of significant concern for the 
medical community.  The correspondence between the rise in incidents of puerperal 
fever and the medicalization of childbirth was not merely coincidental.  The proposed 
connection between the two, suggested by only a handful of physicians at the time, 
launched a long series of high contested debates lasting nearly through the entire 
nineteenth century. 
Moreover, while the patient suffering from puerperal fever felt shame similar 
to that experienced by the syphilitic, the physician feared public sanction.  As Irving 
Loudon (1999:325) notes, "Hidden deaths were almost always deaths from puerperal 
fever for the simple reason that a doctor (or midwife) whose patient died of puerperal 
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fever was liable to be blamed for the death whether justified or not".  In the mid-
1870s, two British midwives were charged and prosecuted for "manslaughter by 
infection" after the women  they had attended died of puerperal fever (Worboys 2000, 
104).  It was not unusual, therefore, for physicians to report deaths from puerperal 
infection with more generic terms, like peritonitis or septicemia (Louden 1992, 1999).     
Deaths caused by peritonitis or septicemia did not by themselves suggest the 
physician's roe in spreading the infection; deaths cause by puerperal fever did. 
Another strategem was to "invoke multiple causes and relegate puerperal fever to a 
secondary position… If a mother had a slight postpartum hemorrhage and died a week 
later of puerperal fever, ‘hemorrhage’ could be put as the primary cause on the death 
certificate, and ‘puerperal fever’ as the secondary cause" (Louden 1999: 325).  Richard 
W. Wertz and Dorothy C. Wertz (1977: 125-26) also note this practice: "A Philadelphia 
doctor said in 1873 that doctors naturally shrank from reporting their fatal midwifery 
cases as such and resorted to calling death from puerperal fever by many other, 
obscuring names." Grace L.  Meigs (1917: 18), examining the data on maternal 
mortality  in the United States, stated that any marked decrease in the actual death 
rate from childbirth during the last 13 years could not have been masked by the 
improvement in reporting deaths from childbirth."   Meigs was referring in part to the 
underreporting of puerperal fever.  The apparent decrease in deaths from "peritonitis 
of unstated origins"—23,000 in the 1890s, only 3,800 in the 1920s—was due not to 
any marked decrease in peritonitis but the availability of two other categories, 
"appendicitis" in 1902 and "duodenal ulcer" in 1911 (Loudon 1999, 327). 
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The early history of identifying puerperal fever as a contagious disease goes 
back at least to the late eighteenth century.  In the United States, one of the first and 
most renowned nineteenth-century figures to address the contagiousness of puerperal 
fever was Oliver Wendell Holmes, a Boston-area resident. .  His essay "The 
Contagiousness of Puerperal Fever"  launched a long-running debate on whether 
physicians, nurses and midwives were responsible for spreading the infection to their 
patients.  As Holmes (1843: 503) noted, "The disease known as Puerperal Fever is so 
far contagious as to be frequently carried from patient to patient by physicians and 
nurses."  Holme's suggestion that physicians were responsible for transmitting disease 
was not well received by the medical community.  De Costa (2002: 669) notes that 
"Charles Meigs, a well-known obstetrician, was incensed at the suggestion he may 
himself be transmitting disease.  ‘Doctors,’ he said, ‘are gentlemen, and gentlemen’s 
hands are clean’"  In Europe, a similar set of reactions were expressed when the 
Viennese physician Ignaz Semmelweis, independently came to the same conclusions as 
Holmes.  The resistance on both continents to accepting that health care personnel 
acted as carriers of such a deadly infection persisted until the late nineteenth century.  
Even with Louis Pasteur’s 1879 discovery of the Streptococcus bacterium caused 
puerperal fever and Joseph Lister’s success in preventing postoperative infections 
through antiseptic procedures, the medical community was nevertheless loath to  
acknowledge the infectious nature of puerperal fever (ibid.). 
Nevertheless, puerperal fever began to decline in the late 1870s and early 
1880s.  In 1897,  H.  B.  Brennecke, a German physician, showed that childbirth related 
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mortality rates in Prussia had dropped sharply beginning in the mid-1870s.  Samuel 
Abbott, secretary of the Massachusetts State Board of Health, did a comparative study 
of childbirth deaths in Massachusetts over the same period and found an almost 
identical pattern of decline.  Brennecke credited a change in the Prussian registration 
system with "the sudden and surprising fall of the puerperal mortality cure in 1874" 
and dismissed the idea that the decline was "due to the influence of antiseptics (which 
were not employed at that time in the country districts)" (Abbott 1898: 807).   Abbott 
(ibid.)claimed  that that explanation did not hold or the Massachusetts’ decline in 
mortality "since while the Massachusetts column [of data in his study] shows precisely 
the same sudden fall three years later, it is not true that any change in the methods or 
the authorities collecting the statistics have here taken place, since they have from the 
very outset, in 1842, been collected by the city registrars and the town clerks 
throughout the State."21  But Abbottt was mistaken.  As we saw in chapter 3, a 
significant change in the reporting methods and authorities had taken place with the 
passing of the 1878 certification law requiring all deaths in Massachusetts to be 
certified by physicians, producing a de facto standardization.  Disease-specific rates 
stabilized significantly from c.1880 through the end of the study period, which also 
marked the beginning of the mortality plateau. 
 
 
 
                                                 
21.  Abbott did not speculate on the Massachusetts decline but rather addressed the 
importance of standardizing the reporting for comparative study. 
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Puerperal Fever in Holyoke and Northampton 
Death rates from puerperal fever in both towns show a pattern of decline very 
similar to that found by Brennecke and Abbott.  The peak incidents occurred in the 
early 1880s but then sharply declined, followed by a plateau beginning in 1890s (see 
Figure 13).  The overall maternal mortality rate began to decline in the 1870s, followed 
by a plateau similar to that of puerperal fever.  The rise in puerperal fever, which 
began in the early 1860s, was probably due to demographic and socioeconomic shifts 
in both towns, for example, high population density, poor living conditions, rapid 
population growth, lagging sanitary and health infrastructures Hautaniemi et al.  1999; 
Beemer et al.  2005).  The pattern of decline in later decades, however, can be more 
precisely explained given certain historical developments.  During this period  
antiseptic procedures began to be employed in both Europe and the United States.  
The successes of Lister and his colleagues demonstrated the efficacy of antisepsis in 
reducing the incidence of postoperative infections.  These successes were most 
pronounced among lying-in hospitals where death rates from puerperal fever dropped 
as much as 80 percent.  Given the increased attention to antiseptic practices, it is 
reasonable to suggest that declines in puerperal fever were due to real reductions.   
Yet the fear of liability and legal sanctions on the part of physicians were on the 
rise.  The reluctance of nineteenth-century physicians to report puerperal fever as a 
cause of death is as likely an explanation as is real reductions.  These two explanations 
are not, however, mutually exclusive.  With the growing recognition that puerperal 
fever was preventable via hand washing and other antiseptic practices, the means for 
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preventing the infection and an environment of liability emerged together.  Once the 
responsibility of prevention had been laid at the feet of physicians and other 
caretakers, reported cases of infection and death could be more carefully scrutinized.22 
As Loudon and others have shown, the prevalence of underreporting puerperal fever 
was a persistent problem and one specifically addressed in both the ICD-1 and the ICD-
1a/2.  Instructions for qualifying deaths in childbirth addressed concerns for whether a 
particular disease was puerperal-related.  The standard instruction was to return the  
 
 
 
Figure 13.  Maternal and Puerperal Fever Mortality Rates,  
Holyoke & Northampton, 1850–1912.23 
 
 
                                                 
22.  Many physicians throughout this period, nevertheless, continued to reject the 
claim that they could be responsible for spreading this horrible infection. 
23 Maternal mortality rates are exclusive of puerperal fever. 
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certificate to the attending physician with a request to clarify whether or not the 
disease was puerperal for cases involving women who had suffered septichæmia, 
eclampsia, peritonitis, or some other putative condition (U.S. Bureau of the Census 
1910: 31, 41, 53, 57-59).24  The very recognition that such terms needed clarification 
when the deaths of women were attributed to those causes is an important 
consideration when we examine the problem of underreported cases of puerperal 
fever. 
 The impact of the ICD-1 on the reporting of puerperal fever, however, appears 
to be fairly modest.  Table 5 shows the percentage of all maternal deaths caused by 
puerperal fever from 1850 to 1912.  The 1880s mark the most active period, with 
puerperal fever representing over half of all maternal deaths in Northampton and 
Holyoke.  From the 1890s through the first decade of the twentieth century , the death 
rate from puerperal fever dropped by nearly half to about a quarter of all cases of  
maternal mortality.  
 
Table 5.   Puerperal fever deaths as a percentage of total maternal deaths, 
Northampton & Holyoke, 1850-1912. 
 
Period Maternal deaths Puerperal fever deaths % of total 
     
1850-59 10 4 40% 
1860-69 30 3 10% 
1870-79 65 13 20% 
1880-89 77 40 52% 
1890-99 68 28 41% 
1900-09 60 17 28% 
1910-12 21 9 43% 
                                                 
24. As to the precise reasons for this specific instruction, there is no discussion in 
either ICD-1 or ICD-1a/2. 
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From 1910 through 1912, however, puerperal fever rebounded to account for 
43 percent of all maternal deaths.  The qualifying instructions for puerperal fever in 
both the ICD-1 and the ICD-1a/2 were meant for clarification purposes and did not 
represent a change in nomenclature per se.  The instructions asked for more precision 
in identifying unqualified causes of death for women of childbearing age.   Again, the 
qualifying instructions for puerperal fever, as well as for syphilis, sought clarification on 
otherwise ambiguous usage.  The reported cases of puerperal fever toward the end of 
this period may have increased in response to requests that physicians better identify  
 
 
 
Figure 14.  Maternal and Puerperal Fever Mortality Rates,  
Holyoke & Northampton, 1880–1910.25 
 
                                                 
25. Maternal mortality rates are exclusive of puerperal fever. 
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them.  Figure 14  clarifies these trends by giving us a closer look at maternal and 
puerperal fever mortality rates from 1880 to 1910 using five-year intervals.  In this 
figure we see a sharp decline in puerperal fever as a reported cause of death beginning 
around 1880, followed by a pattern of relative stability. Despite the modest effects on 
reporting over this period, the ICD’s qualifying instructions reflected the struggles that 
officials faced in securing accurate cause-of-death reporting. From the sharp decline 
and stabilization of deaths from puerperal fever following the 1878 Massachusetts 
certification law, coupled with the potential liabilities associated with puerperal fever, 
it is reasonable to suggest that physicians in Holyoke and Northampton, like medical 
practitioners in England, Pennsylvania, and elsewhere, concealed puerperal fever in 
other cause-of-death categories. Again, the effectual role of antiseptic procedures is 
probably a contributing factor as well. Without further evidence, however, it remains 
unclear what direct impact the ICD’s qualifying instructions had on the reporting of 
puerperal fever in Holyoke and Northampton. 
 
Inanition 
The ICD instructions for inanition, unlike those for puerperal fever, represented 
a unequivocal change in nomenclature.  This particular cause-of-death category was 
employed quite extensively by U.S.  physicians, and the language used in the ICD-1a/2 
to admonish them to stop reporting inanition as a cause of death was the strongest 
among all the correctives.  In the first version of the ICD, "inanition" was listed under 
"affections produced by external causes."  Newborns receiving insufficient food were 
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specifically exempted from this cause and were to be classified under "early infancy: 
lack of care" (U.S. Department of the Treasury, U.S. Marine-hospital Service 1900: 9). 
This cause received no elaboration in the 1900 pamphlet (ICD-1).   However,  inanition 
was eventually listed as one of "the most objectionable returns:"   
 
In some localities, this term covers a multitude of imperfect diagnoses.   
What was the cause of the ‘inanition’?  The name of the disease should 
be given that lead to this condition.  The title ‘Inanition’ (173), as given 
in the Report of the International Commission and in English 
translations among ‘external causes,’ does not at all correspond to our 
usage of the term, which does not usually refer to actual deprivation or 
starvation, but to the wasting resulting from certain diseases.   It is thus 
merely an indefinite expression, like ‘debility’ or ‘marasmus’. (U.s. 
Bureau of the Census 1902: 15-16) 
 
 
It was not until the second revision of the ICD in 1909 (ICD-1a/2) that the term 
inanition was changed to starvation.  Again newborn infants were exempted and were 
to be returned under "ack of care," which had been elaborated to include "Cold.  Lack 
of clothing.  Uncleanliness.  Bad treatment.  Desertion" (U.S. Bureau of the Census 
1910: 63). The title, which applied only to children through the third month of life,  
included a note that "inanition – nonmilk diet" had been moved to "starvation."  The 
footnote for the "Starvation" title further clarified the wishes of the Committee:   
 
A death from "inanition" should be included here only when it implies 
actual starvation by deprivation of food.  When the word is used, as it 
frequently is in the United States, to denote exhaustion from defective 
nourishment, due to disease or congenital or senile debility, it should 
not be compiled under title 177B "[Starvation"].  The term is indefinite 
and otherwise objectionable, and the disease causing inanition should 
be given (ibid.). 
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Austin Flint, a nineteenth-century professor of medicine at Bellevue Hospital 
Medical College and Fellow of the New York Academy of Medicine, illustrates well the 
American position  A Treatise on the Principles and Practice of Medicine.  For Flint 
(1867 417-18), not only was the pathology of inanition implicated in "all diseases 
which interfere with the ingestion or assimilation of aliment,"  but the inability to 
absorb nutrition set up a downward spiral with any disease:  
 
The immediate cause of death in many cases of disease proving fatal by 
slow asthenia is inanition; that is to say, starvation.   These are facts of 
great practical importance, and they are not sufficiently appreciated by 
many practitioners of medicine. ...it is a maxim of conservative medicine 
that under all circumstances a chronic affection is less likely to be 
prolonged, serious lesions of structure are less liable to take place, and 
a fatal termination is postponed, in proportion as the vital powers are 
maintained by a nutritious diet. 
 
 
Additionally, Flint maintained that "innutrition" was frequently a cause for other 
diseases, like typhus, tuberculosis and scorbutus (ibid., 418).   This interaction between 
nutrition and disease was recognized for children as well, but infant and childhood 
malnutrition tended to be attributed to feeding regimens.  In his manual for beginning 
pediatricians,  George M. Tuttle, attending physician at Bethesda Foundling Asylum in 
St.  Louis,  offered a typical discussion of infant nutrition.   After mentioning 
prematurity, low birth weight, and "inheritance" from unhealthy or neurotic parents as 
possible sources of malnutrition, he stated, "But commoner yet, it is seen in children 
who in early infancy have been fed on diet entirely unsuitable to their age" (Tuttle 
1899: 161).   In his address on infant mortality to the American Medical Association, 
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Edwin E. Graham (1908: 1046)declared,  "Breast-feeding is surely a powerful measure 
with which to combat death."    
Proper nutrition was deemed crucial in preventing disease both specifically and 
more generally.  Under the category "Privation of the Class Zymotic, Order Dietic" (a 
new Order introduced in 1855), the Massachusetts state nosology added "want of 
breast milk" in 1863 (Secretary of the Commonwealth 1863: cixii).   Previously, in 1858, 
want of breast milk was excluded from "privation", and prior to the 1855 general 
reorganization of the Massachusetts nosology, "atrophy," "debility" and "infantile" 
were separate diseases listed under the heading "Uncertain Seat," while starvation 
was classed under "Violence."  Even want of breast milk as a specific cause can be read 
ambiguously: the mother may not have had sufficient milk, or the infant may have 
been deprived of breast milk by death, desertion or artificial feedings.   While much of 
the organization in Massachusetts’ nosology is reflected in the early ICD classifications, 
the "Order Dietic" is not.   Rather, the terms contained in that order, Privation, purpura 
and scurvy," "delirium tremens (alcoholism), and intemperance (alcoholism), are 
absent or spread throughout other categories.   For American doctors, the term 
inanition did not necessarily imply starvation in the sense of having food withheld.   
Rather, it encompassed the morally ambiguous area of neglect as well as poor care in 
the form of artificial feeding. 
The admonition to refrain from using inanition was certainly apropos for 
Holyoke physicians.  Inanition, though not infrequently given as a cause of death 
through the 1880s, was applied exclusively to children.   Of 34 inanition deaths during 
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that decade, only 4 decedents were over one year of age, and none  was over the age 
of five.   In Northampton inanition was given as the sole cause of death for both adults 
and children, with the term infantile debility used for the youngest.   (This term does 
not show up in the Holyoke records for that decade.)  During the following decade, the 
use of the term inanition increased (in frequency and scope) in Holyoke, particularly 
after 1894, and from 1895 through the end of the decade, 22 adults, 25 infants and 7 
children were recorded with inanition as the secondary cause of death, which is in 
keeping with the ICD 1909 footnote.   Among infant deaths, the most frequent primary 
cause was gastro-enteritis or premature birth.   However, for infants and children, 
inanition continued to be given as the primary or sole cause of death.  In the 1890s no 
adults in Holyoke died chiefly from inanition, but 79 children did, overwhelmingly in 
the first or second year of life.   Eleven of these children were more than  three 
months old, the cutoff for early infancy causes in the ICD intended to capture 
congenital defects.   In addition, beginning in 1898 the twin causes of marasmus and 
inanition began to appear for infants, a trend that increased through the 1910s.  
Marasmus was simply defined as wasting of flesh.  Inanition—in the American sense of 
exhaustion from defective nourishment—must then be understood as the underlying 
cause, the opposite of what the international community was urging by 1909.   
Beginning in 1900, the term malnutrition began to replace inanition both in terms of 
frequency—there were twice as many deaths from malnutrition as from inanition—
and in terms of being coupled with marasmus, prematurity and gastro-enteritis.  
Inanition as the sole cause of death for children under five years peaked in the late 
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1890s, but had begun to decline by 1900.  Malnutrition as a cause of death for children 
under five years, however, rose sharply in the first decade of the 1900s (see figure 15).   
As with puerperal fever, a number of factors could explain malnutrition’s 
dramatic rise and inanition’s decline.  It is reasonable to infer that the physicians in 
western Massachusetts declared some infant deaths the results of starvation, from 
either outright or implied neglect(one10-week-old infant’s death was recorded as "1.  
bottle-fed baby 2.  inanition").  The shift to malnutrition may have been more precise  
 
 
Figure 15. Inanition and Malnutrition Mortality Rates, Children Ages 0 to 5,  
Holyoke & Northampton, 1850–1912. 
 
 
in physicians’ minds.  Deaths from these coupled causes were particularly troublesome 
in Holyoke in the early twentieth century.  They were not only numerous, but also 
concentrated in the newly opened Bethlehem Asylum for infants at the Sisters of 
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Providence’s Brightside Institute.   The dangers of foundling homes were well 
recognized in Europe and the United States, yet the problems of classifying deaths of 
foundling infants was not directly addressed in the ICD   The note to "Other diseases of 
early infancy" provides at least part of the explanation: "No provision was formerly 
made under the International Classification for deaths of this kind [injuries at birth], 
owing, probably, to the fact that deaths of infants are, in France and some other 
European countries, returned as stillbirths if they occur prior to the date of 
registration" (Bureau of the Census 1910, 63).   In Europe, foundlings were put out to 
wet nurses if at all possible, where they had much better chances of survival than 
institutionalized infants (Kertzer et al.  1999; Levene 2006).   It was not uncommon for 
virtually all infants who were not placed by six months of age to die (Kertzer et al.  
1999).   Placing infants out, or compelling their unmarried mothers to stay and nurse 
them, was recommended in the United States as well (Graham 1908). 
This was not the practice at Bethlehem Asylum, where parents were requested 
to pay $6 per month but often could not (Liptak and Bennett 1999, 60).   The nuns 
were not able to feed their charges proper food, that is, breast milk, and they faced 
severe financial difficulties (Liptak and Bennett 1999).   They also ran orphanages for 
both boys and girls, so that infants who survived their care could remain with them.   
Blaming working-class mothers for killing their infants through artificial feeding was 
common (Swedlund and Ball 1998), but institutional deaths were more problematic.   
To name these deaths as due to "lack of care" or "insufficient nourishment" would 
have implicated the nuns devoted to caring for abandoned and orphaned children, but 
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classifying them under outright starvation would have been worse.  Some physicians 
may also have sympathized with working-class families unable to  provide their 
children with adequate breast milk.   It was during this period that breast feeding, 
particularly among the poor, declined sharply and artificial feeding with cow’s milk 
increased.  In Holyoke, as in many cities across the Northeastern United States, milk 
stations opened as an affordable and safe alternative for low income families, whose 
mothers worked outside the home and could not breast-feed.  The evidence suggests 
that improvements in nutrition for infants and children did not play a factor in the 
decline of reported cases of inanition for Holyoke or Northampton; in fact just the 
opposite appears to be the case.   
Again, the reasons for this shift in nomenclature are not entirely clear.  The 
admonition to refrain from using the term inanition as a cause of death in the 1902 
census manual provides a plausible explanation.  This same proscription did not 
appear in the ICD until its second revision in 1909 (ICD-1a/2), thus precluding its direct 
influence prior to 1910, when it was first published in the United States. Like puerperal 
fever, inanition underwent a  decline well before the ICD’s instruction to refrain from 
using the term.  Indeed, the 1902 census manual referred to the existing inadequacies 
of the 1900 ICD.  Inanition was one among several terms used in the ICD that the 
manual deemed "inadequate and unsatisfactory" (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1902: 15): 
 
All users of this manual, including physicians and registrars of local and 
state offices, will notice certain irregularities and inconsistencies 
inherent in the classification, and many terms will occur that are not 
even yet provided for in the tabular list and index… Provision is made 
for the regular decennial revision of the international classification, and 
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it is not too early to begin to collect data for this purpose.  …desirable 
changes may be noted for the next revision, and any suggestions which 
may be made to this office for this purpose will be… transmitted to the 
international commission of revision (ibid.:18). 
 
 
Delegates of 23 different countries were present at the Second Decennial Revision in 
1909.  The United States was represented by six delegates, the largest contingent of all 
the participating countries.  Many of the U.S.  delegation’s recommended revisions 
were approved for the 1909 Decennial Revision (ICD-1a/2), most notably, many 
identified in the 1902 Manual as indefinite and unsatisfactory (U.S. Bureau of the 
Census 1902: Gehlke 1910: 564).  While the list of U.S.  recommended revisions is not 
available, it is highly likely that the ICD-1a/2 corrective to refrain from using the term 
inanition as a cause of death originated with the U.S.  delegation, and was formally 
adopted into the Second Decennial Revision as a result. 
 
Professional and Organizational Development of the ICD 
The early development of the ICD represented both a beginning and an end in 
the classification of diseases and causes of death.  The Bertillon conferences emerged 
out of a context of diverse and often diverging nomenclatures.  The medical 
community in both the United States and Europe recognized the need to formulate a 
systematic classification of diseases and causes of death as an international endeavor, 
an effort explicitly designed to centralize and regulate common usage of terms.  
Emerging germ theories of disease, the advent of bacteriology, the rise of public health 
regimes and the subsequent changes in medical practices, particularly in Europe, 
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provided the material and conceptual conditions necessary to shift the epidemiological 
landscape during this period.  The ICD represents a benchmark of sorts in the 
transition from pre-germ theoretic understandings of disease to what we now 
consider as modern germ theory. 
Late nineteenth-century medicine and medical science struggled to transform 
themselves from the provincial impulses that had localized its practices and 
perspectives for centuries.  Changes in medical science, in conjunction with 
developments in public health and sanitation, changed the context in which physicians 
practiced in a relatively short period of time.  Resistance to this ever-shifting ground, 
as well as simply not having access to new developments in medical science, created a 
need to pull the various strands together in some systematic fashion.  The constitutive 
and regulative features that emerged out the ICD consisted of a collaboration of 
several different communities and practices, centering on a convergence of clinical and 
scientific practices.  With the publication of ICD-1 in 1900, we see the combined efforts 
of both physicians and statisticians to standardize disease and cause-of-death 
reporting come to fruition.  The broad international character of the ICD illustrates the 
professional and organizational development that was necessary for the 
implementation and success of these collaborative efforts.  European influence clearly 
dominated the early attempts at developing a standard classification system.  By the 
Second Decennial Revision in 1909, the U.S.  representation on the International 
Commission was significant enough that it hosted the Third Decennial Revision in 
Washington DC in 1919.  This influence was due in large part to the ongoing efforts of 
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the American Medical Association, the American Statistical Association, and the 
American Public Health Association to effect standardization in the United States. 
The call for an international standard for disease and cause-of-death 
classification began in the mid-nineteenth century with the work of Farr and his 
successor, Bertillon.  The Bertillon International Commission extended beyond simply 
classifying diseases and causes of death.  It provided a window into emerging medical 
and public health professions.  During the early stages of the North American 
epidemiological transition, the medical community as an organized professional body 
was in its infancy.  Physician training lacked a clear, uniform standard of instruction; 
systems for recording causes of death and diagnostic measures tended to follow local 
or regional criterion; and broad public health concerns were just beginning to take 
shape.  These and other factors influenced conceptions of disease throughout this 
period and are readily seen in the recorded causes of death in Massachusetts over the 
second half of the nineteenth century.   
In Massachusetts, Holyoke and Northampton illustrate some of the more 
dramatic shifts in the social and epidemiological landscape during the late nineteenth 
century.  "Puerperal fever" and "Inanition" are two examples of how the international 
community attempted to regulate the underlying grammars of death at the local level.  
This was only possible given the earlier developments in Massachusetts's registration 
system.  The ICD was not simply a set of unilateral injunctions from European medical 
professionals to instruct physicians in proper nomenclature.  The document was truly a 
collaborative effort from all participating countries, and it provided a mechanism for 
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implementing provincial concerns.  In the United States this entailed the ongoing 
efforts to expand the death registration area to include all the states by means of an 
internationally recognized standard nomenclature.  Unlike most European countries, 
the United States  did not have a national death registration system in place but relied 
upon the voluntary reporting of individual states for gathering mortality statistics on a 
national scale, which continues to be the case today.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
130 
 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
Institutional Mandates and Their Accountability Conditions 
Institutionalizing cause-of-death reporting in Massachusetts required more 
than a reporting system with dedicated professionals, or standardized reporting 
procedures and nomenclature, or State regulatory measures.  Cause-of-death 
reporting required a set of practices that corresponded with its institutional mandate 
and a requisite set of professional practitioners to carry out that mandate.  The 
purposes for which Shattuck envisioned a death registration system was twofold, 1) to 
collect complete and accurate statistical data, and 2) to use that data for 
understanding the public's health.  Massachusetts' Registration Act of March 3, 1842 
established the requirements and guidelines for implementing a modern system of 
vital registration.  Establishing these requirements and guidelines put the statistical 
and public health mandates in motion, but implementing that modern system of vital 
registration took nearly forty years to fulfill.  The regulatory development of death 
registration was a slow, incremental process that tinkered with legal mandates to help 
bring about a more accurate system of reporting.  Most of the statutes missed their 
mark, however, and the system stagnated on several fronts. 
 Vital registration in Massachusetts as elsewhere included the recording of 
births, marriages, and deaths.  The old system that had existed since the seventeenth 
century was predicated on a legal and economic basis.  Gathering public-health 
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statistics was not part of its mandate.  The system that went into effect in 1842 was 
operationally an extension of the earlier system.  As Gutman points out (p.47 above), 
the practical significance of the 1842 Registration Act was negligible because most of 
the provision had not change from the 1792 law.  The key difference distinguishing the 
new system from the earlier system was the public health mandate.  The reporting 
practices in place prior to 1842 essentially remained the same after 1842 because the 
practitioners given charge of executing vital registration had not changed.  Granted, 
the new system had become centralized, it was implemented under state authority, a 
fledgling bureaucracy was put into place, and the expectations and scope were 
significantly expanded.  The operational side was, nevertheless, still under the guise of 
town clerks and the administrative practices that served that community of 
professionals for decades.  The constitutive and regulative norms under which town 
clerks practiced their profession fit relatively well with the administrative task of 
collecting registration data for births and marriages.  Simply recording births and 
marriages did not require any additional expertise for ensuring accuracy.  For the task 
of accurately recording causes-of-death as an extension of diagnostic practice, town 
clerks did not possess the constitutive competency necessary for establishing this duty 
as normative basis for practice.  The only professionals for which that practice had 
constituent meaning were physicians. 
 The public health mandate that launched the 1842 Registration Act required a 
new set of practices.  The constitutive and regulative norms that governed the 
administrative practices of town clerks were insufficient for carrying out that task.  The  
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constitutive and regulative norms that governed the diagnostic practices of physicians 
were also insufficient for carrying out that task.  The assumption that the mere 
conjunction of two very different types of practices could sufficiently produce and 
sustain an institutional mandate effectively halted the institution-building that was 
necessary in developing cause-of-death reporting as a public health institution in its 
own right.  The constitutive norms that governed physicians' diagnostic practices were 
contextual features of practices with unique accountability conditions.  The shared 
customs and practices that provided physicians their basis for diagnosing disease were 
forged against the backdrop of a community of language users who demonstrated 
their agreement through their professional use of diagnostic language (see chapter 2, 
p. 27ff).  The same was true for the administrative practices of town clerks.  The 
constituencies and competencies in both cases were different, however.  The specific 
practices that defined the communities for which they belonged and served were 
locally unique in terms of their meanings and accountability conditions.  As such, the 
respective practices of physicians and clerks emerged, developed, and existed 
independently and with their own unique accountability conditions.  For cause-of-
death registration to be successful as a public health institution a set of practices with 
its own accountability conditions needed to emerge, develop, and exist independently 
as something more than what physicians or clerks brought to the table in their 
respective professional capacities.  Put differently, a new language game needed to 
emerge that drew upon a unique set of practices developed through the professional 
practices of physicians and clerks. 
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While practices themselves are locally unique as defining outcomes of 
particular communities, the broader social processes by which these practices find life 
transcend their local configurations.  The pragmatic mechanisms of public 
accountability most certainly find their expression within the context of local practices, 
that is, all communities develop accountability configurations that are distinctive to 
their practices, but the processes through which accountability configurations are 
created extend across these local expressions.  The pragmatic path that provides the 
conditions allowing for the emergence of distinct accountability configurations is the 
same regardless of the unique outcomes.  As we saw in chapter 2, the conditions that 
allow for these distinct accountability configurations is the expectation or presumption 
of symmetry between actors in their publically accountable interactions.  This is the 
pragmatic constraint – the ever-present expectation that those with whom we are 
interacting are doing so under a mutual set of expectations from a third-person 
perspective.  In other words, we approach interactions from the perspective of the 
other and expect those with whom we are interacting to do the same.  We draw upon 
an assumption of public accountability before engaging in any particular configuration 
that accountability conditions provide (see above, p.32ff).  This in a nutshell is what 
public accountability is all about.  While it is presupposed in all interactive contexts, 
public accountability must nevertheless be expressed through shared – normatively 
governed – practices that are configured locally by means of their constitutive and 
regulative features.  The broader extension of these pragmatic mechanisms is the 
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working out of the constitutive and regulative norms that identify the unique practices 
of particular communities. 
Establishing constitutive and regulative normativity in conjunction with an 
evolving set of accountability conditions is a necessary step in defining any community 
practice.  This is an emergent process that draws upon existing institutional resources 
and practices.  The accountability conditions of Massachusetts's cause-of-death 
registration system reveal the normative configurations that were necessary in the 
institutional development of vital registration in Massachusetts.  That new practices 
can emerge from existing practices speaks to the transcendental nature of these 
pragmatic mechanisms.  We see this institution-building process in the early and 
continuing development of the ICD. 
  
Institution-Building in the Rise of the ICD Community 
Since the turn of the twentieth century, physicians in the United States have 
been required to record causes of death in accordance with the International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD).  This system of classification has been part of the 
medical profession's diagnostic language for over a hundred years.  It has undergone 
periodic changes since its inception in 1901, and is now in its tenth revision.  The 
diagnostic practices of physicians and other medical personnel are intertwined with 
this classification system.  The ICD guidelines govern the ways in which physicians and 
reporting agents are permitted to report causes of death.  Categorical constraints and 
boundaries are imposed, limiting the number of options available to the reporting 
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agent.  Causes of death are coded according to the rules and guidelines set forth 
through the World Health Organization.  To be qualified to record causes of death, one 
must go through a certification process that begins with taking approved courses in 
ICD coding.  Inclusion into this group of ICD coders requires one to engage in practices 
that demonstrate the requisite knowledge and skills necessary to be considered a 
member of this community.  The ICD receives its marching orders from the collective 
practices and shared meanings that have developed and continue to develop within an 
ever-widening community of health practitioners.  The periodic changes in the ICD are 
the result of changes in the way the ICD was and continues to be used, its practical 
usefulness for the communities it serves, and the general agreement that its 
practitioners demonstrate in its use.  As such, the ICD is an expression of the shared 
practices that define the ICD community. 
Classifying diseases obviously did not begin with the ICD nor will it end with the 
ICD.  The practice of disease classification has been around for centuries.  Nosologies 
were commonly used and referred to long before the ICD emerged.  These were by 
and large theoretical instruments created by individual physicians designed for clinical 
purposes.  The context and constituency of this practice are important in 
understanding why classifications looked as they did.  For most of its history, the 
practice of medicine took place in the private sphere and existed as a very isolating 
trade from a professional perspective.  Identifying oneself with a broader professional 
community did not enter into the minds of most physician prior to the mid-nineteenth 
century.  Medical practice was neither a public endeavor nor viewed necessarily as a 
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public good.  The need to standardize was first driven by a public health agenda.  The 
value of standardizing disease terms was lost to physicians because it had no 
conceivable clinical value.  Farr's nosology was too broad of a classification schema to 
be of much practical use.  At the same time, Farr's intent in developing his "uniform 
statistical nomenclature" was quite different from the everyday concerns of 
nineteenth-century physicians.  His purpose was to redress what he saw as significant 
deficiencies in past nosologies, Sydenham's in particular.  While it may have been of no 
concern or by design for earlier nosologists to use multiple terms for the same disease 
or ignore the need for precision in characterizing these diseases, such practices were 
fundamentally at odds with what Farr was attempting to accomplish with his nosology.  
Farr, Shattuck, and the growing international group of public health reformers were at 
work establishing their own practices during this period.  Context, constituency, and 
competency were integral in the developing and moving the public-health movement 
into a professional community with their own unique practices. 
The stepwise developments of Massachusetts vital registration system were 
not unique.  The same reporting challenges were present in states all across the 
country.  Without the presence of these reporting regimes, the international 
developments in standardizing disease and cause-of-death nomenclature could not 
have occurred.  The international character of the ICD represented the professional 
and organizational interests of local and regional communities in the medical and 
public-health sectors.  As an international institution, the ICD emerged out of these 
local and regional interests.  The success of these collaborative efforts, however, 
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rested on creating a new set of practices designed to serve its international 
constituency.  The journey was certainly not a smooth one.  Like Massachusetts' cause-
of-death registration system, the task of establishing practices and practitioners 
required the development of accountability conditions that corresponded with the 
institutional mandates that defined the ICD community.  Much of the story of that 
struggle took place and continues to take place after our period.  Those struggles, 
however, were seeded in the latter half of the nineteenth century in both Europe and 
the United States.  At the same time, the institutional successes of the ICD were 
equally seeded during this period. 
The pragmatic conditions out of which both Massachusetts' cause-of-death 
registration system and the International Classification of Diseases emerged do not 
consist of special circumstances or settings.  The same pragmatic constraints that we 
confront in our everyday lives are the same pragmatic constraints from which these 
two institutions emerged.  The central objects for which both systems were given 
charge were disease and cause-of-death terms.  How that language was used in each 
context provided the constitutive and regulative medium that governed their 
institutional practices.  Language is not a free-floating system.  It requires the actions 
of real people who act in very tangible and consequential ways.  As I have argued, 
public accountability is an imminent feature of how we use language.  The public 
nature of our language games, whether played in a professional, ordinary, consensual, 
or conflictual capacity is what allows for our communicative, justificatory, and 
intersubjective practices to be meaningful.  The social meanings of mortality in 
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nineteenth-century Massachusetts reflect the public commitments of a diverse set of 
communities and practices that shared similar resources in working out the struggles 
and triumphs of communicating the language of death and disease.  
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APPENDIX 
 
1877 STATE BOARD OF HEALTH SURVEY OF PHYSICIANS AND CLERKS 
 
 
Note: The following contains the survey responses of Medical Correspondents and City 
and Town Clerks to the Massachusetts State Board of Health, as published in the 1877 
Annual Report of the Massachusetts's State Board of Health, regarding the accuracy 
and compliance of cause-of-death registration in the State of Massachusetts. The 
published responses were selected by the Board of Health for illustrative purpose and 
did not contain all survey responses. Each response retains its original numbering as 
recorded in the survey results. 
 
Page 235 
 
Replies of Medical Correspondents 
 
1.  The registration of deaths in this town is quite complete and satisfactory, with 
perhaps the exception that the cause of death is reported in too general terms, a 
matter that can be easily remedied by physicians making the report, which is not done 
in all cases now.  The deaths are returned by the undertaker to the clerk once a year; 
this, perhaps, is not as often as it should be done, but such matters, I think, cannot be 
attended to conveniently with that promptness in country places as in cities. 
 
2.  I presume that our town authorities are not remiss in reporting all cases of death, 
but are certainly not over-particular in the minutiae of the subject, -in fact, have not in 
a single case referred to me for such particulars. 
 
5.  Undoubtedly the number of deaths is given the clerk with sufficient accuracy, but 
the causes of death in many cases must be quite imaginary, as the physicians are not 
consulted about this. 
 
7.  The cause of death is invariably returned on the undertaker's certificate and is given 
by the friends of the deceased.  I am never asked to make a physician's certificate. 
 
9.  In a few instances, decedents are taken to other places for burial without the town 
clerk's license (and probably escape registration). 
 
Page 236 
 
17.  I think all deaths are returned, but I think that the value of registration is 
essentially impaired by wrong causes being reported, usually through ignorance; there 
is evidently no intentional misrepresentation.  Perhaps the physician's signature 
accompanies about two per cent of all certificates. 
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18.  It has been the custom for the undertaker to take around, once or twice a year, to 
physicians, their blanks, filled out in other respects, and get the attending physician to 
certify.  If not disposed, they have filled them out themselves. 
 
19.  The registration of deaths and their causes in this town is very incomplete and 
unsatisfactory, and I am aware all the deaths are not recorded.  The custom has been 
for the town clerk to go through the town once a year and "collect the births and 
deaths" - while during the year many births and deaths have occurred in families who 
have removed from town; consequently no record can be made of them.  There being 
no particular undertaker, I think no one ever makes any return to the clerk, and I think 
the cause of death is never reported by any of our physicians.  I have long been aware 
of the unsatisfactory manner and incompleteness of the registration of deaths and 
causes of death, not only in this town, but in many other towns. 
 
24.  Since I received your circular I have had an interview with the town clerk.  He says 
the registration is all a farce.  I inquired how he procured his information, and he said 
it was supposed he would send to every house, but I think he takes the neighborhood 
reports. 
 
24-1/2.  The undertaker usually puts down the cause from hearsay oftener than he 
ascertains from the attending physician the real cause. 
 
25.  I think the registration of deaths is generally made quite promptly, but the 
undertakers are not careful enough to inquire of the physicians as to the causes of 
death, and one often sees names given which are altogether outside of medical 
nomenclature.  The physicians are equally careless in the same thing, and one would 
often be in doubt to know what the true cause of death was, unless they had attended 
the cases themselves, as our yearly death-list will testify.  The law does not oblige a 
physician to give the cause, unless applied to for it, and then he is liable of a fine of ten 
dollars if he does not make the return in fifteen days.  I think an improvement can be 
made by obliging the physicians to fill blanks in a scientific manner and return them to 
the clerk without having the undertaker as a medium. 
 
28.  I would suggest an amendment to the statutes on this subject, that no interment 
be allowed to take place, under a severe penalty, in any town or city, without the 
certificate of the clerk of the town or city in which the death occurred (or the deceased 
resided) having been first obtained.  There seems to me to be no necessity for any 
exceptions. 
 
34.  In a full practice in this town for more than forty-four years, I have never been 
asked for the causes of death, nor have I ever so reported.  We do not have, in the 
country towns, "undertakers," and of course no returns of such persons have been 
made to clerks. 
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35.  There are a considerable number of cases of death among the foreign population 
who die without any regular attendance.  I have supposed they were reported by the 
sexton as deaths, but the cause of death would often be random guessing on the part 
of relatives. 
 
36.  I have never been called upon to give the causes of deaths, and therefore cannot 
say whether they are accurate or not. 
 
37.  The registration of deaths, and the causes of death, in this town, has been very 
imperfect; and, as far as sanitary purposes are concerned, worse than useless.  Last 
year I made a formal protest to our selectman, the registration was so incorrect, 
especially as to the cause of death, more than one-tenth having been recorded 
incorrectly. The undertaker has been in the habit of asking the friends the "cause," and 
once in two or three months reporting to the town clerk.  Of course such statistics are 
worse than useless.  Statistics, to be of any value, should be themselves correct.  This 
year I have been asked in a few cases to certify as the cause of death; for several years 
past, not once.  There ought to be a law compelling the sexton to require of the 
physician in charge to certify to the cause of every death, before interment, with a 
penalty attached for non-performance.  No respectable physician would ever object to 
doing this.  The law now is, I believe, that the physician shall give a certificate when 
required to do so; but no one is compelled to make the request.  No body should be 
removed from town, or interred, without a proper certificate of the cause of death 
from the attending physician. 
 
39.  Many times the physician never sees the return at all.  The statement of some 
member of the family is all the authority.  I don't think, during my practice, that fifty 
per cent. of the deaths were returned in a proper manner. 
 
43.  The registration of deaths in our town is done after a poor fashion.  Near the end 
of the year, or rather, near the time to make the annual returns, the town clerk 
himself, or someone for him, goes around and "picks up" all the deaths he or she can 
hear of; the cause of death is learned from friends or neighbors.  I do not, nor does any 
other physician, make any returns to the clerk, in our town. 
 
44.  The registration of deaths here is not satisfactory.  There is one undertaker, and he 
is negligent in this matter, frequently letting the half-filled blanks remain on his hands 
and accumulate till the end of the year, then getting the physicians to certify to the 
causes of death from memory, which in many cases involves inaccuracy.  I do not know 
but all cases may be returned, but I do know, that by reason of the slack way in which 
it is attended to, there is much guesswork in the final report when it is made up. 
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47.  Before burial in our cemeteries, it is of course necessary to secure a permit from 
the city authorities, and so far the registration is complete.  Whatever return there is 
of the cause of death comes from the undertakers, and from them alone.  I do not 
remember to have been asked the cause of death in more than two or three instances 
for many years.  The undertakers prepare the statement from reports of friends.  The 
city clerk informs me that there is much delay in the sending in of these reports, 
generally requiring his personal attention to obtain them, and then not very 
satisfactory in every case. 
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48.  The registration of deaths in this city is complete, in so far that the total number is 
correctly returned.  It is not satisfactory, in that there is some confusion in the 
important item, "cause of death."  It has been customary for the undertaker to fill up 
the blanks, generally without consultation with the attending physician, relying upon 
friends for his information.  In cases which he considered doubtful, the physician is 
sometimes called upon for his opinion, and to fill the blank. In the cases which the 
cause of death is given to the satisfaction of the undertaker by friends of the deceased, 
he inserts the name of the physician, though he has not seen the certificate.  I have to-
day examined the certificates returned to the clerk's office for a couple of months 
past, perhaps fifty in number.  The name of the attending physician has been inserted 
in all, but in only two or three instances by himself. 
 
50.  The registration of deaths and causes of death is, I think, very unsatisfactory, so far 
as our city is concerned.  I think, however, that but few deaths escape registration.  So 
far as "causes of death" are concerned, the record is comparatively little value.  The 
undertakers almost never take the certificate of return to the physician who attended 
the deceased for his signature of cause of death, but put down as cause of death 
whatever the family say the doctor said was the cause.  I got the returns of the last 
year from the city clerk to look through, to find out about some of these things I have 
mentioned.  We have a yearly mortality of about two hundred or more at present.  I 
think there were obtained, last year, three certificates of death with signatures of 
physicians, out of two hundred.  
 
A case of "chronic rheumatism" was cirrhotic kidney; a case of "ulceration of the 
bowels" was cancer of rectum; a case of "heart-disease" was septicæmia or pyæmia, 
following amputation for old disease of knee-joint; a case of "tumor" was aneurism of 
the aorta.  "Infancy" is down for twelve deaths, etc., etc. 
I have been trying to do something to make our registration better, and the city clerk 
has seen the undertakers, and they agree to take their certificates of return to the 
physicians for their signatures.  I brought up the subject in our local society, but I did 
not succeed in getting the members interested apparently; nobody, with one, perhaps 
two exceptions, seemed to care anything about it. 
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51.  If the law provided that no burial could take place without the possession by the 
proper authority, of a certificate of the cause of death from the attending physician, it 
would seem that some of the faulty and unsatisfactory "causes of death" might be 
avoided.  
 
55.  As far as I can learn, both from my own experience and from inquiry of the clerk of 
the town, I think  it (registration) has been done in an imperfect manner, and 
necessarily, from the fact that the returns have been made once a year. 
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56.  So far as my experience and knowledge of registration of deaths extend, it is far 
from satisfactory; and this, I believe, is mainly due to neglect on the part of the 
undertakers in complying with the requirements of the law.   Certificates of death are 
generally sent in some weeks and sometimes months after burial.  I always attend 
immediately to the filling out of certificates on receiving them.  I have now upon my 
desk two that have been there several weeks awaiting the call of the undertaker. 
 
57.  I am not called upon in half my cases to give the certificate.  I understand that 
undertakers get them filled by the family, and I know that many certificates are wholly 
false as to cause of death.  Almost any cough is reported either "consumption" or 
"lung fever," and so in other diseases. 
 
61.  The method of registration for this town is as follows: Two persons dig the graves 
and drive the hearses.  These persons, at the end of the year, go about town and visit 
every house in which they learn of a death or birth having taken place during the year.  
The name, age, disease of which the person dies, etc., are put down, and all are 
returned to the town clerk.  The record is, therefore, made up wholly of the 
statements of the families in which the person died.  Physicians make no return 
whatever. In a few instances, families, if uncertain of the causes of death, refer the 
sexton to the physician.  More commonly they are better satisfied to give their own 
opinions than those of the physician, if they do not happen to coincide.  Hence the 
record cannot be very accurate.  In looking over the records for various purposes, I 
have been very much dissatisfied at what I found in many instances assigned as the 
cause of death in cases that I had treated. 
 
66.  The undertaker fills out the blanks relating to causes of death, according to the 
dictation of the family.  When the disease is obscure or peculiar, the physician is 
consulted to give the name of the disease, but this is often loosely done.  I am not able 
to report as to the promptness of returns to the city clerk. 
 
67.  So far as I can learn, all the deaths in this city are reported except still-births, of 
which I find no record.  The city clerk informs me that the undertakers are generally 
prompt in their returns.  Physicians do not make out certificates of the causes of death 
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at all, that I can learn of, though on half a dozen returns rendered this year, I find the 
physician has filled out the cause-of-death blank (on the undertaker's return), and 
signed his name in the space left for the name of the attending physician.  In 60 of this 
year's returns the name of the physician is given, but his signature is not attached.  In 
134 of this year's returns the name of the physician is omitted.  The cause of death in 
many cases is obscurely or incorrectly given, as "weakness," "cut with a knife," 
"accidental," "inward spasm," "cold," "troubled in the brain," "dropsy," "debility," 
"teething," etc.  One return has the honest record of "don't know," for which indeed 
causes many deaths.  I would suggest that it be required for the physician to fill out 
and sign, in every case, the cause-of-death blank on the undertaker's return before it is 
handed in to the clerk. 
 
71.  Causes of death are never, or rarely, reported by the physicians of this town. The 
clerk makes up his report upon hearsay testimony, never asking information of the 
physician in charge of the case.  I have known "puerperal fever" returned as "typhoid," 
or, in another case, as "lung fever."  So far as my observation extends, in this and many 
other country towns in Western Massachusetts, very little dependence can be placed 
upon the statistics of causes of deaths as returned by town clerks.  Undertakers never 
require any certificate from attending physicians.  I would suggest that it be made a 
penal offence for an interment to occur without the undertaker having a certificate 
from some respectable physician, and that a further penalty be added if the 
undertaker fails to return this certificate to the town clerk. 
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74.  As I have been town clerk for the last twenty years, I can speak from personal 
observation, and, when I say that the death-returns are incomplete and unsatisfactory, 
I only say what I know to be truth.  In fact, in some forty deaths returned the past year, 
I did not find five certificates from physicians, notwithstanding I had been careful to 
furnish them with a full supply of blanks for the purpose. As a matter of course, the 
great object in view is, to a great extent, lost.  The number of deaths is promptly 
returned according to an understanding with the sexton, and, if physicians would only 
meet the requirements of law, our returns would become reliable.  The only remedy 
which suggests itself to me at this moment, is, that a certificate from the clerk to the 
sexton, that all the requirements of law had been complied with, should be furnished 
previous to burial, and that the sexton shall be prohibited from making burials without 
such certificate, under penalty.  Some efficient remedy should be applied soon in order 
to render the returns valuable. 
 
75  I think the registration of deaths in this city has improved since I referred to it in a 
communication to you a year or two since.  I have taken occasion to urge upon the 
undertakers the importance of obtaining the written statement of physicians in 
relation to the causes of death.  Formerly it was customary, and it is practiced, I fear, 
to some extent now, for the undertakers to take the statement of the friends of the 
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deceased in regard to the cause of death, without consulting the attending physician. 
Most of the undertakers, however, submit the proper blanks to the attending 
physicians to be filled by them.  It often happens, particularly among the poorer 
classes, who are not able to employ, or do not choose to employ, a physician through 
the course of a disease, that a physician is called, perhaps once, to prescribe for a 
patient, and, after that, his services are not requested, and the patient, after the lapse 
of an indefinite period of time, one, two, or more weeks, dies. When the return is 
made out by the undertaker, he may apply to the physician for the nature of the 
disease, but it is often quite impossible for the physician to state accurately the 
immediate and sometimes even the remote cause of death.  In consequence  of the 
great diversity of skill among those who have the title of "Doctor," in this land of 
medical liberty or license, the nomenclature employed in reporting deaths is 
sometimes very inaccurate and indefinite.  I note the following causes of death in the 
city clerk's register for the present year: "Teething," "worm fever," "pharalithic 
rheumatism," "canker," "jaundice," "pelvis malformation." There are, however, fewer 
of such indefinite terms employed, than might be expected.  I have reason to believe 
that all deaths are reported to the undertakers, and by them promptly returned to the 
city clerk. 
 
78.  I am never called upon in any way to report upon the causes of death- at least 
have not been in late years. 
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78-1/2.  Our undertaker is a man of thirty years' experience; in early life a carpenter by 
trade; does not belong to any temperance society; he often has the difficult duty of 
deciding the cause of death from viewing the cadaver, and he makes his returns in 
conformity with his own inquest. 
 
81.  Could the public mind be educated up to the point of compulsory autopsies in all 
cases of death, such autopsies to be performed by duly qualified, legally appointed 
medical officers, would not both the science of medicine and the art of healing make 
large advances in our midst during the next half century?  What accomplished 
diagnosticians would arise as one result of such a measure!  But this is a Utopian idea; 
a thing to dream of, but never to be practically realized in this country.  I may say, in 
conclusion, that the registrations of death is "complete and satisfactory," at least very 
much so in my town.  But the registration of the "causes of death" is not satisfactory; 
that is, much less satisfactory. 
 
83.  I have practised in town five years, and have never been called upon for 
certificates of death during that time.  The reports  of the deaths in the town appear 
yearly in the clerk's report, but his information is derived from other sources than 
through physicians.   
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84.  During the past two years, of all deaths returned, not one in three was signed by 
any physician. 
 
88.  The undertakers make prompt returns, but the physicians are not prompt with the 
cause, and the town clerk is obliged to hunt up the cause before the end of the year.  
In regard to still-born children, if any undertaker is called, he makes a return; if, 
however, the friends bury the child, no return is made. 
 
89.  Cases have occurred in the past, where the body has been taken just across the 
line into Lawrence, and no return made to the clerk here. 
 
91.  All deaths are supposed to be returned; but the causes of deaths, as returned, are 
frequently very unsatisfactory; about one-half are judged to be misnamed. 
 
93.  The clerk said, further, that he found it very difficult, in many cases, to obtain the 
facts and information necessary for him to make the records on the town books 
complete.  Some would be attended by physicians out of town; other families would 
move out of town soon after a death, without making or leaving any record of the 
death or cause of death for the clerk.  Transient persons, shop hands, etc., would 
sicken and die suddenly, their friends would come and take their remains to some 
distant place for interment, without making any returns of the death to the clerk.  
 
94.  I had a talk with the town clerk this morning, and he informs me that returns of 
deaths are not made promptly by the undertakers to him, and that only myself and 
one other physician make out certificates of causes of death.  There are four practising 
medical men here, and no one but myself appears to be in the practice of making out a 
certificate immediately after the occurrence of death.  The principal undertaker 
seldom calls for a certificate, and, the doctors only being required by law to give a 
certificate when it is called for, the whole matter is neglected in a majority of the 
deaths.  The present town clerk appears to have tried to get his returns in promptly, 
but the undertakers and the medical attendants have been careless and remiss. 
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95.  Empirics, often grossly ignorant, report causes in a large proportion of deaths; 
these reports are received on a par with those of the educated physician. 
 
96.  To my mind the registration of deaths and causes of death in this city is not at all 
satisfactory or complete, when viewed from a medical stand-point.  In fact, as far as 
statistics or the use of such registration in matters affecting the public health are 
concerned, the matter is a mere farce.  I have no means of knowing whether all deaths 
are returned to the undertakers or not.  Upon inquiry of the undertakers, I find that 
they make their return to the city clerk once a month, and that, as a rule, they obtain 
their knowledge of causes of death from inquiring of the family.  Certificates of the 
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causes of death are not given in this city by any physician, they never being requested 
to do so. 
 
98.  In regard to the registration of the causes of deaths, there is room and good 
reason for making a radical change.  In a majority of instances, the undertaker makes 
his return, giving the cause of death and the name of the attending physician from 
information obtained from the parents or relatives of the deceased.  I have in mind an 
instance which as occurred within ten days, where the cause of death was reported as 
"pneumonia," and I know, from personal examination, that the party died from 
"phthisis."  It seems to me that in  order to obtain a correct registration as to causes of 
death, and have a report that would be reliable on which to base a statistical report, 
that it should be made obligatory on the part of the physician in attendance at the 
time of death of the patient, to sign, in his own handwriting, the undertaker's return, 
as to the cause of death.  Some way should be devised to prevent the undertakers 
from making their returns, without first obtaining their information as to causes of 
death from the physician in attendance.  As the returns are now made, there is no 
responsibility on the part of the physician; it is left entirely in the hands of 
irresponsible parties, and, of course, the attending physician is the only one qualified 
to make a correct return. 
 
99.  I think the attending physician is very seldom interrogated in relation to the 
matter, and do not know that I ever was.  A nearer approximation (I think) would be 
made to the truth, if every physician were obliged to furnish a certificate to the 
undertaker or to the clerk of the town, for a record of each death that may occur in his 
practice, with a penalty, should an undertaker officiate without such certificate. 
 
100.  The town clerk informs me that the registration of deaths and the causes of 
death is incomplete; that at least one corpse a month, on the average, is removed from 
town without any return being made, either of the death itself or of the causes of it. 
 
101.  I called upon our undertaker.  He informs me that all deaths are returned to him, 
and he returns them to the clerk.  It is not his custom to call upon the physicians in all 
cases for the cause of death, but takes the statement of the family unless they refer 
him to the physician.  I have no suggestions to offer, but it seems to me the statistics 
would be much more valuable, if, in every instance, the cause of death was certified by 
the attending physician. 
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103.  The registration of deaths and causes thereof is satisfactory and correct, so far as 
I can find out, except that the undertaker or friends of the deceased often neglect to 
present the return of death to the attending physician for his opinion of cause of death 
and signature, but fill it in themselves, so that omissions and mistakes are frequent.  I 
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do not think that I have signed more than half the returns of deaths which have 
occurred in my own practice for the last eight years.  
 
105.  I am seldom asked to fill out a blank, and know but little of the reports. 
 
108.  The town clerk's record is well kept, so far as he can be expected to keep it; yet 
even in the record are evidences that the neglect of the law relating to physician's 
certificates occasions much looseness in the record of the causes of death.  The law in 
relation to physician's certificates, I am informed, has never been enforced here.  The 
town clerk also states, that in his yearly round for obtaining the births for registration, 
he has occasionally heard of a death which has not been reported to him.  Another 
irregularity has been permitted in allowing undertakers of the neighboring city of 
Salem and those of the adjoining towns to make their returns of deaths at which they 
have officiated, semi-annually.  
 
109.  I have never been asked to make a certificate of death and the cause of death for 
any one who has died in this town. 
 
113.  It would be an important improvement in the present law if the physician's 
certificate of cause of death were required in all cases, without exception, previous to 
interment, and cemetery authorities were forbidden to permit any interment except 
on presentation of an order or certificate from the town clerk.  I cannot ascertain that 
any unrecorded interments have been made here in the past two years; but such an 
occurrence is not at all impossible under existing regulations. 
 
122.  The causes of death are at present registered with commendable painstaking by 
our municipal officers.  Only a very small percentage of deaths are registered without a 
statement of the cause certified to by some medical attendant.  But the provisions of 
the law last enacted to secure a registration are not strictly observed.  From the nature 
of the work, I think the registration of causes of death should be at least subject to the 
supervision of a medical officer.  In our cities this could be made one of the duties of 
the city physician.  Moreover, tables should be furnished to the recording officer and 
to physicians, indicating the general classification to be followed.  I think that for the 
purposes sought through this registration, only a general classification should be 
attempted.  A minute classification is likely to prove useless from the mixture of 
inaccurate diagnoses from ignorant practitioners, with the opinions of careful 
observers.  
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123.  The town clerk employs a man to canvass the town every year to collect all the 
statistics and report to him at the beginning of the year. 
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125.  The town clerk informs me that there are a few returns which are not adequately 
filled.  I cannot control returns of deaths of cases under the care of other physicians, 
but I am in the habit of calling at the office of the town clerk every year before he 
forwards his returns, and of assisting him, as far as possible, in making them complete 
in my department.  
 
131.  The registration may be complete, yet I think not wholly satisfactory - the 
physician's certificate frequently not being called for until several months have elapsed 
since a death, and then the circumstances not fully in mind. To decide whether such 
registration is satisfactory or not, I would first know the object of any registration.  If 
for the basis of statistical tables of causes of death, prevalent diseases, etc., I should 
say not; if to satisfy the public whether the death was from disease or violence, I 
should say yes.   
 
133.  The registration of deaths and the causes of death in this town is very 
incomplete; beyond the fact that the person is dead, it is of no utility at all.  My 
impression is, that to be of any use, some uniform method should be established 
throughout the Commonwealth, making it the duty of the attending physician to make 
and return to some proper officer, within a certain time, a certificate of the death, its 
immediate cause, etc.  As long as every case of diarrhea in children is called "cholera 
infantum," and every case attended with cough "consumption," every sudden death 
"heart disease," what sensible man can peruse the record with confidence? 
 
136.  I see but one way to make the "returns of death" complete and satisfactory: viz., 
forbid by law, under penalty, the interment of any body in any cemetery, or 
transportation in any public conveyance, without a certificate of death signed by a 
physician, countersigned by the town clerk or some other responsible officer; this 
certificate to be retained by the person in charge of the cemetery or public 
conveyance, and returned to the officer issuing the same. The person issuing the 
certificate to be forbidden to give it unless he has in his possession a certificate of 
death of approved form, and signed by a physician.  I have tried all other means, and 
am convinced that in this city no other plan as feasible will succeed.   Many certificates 
of death have been signed by the undertakers, or not signed at all, and are returned in 
a lump at the end of the month.  Notably is this the case with certain undertakers.  The 
objection that has been urged against enforcing this law, or in fact any reasonable 
regulation, is that it is difficult to find the doctor to sign, etc.  Pass a law requiring 
every physician to send to the clerk or other official a certificate of the cause of death 
within twenty-four hours of death; the city physician or health officer to furnish a 
certificate, if no physician is in immediate attendance.  I am glad that some 
investigation is being started in this matter.  
 
137-1/2.  The same idea (of requiring certificates from physicians) would lead us to 
prefer that all practitioners should be compelled to have diplomas or certificates of 
competency before being allowed to follow their profession. 
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141-1/2. The town clerk thinks some undertakers fail to get and return the required 
reports, so that some deaths fail of any registration whatever; others return promptly.  
Generally, the causes of death are not reported by physicians, but are obtained, as 
best they may be, from friends' or neighbors' reports of physician's opinions; often, of 
course, ill understood and improperly reported.  In some cases, the attending 
physician's name appears as having certified the cause of death, when he has really 
certified nothing, and only because he was known to have attended the case.  Thus my 
own name appeared as certifying as cause of one death, "fall at Purgatory"!  
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142.  Out-of-town physicians, as well as resident physicians, have never returned any 
deaths, nor causes of death, except when the body was to be buried away from this 
place.  For a period of sixteen years I have never been asked nor required to sign a 
certificate as to the cause of death, except as above stated. 
 
142-1/2.  I believe that the nature of the disease or the cause of death is in seventy per 
cent. of cases mere guesswork.  These returns form in many instances the bases of 
theories from which sanitarians deduce the most positive conclusions. 
 
143.  For two years I have neither filled out one [death-certificate] nor even seen one.  
For aught that I now they may be now obsolete.  
 
147.  I have thought that our high death-rate from consumption, as shown by 
statistics, might perhaps be accounted for in a measure by the fact that the undertaker 
sometimes, in what he considers a clear case, fills out the blank. 
 
148.  The registration of deaths and causes of death here is more satisfactory now than 
it was a few years ago, and it is intended by the present clerk to make it complete and 
satisfactory.  I think the deaths here have all been recorded. The criticism I make is, 
that probably the former clerks have sometimes listened to common report as to the 
cause of death, and so, many of the deaths are recorded "consumption" which are due 
to other causes.  On examining the records for sixteen years ending with 1870, the 
deaths recorded number 563.  Of these, 153 are recorded as caused by consumption, 
making 27 per cent. of the whole.  Comparing this with the years 1871 to 1876, 
inclusive, to the present time, the deaths recorded number 187. Of these, 27 are 
reported as caused by consumption (14-1/2 per cent.). 
 
150.  The registration is inefficient and unsatisfactory; and principally because of the 
loose and indefinite way in which the physicians of the town and vicinity record their 
deaths, the nosology being defective and the cause often omitted as a trivial affair 
after all.  I do not think all deaths get recorded, but most do.  The undertakers are very 
prompt to ask for the certificates, but do not always readily get them. 
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152.  I think the value of the returns is much diminished by the certificates of irregular 
and ignorant practitioners being received, but as such attend quite a large proportion 
of the sick everywhere I see no present remedy. 
 
153.  From inquiries, I judge that all deaths are returned to the undertakers, and quite 
promptly by them to the town clerk.  The certificates are fully made out, but I find that 
the undertakers seldom obtain the names of the diseases and their causes from 
attending physicians, and no doubt they are not unfrequently incorrectly stated.  On 
this I would make a suggestion.  The law does not oblige the attending physician to 
return the name and sex of the deceased, the disease and its causes, except when 
requested.  My suggestion is to have the law changed so as to make it obligatory on 
the part of the attending physician to return the name and sex of the deceased, the 
name of the disease and its cause, to the town or city clerk; and on the part of the 
undertaker to obtain the name of the disease and its cause from the attending 
physician, the certificates retaining their present form. 
 
154.  I thing they [deaths] are all returned to the town clerk, but I see by examination 
to-day, of those for 1876 to date, that the disease is not stated by the attending 
physician in more than one-half of the certificates. 
 
156.  I doubt if in every case of death the cause is certified by a medical man, for the 
reason that a certain number die every year without medical attendance, and under 
such circumstances that no physician could make an  unconditional return without a 
post-mortem examination.  In such cases, one can give a medical certificate to be used 
by parties known and supposed to be honest, with a declaration that is based upon the 
representations of parents or friends.  Such a document may be absolutely necessary 
to facilitate interment. 
 
157.  I have reason to believe that the causes of death are very indifferently reported.  
Physicians' certificates are not always required. 
 
157-1/2.  The deficiencies in the first place are with the undertakers, or those having 
the care of the funeral, or of the body of the deceased, to ascertain the facts in regard 
to the cause of death.  In many cases the medical attendant is not even asked for the 
cause of death, or not even what ailed the patient; and when the return is made up 
there is some cause assigned in the certificate which does or does not represent the 
true cause of the death, and therefore not reliable for accurate statistical information.   
For an example, which occurred in my own practice: A gentleman died from cancer of 
the bladder and prostate gland, of several years' duration; it was returned as kidney 
disease, or complaint.  The undertaker was informed by myself of the true cause of the 
disease, while, as he says, the family said it was kidney disease, and he thought they 
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ought to know best, and so he made his return as kidney disease; and I find in my 
examination of the register very many errors of a like kind.  It is my impression, in fact I 
know, that the cause of death is not very generally reported  by physicians in this town 
unless called for; perhaps more so now than formerly, for I have been urging the 
undertakers to be more particular in regard to the matter of ascertaining the true 
cause of death, and fulfilling all the requirements of the laws of registration.  Another 
fault is, the returns are not promptly made at the time of death and burial.  The return 
is often delayed for one or two months, and even longer, and has even been delayed 
until after the annual return has been made to the secretary of the Commonwealth.  
This fact came under my own observation, for the returns were handed to me by the 
undertaker, saying that he forgot to hand them in before, and supposed that it would 
make no difference, as he was in the habit of making his returns but once a year. 
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161.  The town sexton reports all deaths to the town clerk once a year, bringing the 
blank forms to the physicians for them to fill out, guessing, as near can be done, when, 
from any cause, physicians are unable to certify advisedly.  My belief is, that if the 
sextons were required to report every month at least, in country towns, the business 
would be performed more satisfactorily and with more exactness.  Copies of the 
statutes relating to the matter should be posted up in some conspicuous place in 
town, -in the post office, for instance, - so that all parties desiring to know what is law 
and usage, can thus be informed.  
 
162.  The returns are hardly ever filled and given to the registrar until the close of the 
year, which might, in some cases, make a little jar in the correct filling of the blanks.  
The sexton usually brings his blank to me at the close of the year to be revised and 
filled as to points he is unable to do himself; in some cases, the death is so far back, 
that I am unable to be as correct as I would like.  I do not say this to find fault with the 
sexton, for I think him to be a very careful man; it has been the custom for years, and 
he has only followed the custom. 
 
163.  The causes of death are sometimes certified to by a physician, if he is handy; if 
not, any one considers himself competent to assign the cause.  In reply to the 
question, "Are three out of five certified to by physicians?" he (the town clerk) said, 
"No, not so many." 
 
164.  When undertakers are employed, they generally obtain certificates of causes of 
death from the physician in charge;  but there are quite a number of burials by the 
family, where no undertaker is called upon, and in these cases no record is returned, 
unless the physician makes a point of returning the case himself, which few do. 
 
170.  I think the registration, as far as the name of the person is concerned, is 
complete and accurate, but of the causes of death, very inaccurate and deficient.  The 
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returns are made by the undertakers to the city clerk every week, and, so far as I 
know, they make returns of all the deaths, excepting in some cases of still-birth.  But 
the causes assigned by the undertakers, in many cases, are very inaccurate and 
ridiculous, and in some instances with intentional deception.  It is rare for the 
physicians to report the causes of the deaths. 
 
171.  Deaths are returned by the undertakers to the clerks, they inserting the cause of 
death, and simply guessing at it.  No certificate has ever been presented to me for 
signature or filling by undertakers. 
 
172.  While perhaps all cases of death may be reported by the undertakers to the 
clerks, the causes are provokingly inaccurate, for the reason that physicians are not 
required to return causes of death, and the undertakers make returns of what they  
may be able to gather from the family. 
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179.  For many years I have been so disgusted with the manner of conducting this 
business, that I have lost all interest in the matter. 
 
180.  Judging from returns of deaths coming under my own observation, I should say 
that undertakers are careful to make the returns.  In looking over the returns of causes 
of death in the clerk's office, I should give my opinion that tables made from them 
would be of little value. 
 
182.  I do not think all deaths are reported to the clerks - certainly not promptly.  They 
are not returned by the physicians, but by the undertaker, who reports the cause of 
death as received from the friends.  I have corrected the returns for the town clerk, as 
well as I could, for the past four or five years, but, of course, was not always sure of 
giving the accurate cause of death in every case, except where I have been the 
attendant. 
  
 185.  In the main, I have long regarded the returns of deaths very imperfect.  For 
instance, there were some 40 deaths returned by the clerk last year, and on my private 
list of deaths, which I keep from year to year, I had recorded 60. 
  
 190.  The returns are made pretty promptly every week.  As to the causes of death, 
the returns are as unreliable as is popular rumor in general, for that is all they amount 
to.  The cause of death very rarely comes direct from any physician.  I wish you would 
suggest the best way of remedying this matter; of making these comparatively 
worthless records what they might be - a valuable store of facts.  For we shall probably 
have an available mayor next year.  
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 191.  I am glad you are going to present the subject of registration.  It is one which has 
interested me for a long time.  I have resolutely tried to have the system changed 
here, but to no purpose, as the city government has been changed every  year; and I 
have not been able to get the mayor interested until the end of the year, when he has 
been turned out for a new man. 
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Replies of City and Town Clerks 
 
8.  The custom has been to return the deaths at the end of the year, except when the 
body is carried out of town for burial; then I get a return near the date of death.  I 
seldom get the physician's certificate with the return; the cause of death is usually 
named, also the name of the physician; but all in the handwriting of the undertaker, 
and I think it is obtained from some member of the family of the deceased.  I think the 
disease or cause of death is in many cases guessed at, so that my return to the 
department is not accurate as to the prevailing disease. 
 
10.  I find that about six-sevenths of the returns are made by the undertakers; the 
other one-seventh seem to have been made by friends of the deceased, rather than by 
physicians.  The undertakers may have received their information from physicians for 
aught I know. 
 
15.  In answer to your inquiries, I would say that our undertaker makes full returns of 
all deaths where he officiates, but that is not in one-half of the cases.  There are 
undertakers who come into this town and remove the dead and make no returns; but 
when I go through the town for the births, and find a death, I get the best information I 
can. 
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17.  The undertaker is furnished with blanks to fill, and he gets the best information he 
can from the family of the deceased, when making preparations for the funeral.  These 
certificates are returned to the town clerk for registration at the close of each year.  
They usually contain some kind of a statement of the causes of death, sometimes 
attested by a physician and sometimes not.  A section of our town always go to P---- 
for an undertaker, and the town clerk never gets any returns except such as he can 
gather when canvassing for the particulars concerning births.  From this section, 
information as to the causes of deaths is very unsatisfactory.  
 
19.  I fear that in some towns not one-half the causes of death are obtained. 
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20.  In small towns like this, where there is no undertaker, we do not get all the 
returns, and, if the clerk goes after them, it is very doubtful if the gets the cause of 
death correct. 
 
24.  A great many causes of death are returned as "heart disease," and nothing more.  
That disease assumes so many forms I have thought whether to medical men that was 
satisfactory. 
 
27.  I have never had reason to suspect any inaccuracy except in one instance, 
returned as "inflammation of stomach," where the death was probably caused by an 
attempt at abortion. 
 
29.  It has become unfashionable to comply with the requisitions of the statues, and, if 
any officer points out this neglect of duty, he is answered that other town clerks are 
not so particular, and that no one lives up to the laws. 
 
31.  The law is in no case complied with, either as regards the undertaker, physician, or 
by the families themselves.  At the close of the year, the births and deaths of the year 
past are collected by going from house to house throughout the town, making the 
result very unsatisfactory and expensive. 
 
36.  I think all the deaths substantially are reported to the undertakers, and most of 
these return the deaths promptly and accurately, but not the causes of deaths.  In the 
case of private cemeteries, some of the undertakers make no attempt to obtain 
certificates.  One undertaker in this city has always been in arrears, more than all other 
undertakers together.  I showed him this circular, and he has since brought in all the 
certificates that were wanting, to date.  In some cases no physician is employed, and 
we have no "city physician" to investigate the cause of death.  Incompetent persons, 
quacks of both sexes, midwives, professional or non-professional, are employed in 
some cases, and their certificates are incorrect or worthless.  Some of the regular 
physicians give a great deal of unnecessary trouble to get the undertakers, who are 
often obliged to go many times before they can get a certificate.  If the attention of 
physicians could be called to this matter, and if undertakers could know that they were 
liable to removal for not making full returns, most of the present difficulties would be 
removed.  
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38.  There are not more than one-eighth of the causes of death certified to by 
physicians. 
 
40.  Returns are sometimes made with the cause of death omitted, or inserted by the 
person making the return, and too often stated in a vague or general way.  Unless a 
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permit for removal of a body is required, undertakers do not make their returns, as a 
rule, until the close of the year. 
 
43.  The certificates of physicians as to causes of death are rarely received at this 
office, and the record is dependent on the undertaker's certificate. 
 
54.  We have not any undertaker, but we usually employ those from the city of New 
Bedford, and they do not take the pains to make any returns in one-half the cases or 
more, and I seldom get the cause of death reported by a physician.  
 
68.  I should say that all the facts I report in about fifty per cent. of the deaths, I obtain 
as best I can. 
 
74.  During the present year, I have furnished the physicians and undertakers with all 
the proper blanks, together with pamphlet of instructions, but up to the present time 
not a single death has been returned to this office. 
 
76.  I think our registration of deaths is about as complete as you could have it.  
Whether we get the causes of deaths as accurate as possible, is a matter the 
physicians know best about.  I don't think we do, in each and every case. 
 
79.  It has been my practice for quite a number of years past, when clerk, to visit or 
send some competent person to visit the families where births and deaths have 
occurred, and to ascertain the facts and particulars before making returns to Boston. 
 
88.  Physicians do not report any cases at all. 
 
90.  I have been clerk of the town for six years in succession, and have employed a man 
to gather all the information in regard to births and deaths called for in the blanks sent 
to me for that purpose.  I have never received any information from physicians or 
undertakers. 
 
93.  If I were to make any suggestion, it would be that the people, especially in the 
small towns like ours, be in some way reminded by the state authorities of their duty 
in the matter of returning deaths, and other vital statistics, to the town clerk.  As 
before stated, it now seems to remain with the clerk, in our town at least, to collect 
the facts concerning such deaths as may come to his knowledge, and it is only by 
keeping a close watch that he can be at all confident of accuracy. 
 
94.  They physicians' reports do not come so easily.  The reason, I think, is, that the 
friends do not know that such a thing is required, so come unprepared, then of course 
forget to see the "Medicus," and the matter slips over.  We have but one physician 
here.  I see him occasionally, and fill up cases that he knows about, but many people 
employ doctors from the neighboring villages, and so I sometimes lose one. 
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95.  I also am quite sure that the undertaker obtains his information in regard to the 
cause of death, in a majority of cases, from some member of the family, rather than 
from the physician.  The reports of causes of deaths are incomplete. 
 
97.  Never until this year, has the returning of deaths been made in a proper manner; 
and I determined that I would have it properly done if the law was good for anything.  I 
accordingly sent to or saw every physician and undertaker in the city and told them 
what I wanted to do, and that I must have their cooperation and assistance.  I have had 
it, and must say that I am very well satisfied.  It is only in the cases of those who are 
too poor to employ medical services, that the cause of death is not reported. 
 
108.  I have been in the custom of getting the cause of death indirectly from the 
undertakers through the superintendent of burials, who is a physician, and can give 
the technical name, which we would fail to get if we relied on the undertaker's return, 
especially in cases where there was no physician in attendance.  The undertakers 
complain that they have difficulty in obtaining the cause of death from the physician in 
attendance, in time to make the return to the city clerk within the time required by 
law.  The registration in this city has been very complete and satisfactory, especially for 
the last three or four years. 
 
115.  The causes of death, as returned by the undertakers, are not always correct, as 
they do not obtain the certificate of the attending physician.  I therefore get the 
doctor's statement myself, and  often find that it does not agree with the undertaker's 
return, which is made up from statements by the family of the deceased.  
 
119.  The causes of deaths are not generally made known, except in an incomplete and 
unsatisfactory way. 
 
122.  I have experienced some difficulty in obtaining the physician's certificates as to 
the cause, etc., that is to say, they delay the matter, and will not fill them out until 
solicited to do so by some one.  I have always obtained or received them after a time.  
it they were required to fill them out immediately, the returns would be more 
accurate, and it would certainly assist matters. 
 
123.  I have physicians' reports of causes of death in 60 per cent. of the number of 
deaths. 
 
126.  There being no resident physician in active practice here, the people are obliged 
to employ physicians from other towns, rendering it impracticable, in many cases, to 
obtain the physician's certificate of the cause of death.  Somewhat less than one-half 
of the deaths are so certified.  All deaths are promptly returned by the undertaker, 
  
158 
 
with a statement in each case of the cause of death, as correctly as it can be 
ascertained from the friends of the deceased.  
 
127.  In this town I think all the deaths are registered - the facts being returned to the 
clerk by the undertakers, each week, they are surer to be right than if returned 
monthly; this I know by experience; for, when returned monthly, as required by the 
statues, it would often happen that some would be delayed for two or three months, 
and I found more difficulty in having them corrected.  No certificates of the cause of 
death are ever given in this town by the physicians; hence the cause of death, as 
returned to me, is very imperfect, in my opinion.  
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129.  The cause of death is not returned in  more than one-fourth the cases, and I have 
been obliged to ascertain it and, in many instances, to fill the returns myself.  I think 
there should be some method by which the returns of deaths may be made more 
complete. 
 
131.  The only difficulty that I have experienced from the undertaker (for it is usually 
the same person from year to year )is, that he will insist upon keeping his returns until 
the end of the year, and making them in a body. 
 
132.  In answer to your circular of the 1st inst., I have to say that since my connection 
with this office I have found it almost impossible to get the complete returns of deaths 
from the undertaker.  I have taken it upon myself to obtain them, and believe that, for 
the past nine months, the registration has been complete, except in a comparatively 
few cases, where physicians have neglected to make returns of "causes of death," 
when frequent applications have been made for them.  How to remedy this neglect on 
the part of physicians and undertakers in small towns, is, in my opinion, a difficult 
matter to solve, unless, perhaps the whole duty of obtaining all the facts relating to a 
death be assigned to one person. 
 
135.  In answer to your inquiries, I will state my impressions.  I have kept the records 
since the year 1870, and have endeavored to have them correct.  The rules and 
regulations of the board of health, in this city, are so well observed that every death is 
recorded, and the cause of death, as returned, is usually correct.  If I have any doubt, I 
immediately send a blank to the physician, and leave the filling of the record until I 
have it returned.  
 
136.  To my knowledge, physicians' certificates of causes of deaths have never been 
called for or reported by them, with, perhaps, one or two exceptions, occurring some 
years ago. 
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139.  I consider the registration very nearly complete in this town; the only deficiency 
being now and then a body removed from town for burial elsewhere, without 
application for a permit.  I think there may be twelve such cases in a year; the number 
registered being from two to three hundred.  The causes of death are given in all cases.  
In this town the returns are made to the clerk by the sexton who has charge of the 
burial, so that we are sure of returns of every interment.  The sextons make these 
returns on the proper blanks, once in six months. 
 
142.  It is quite too common that the cause is not certified by a physician, especially in 
cases where no physician is in attendance; and I have heard the sexton say frequently 
that the doctors were rather indifferent as to the performance of the duty. 
 
146.  I think the present system of registration in case of deaths works well in this 
town of about nine hundred inhabitants.  Our undertaker is very careful to make full 
returns of all deaths; in nearly every instance the cause of death is reported and 
recorded.  I presume more difficulty would be experienced in securing full returns in 
larger towns, especially among the foreign element. 
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147.  Strangers sometimes die and are removed to a distance for burial.  Such are 
liable to be overlooked, as they rarely call on the town clerk for a license to remove 
the body, probably through ignorance that the law required it.  It might be well to 
prohibit railroad employees from passing such over the road without having a license 
pasted on the top of the box.   
 
158.  In towns over ten thousand inhabitants, it would seem that undertakers should 
make their returns at once, as soon as they are employed, and not be allowed a grace 
of seven days.  The physician should make this certificate and leave it with the family 
or persons having care of the deceased at once after death, and not have fifteen days 
of grace.  If the physician attends to his duty, then the undertaker has most of the 
information required; and it would be only a moment's work to fill up the necessary 
return complete, and the town clerk, with limited means for information, would not be 
obliged to supply all deficiencies, which is almost impossible in a town so large as this. 
We have two large cemeteries here, and the smaller towns send during the 
year a great many bodies to be buried here.  In such case, we have to be without any 
"permit to remove" or a physician's original certificate, and have to take the word of 
the undertaker, who fills the blank according to what he may have remembered being 
told or heard.  In many cases, corrections have been made at my own expense, but I 
have not been and an not able to give my whole attention to this particular branch of  
my duties.  In most of these out-of-town cases, the undertaker waits ten days, and 
oftener two or three weeks, before making any return; the record is then, at best, very 
meagre, and there is no way to make a full return.  Everybody has shirked the matter 
or been careless, and all the town clerk has to do is to supply deficiencies and give the 
  
160 
 
undertaker a permit, because the cemetery corporation has allowed the burial without 
a permit and the undertakers has really done the best he could(?).  If the railroad and 
express companies would not receive a body unless there is the proper certificate of 
removal accompanying it, and if the cemeteries would not allow a body to be buried 
without a "permit to bury," I think the difficulty would be overcome.  This might not be 
easy to carry out in small towns at first, but in large towns of ten thousand inhabitants 
and over, there would be no trouble after a few weeks, if the physician and undertaker 
would make their certificates as suggested. 
We rarely use the "physician's certificate," but, instead, use the one on the 
return blank.  I have tried my best to have the first used, but have given it up.  There 
are so many "holes" in the statute that all we can do is "the best we can."  I do not 
know that I can suggest anything in regard to registration, but can give you 
information regarding the work in this town and hope that we are not behind our 
neighbors. 
The average of time between decease and registration is about ten days.  
Permits to bury are granted in all our cases, but always after interment.  In removal 
from town, our undertakers always get a "permit."  We rarely use a physician's 
certificate-blank.  In most cases, we are able to get a physician's certificate to the 
return; in case there is no doctor in attendance, we do without.  We rarely receive 
permits to remove, with bodies coming from other towns in the State, excepting, 
always, the large cities. 
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159.  In a town of this size, there is not much danger that any death will escape 
registration.  People seldom die here except from old age. 
 
165.  Causes are not reported by the physicians as they should be, but, in more than 
half the deaths, causes are obtained from physicians before any record is made. 
 
168.  As we are situated near the state line of Rhode Island, undertakers come from 
Providence, take charge of funerals and do not make any returns to me.  For the last 
two years, since I have been town clerk, I remember of but one instance, in about 
twenty such cases, where they have made the returns that our law requires.  
 
169.  The deaths are not all returned by the undertakers, but the fault seems to be 
with physicians, who are very negligent in the performance of that duty. At least 
twenty-five per cent. of deaths, in this town, are reported from other sources. 
 
172.  Probably the causes of about one-quarter of the deaths are certified to by a 
physician. The town is so small that the physician's certificate is not necessary, as the 
cause is known generally. 
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179.  The registration of deaths in this town is all correct, so far as we can obtain 
returns, but the returns are not as prompt and certain as they should be.  There were 
two or three deaths in town last year that were not reported, I have since learned, and 
they are not all returned in the manner the law directs. 
 
180.  In reply to your circular received a short time since, I will say that neither the 
undertakers nor the physicians make any report whatever in regard to deaths or the 
causes thereof. I have, at my own expense, sent a man over the town each year since I 
have been town clerk, with instructions to get all the facts and every name of persons 
who have died during said year. As to the accuracy of what he was able to gather 
respecting the "causes of death," you can judge better than I. The friends report what 
they have understood the physician to say was the disease or cause of death. 
 
182.  The registration of the number of deaths is probably complete; causes, perhaps, 
not fully satisfactory, blanks for "return of deaths" being seldom filled by the attendant 
physician, but by the acting undertaker or some individual chosen by the family of the 
deceased to take charge of the funeral ceremonies. 
 
186.  The cause of death gives me most trouble. When families are not able to state it, 
I make a point of ascertaining from the attending physician, and do not always get it 
then. 
 
195.  Of the 64 deaths registered here in 1875, 46 were certified by physicians, and 
that proportion is probably not very different from that in past years. 
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196.  Of all returns made, from fifty to sixty per cent. are certified by physicians. 
 
216.  The great deficiency is in regard to causes of death; very few physicians' 
certificates are furnished, and the information of the undertakers, obtained from the 
family, is often partial and inaccurate. 
 
219.  Nearly all the returns of the fact of death are promptly reported.  There are some 
cases omitted where a sexton from out of town is employed, and in them I endeavor 
to supply the deficiency, as far as possible, when looking up the births. 
 
225.  I think the registration is quite complete, and that all the deaths are very fully 
registered. The causes of death are not nearly so satisfactory, the undertaker getting 
the information for the family, and, I think, quite rarely from the physician. I remedy 
this as much as possible by taking them to the physician myself at the end of the year 
and getting him to revise them. I send you a few causes of death, by which you will see 
the necessity for revisions. If sextons were obliged, in all cases where there is an 
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attending physician, to get the information from them, it would improve the character 
of the returns. 
 
230.  The undertaker has generally left a blank a the time of the interment, which, in 
some cases, has been retained to nearly the close of the year, and I have been obliged 
to hunt them up myself.  Of thirteen returned to me the present year, six were without 
the cause of death certified by any physician.  
 
237.  About half of the deaths are returned.  The remainder are obtained by the clerk 
as he collects the births.  Only in a few cases are the causes of death accurately and 
specifically given, the clerk being obliged to supplement that part of the work.  Very 
few, if any, of the regular blanks are used, although there have always been plenty in 
the office here for that purpose.   
 
242.  But very few of the causes of death are returned by physicians.  None of our 
leading physicians have made any returns for some years, and never did so except in a 
very few cases.  Some eight years since, I furnished all the physicians in this city with 
blank certificates for them to make returns of the cause of death, and only received a 
limited number of them.  
 
243.  The causes of deaths are not returned generally as they should be. 
 
244.  The returns by undertakers are made promptly, and I think I get them all except 
in case of foreigners who remove for burial.  Sometimes they are not returned.  The 
causes of deaths returned are not perhaps always satisfactory. 
 
245.  In many cases, the causes of death are reported according to the received belief 
of the family and neighborhood. Ii get such returns as "died by the visitation of God," 
or "by the hand of God," quite often; and "heart disease" and "old age" constantly.  
When I know little or nothing about the cases, I make the record according to the 
undertaker's return.  In other cases, although I am no physician, scientific or otherwise, 
I exercise some little discrimination of my own. 
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246.  I would say that for six years that I have been clerk of this town, but one death 
has been returned to me by the parties required by law to do so. 
 
247.  Probably three-fourths of the death-reports are accompanied by a statement of 
causes.  I usually call upon the physicians a second time; i.e., after the undertaker.  In 
this way, I get most of them complete, but not any too accurate, I fear. 
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250.  I cannot recall a single instance, during the nine years I have been clerk of this 
town, of having received a physician's certificate of cause of death; and the causes, as 
reported by undertakers' returns, are in many instances inaccurate and incomplete.  
 
254.  Three or four years ago, when cerebro-spinal meningitis was prevalent, I had 
from this class (irregular practitioners) one or two deaths returned from that disease, 
when I thought I knew absolutely that the cause of death was entirely different.  In 
such case, has not the town clerk the power to alter and correct the returns?  I do. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
164 
 
REFERENCES 
 
 
Abbott, Samuel W. 1897. The vital statistics of Massachusetts: A forty years’ 
 summary,1856-1895. In Massachusetts, State Board of Health, Twenty-eighth 
 Annual Report of the Massachusetts State Board of Health. Public Document 
 No. 34. Boston: Wright and Potter. 
 
Alter, George, and Ann Carmichael. 1996. Studying Causes of Death in the Past: 
Problems and Models. Historical Methods 29 (2): 44-48. 
 
________. 1999. Classifying the dead: toward a history of the registration of causes of 
death. Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 54 (2): 114-32. 
 
Anderton, Douglas L. 2003. Disease: Concepts and Classifications. In Encyclopedia of 
Population, edited by Paul Demeny and Geoffrey McNicoll, 247-50. New York: 
Macmillan. 
 
Anderton, Douglas L., and Susan I. Hautaniemi. 2004. Grammars of Death: An Analysis 
of Nineteenth-Century Literal Causes of Death from the Age of Miasmas to 
Germ Theory. Social Science History 28 (1): 111-43. 
 
Armstrong, David. 1986. The Invention of Infant Mortality. Sociology of Health & Illness 
8 (3): 211-32. 
 
Arrizabalaga, Jon.  1999.  Medical Causes of Death in Preindustrial Europe: Some 
 Historiographical Considerations. Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied 
 Sciences 54 (2): 241-60. 
 
Baker, Gordon. 1998. The Private Language Argument. Language & Communication 18 
 (4): 325–56. 
 
Baldwin, Peter. 1999. Contagion and the State in Europe, 1830–1930.  Cambridge: 
 Cambridge University Press. 
 
Barnes, David S. 1995. The Making of a Social Disease: Tuberculosis in Nineteenth-
 Century France. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Bartley, Mel., George D. Smith, and David Blane. 1997. Vital comparisons: the social 
 construction of mortality measurement. In The Sociology of Medical Science 
 and Technology, edited by Mary Ann Elston, 127-52. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
 
  
165 
 
Beemer, Jeffrey K., Douglas L.  Anderton and Susan I.  Hautaniemi. 2005. Sewers in the 
 City: A Case Study of Individual-Level Mortality and Public Health Initiatives in 
 Northampton, Massachusetts at the Turn of the Century. Journal of the History 
 of Medicine and Allied Sciences 60 (1): 42-72. 
 
Benson, Lucy Wilson. 1954. Floods and disasters. In The Northampton Book: Chapters 
from 300 Years in the Life of a New England Town, 1654–1954, edited by the 
Tercentenary History Committee. Northampton, 355-63. MA: Tercentenary 
Committee. 
 
Bernstein, Richard J. 2010. The Pragmatic Turn. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Bonner, Thomas Neville. 2000. Becoming a Physician: Medical Education in Britian, 
 France, Germany, and the United States, 1750-1945. Baltimore: The Johns 
 Hopkins University Press. 
 
Bolles, John A., Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 1843. Second 
 Annual Report to the Legislature: Under the Act of March, 1842, Relating to the 
 Registry and Returns of Births, Marriages and Deaths in Massachusetts. Boston: 
 Dutton and Wentworth. 
 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste. 
 Translated by Richard Nice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
  
Bowker, Geoffrey C., and Susan Leigh Star. 2000. Sorting Things Out: Classification and 
 Its Consequences. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Bynum, William F. 1993. Nosology. In Companion Encyclopedia of the History of 
 Medicine, Vol. 1. edited by William F. Bynum and Roy Porter, 335-56. New York: 
 Routledge. 
 
_________. 1994. Science and the Practice of Medicine in the Nineteenth Century. 
 New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Carter, K.  Codell. 2003. The Rise of Causal Concepts of Disease: Case Histories.  
 Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
 
Cassedy, James H. 1986. Medicine and American Growth, 1800-1860. Madison: 
 University of Wisconsin Press. 
 
Cohen, Sir Henry. 1953. The Evolution of the Concept of Disease. Proceedings of the 
 Royal Society of Medicine 48 (3): 155–160. 
 
  
166 
 
Condran, Gretchen A., and Rose A. Cheney. 1982. Mortality Trends in Philadelphia: 
Age- and Cause-Specific Death Rates 1870-1930. Demography 19 (1): 97-123. 
 
 
Condran, Gretchen A., Henry Williams, and Rose A. Cheney. 1984. The Decline in 
Mortality in Philadelphia from 1870-1930: The Role of Municipal Services. The 
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 108 (April): 153-77. 
 
Crimmins, Eileen M., and Gretchen A. Condran. 1983. Mortality Variations in U.S. Cities 
in 1900. Social Science History 7 (1): 31-59. 
 
De Costa, Caroline M. 2002. The Contagiousness of Childbed Fever: a Short History of 
 Puerperal Sepsis and Its Treatment. Medical Journal of Australia 177 (11-12): 
 668-71. 
 
DeLacy, Margaret. 1999. Nosology, Mortality, and Disease Theory in the Eighteenth 
Century. Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 54 (2): 261-84. 
 
Donnelly, Michael. 2005. William Farr and Quantification in Nineteenth-Century 
 English Public Health. In Body Counts: Medical Quantification in Historical and 
 Sociological perspectives, edited by Gerard Forland, Annick Opinel, George 
 Weisz. Quantification in Historical & Sociological Perspectives.  Montreal: 
 McGuill-Queen’s University Press. 
 
Dormandy, Thomas. 1999. The White Death: A History of Tuberculosis. London: 
 Hambledon Press. 
 
Dubos, René, and Jean Dubos. 1996[1952]. The White Plague: Tuberculosis, Man, and 
 Society. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. 
 
Duffy, John. 1993. The Sanitarians: A History of American Public Health. Urbana and 
 Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 
 
Edge, P. Granville. 1928. Vital Registration in Europe. The Development of Official 
 Statistics and Some Differences in Practice. Journal of the Royal Statistical 
 Society 91 (3): 346-93. 
 
Ettinger, Laura E. 2006. Nurse-Midwifery: The Birth of a New American Profession.  
 Columbus: Ohio State University Press. 
 
Eyler, John. 1979. Victorian Social Medicine: The Ideas and Methods of William Farr.  
 Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Farr, William. 1885. Vital Statistics. London: Offices of the Sanitary Institute. 
  
167 
 
 
Foucault, Michel. 1973. The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception. 
 London: Tavistock. 
 
Gelfand, Toby. 1997. The History of the Medical Profession. In Companion 
 Encyclopedia of the History of Medicine, Vol. 2. edited by William F. Bynum 
 and Roy Porter, 1119-50. New York: Routledge. 
 
Gittelsohn, A. M. 1982. On the distribution of underlying causes of death. American 
 Journal of Public Health 72 (2): 133–40. 
 
Goubert, Jean-Pierre. 1984. Public Hygiene and Mortality Decline in France in the 19th 
 Century. In Preindustrial Population Change: The Mortality Decline and Short-
 Term Population Movements, edited by Tommy  Bengtsson, Gunnar Fridlizius, 
 and Rolf Ohlsson. Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell International. 
 
Graham, Edwin E. 1908. Infant Mortality. Chairman’s Address before the Section on 
 Diseases of Children, at the Fifty-Ninth Annual Session, American Medical 
 Association, 1908. Journal of the American Medical Association 51 (13): 1045-
 50.  
 
Graunt, John. 1939[1662]. Natural and Political Observations Made upon the Bills of 
 Mortality. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Green, Constance McLaughlin. 1939. Holyoke, Massachusetts: A Case History of the 
 Industrial Revolution in America. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
 
Grob, Gerlad N. 2002. The Deadly Truth: A History of Disease in America. Cambridge, 
 MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Gutman, Robert. 1959. Birth and Death Registration in Massachusetts 1639-1900. New 
 York: Milbank Memorial Fund. 
 
Haber, Samuel. 1991. The Quest for Authority and Honor in the American Professions, 
 1750-1900. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Habermas, Jürgen. 1998. On the Pragmatics of Communication. edited by Maeve 
 Cooke. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
 
_________. 2003. Truth and Justification. edited and with translation by Barbara 
 Fultner. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
 
Hacker, P. M. S. 1990. Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
  
168 
 
Haines, Michael R. 2000. The White Population of the United States, 1790-1920. In A 
 Population History of North America, edited by Michael R. Haines and Richard 
 H. Steckel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Haines, Michael R. 2003. The Great Modern Mortality Transition. Social Science History 
 Association Newsletter, Winter. 
 
Hamlin, Christopher. 1992. Predisposing Causes and Public Health in Early Nineteenth-
 Century Medical Thought. Social History of Medicine 5 (1): 43-70. 
 
_________. 1995. Could You Starve to Death in England in 1839? The Chadwick-Farr 
 Controversy and the Loss of the "Social" in Public Health.  American Journal of 
 Public Health 85 (6): 857–66. 
 
_________. 2002. Public Sphere to Public Health: the Transformation of "Nuisance." In 
 Medicine, Health, and the Public Sphere in Britain, 1600-2000, edited by Steve 
 Sturdy, 190-204. London: Routledge. 
 
Hankins, Frank H. 1954. Economic Transition: 1817-1860. In The Northampton Book: 
Chapters from 300 Years in the Life of a New England Town, 1654–1954. edited 
by the Tercentenary History Committee, 77-84. Northampton, MA: 
Tercentenary Committee. 
 
Hardy, Anne. 1994. 'Death is the Cure of All Diseases': Using the General Register 
 Office Cause of Death Statistics for 1837–1920. Social History of Medicine 7 
 (3): 472-92. 
 
Hautaniemi, Susan I. 2002. "Demography and Death in Emergent Industrial Cities of 
 New England." PhD diss., University of Massachusetts-Amherst. 
 
Hautaniemi, Susan I., Alan C.  Swedlund and Douglas L.  Anderton. 1999. Mill Town 
 Mortality Consequences of Industrial Growth in Two Nineteenth-Century New 
 England Towns. Social Science History 23 (1): 1-39. 
 
Heath, Joseph. 2001. Communicative Action and Rational Choice. Cambridge, MA: The 
 MIT Press. 
 
Hetzel, Alice M. 1997. U.S. Vital Statistics System Major Activities and Developments, 
 1950-95. Hyattsville, Maryland: National Center for Health Statistics. 
 http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/misc/usvss.pdf 
 
Holmes, Oliver Wendell. 1843. The Contagiousness of Puerperal Fever. The New 
 England Quarterly Journal of Medicine and Surgery 1 (1): 503-30.  
 
  
169 
 
Howard-Jones, Norman. 1974. Cholera Nomenclature and Nosology: A Historical Note. 
 Bulletin of the World Health Organization 51 (3): 317-24. 
 
Jacob, Edward C. 1999. One Morning in May: The Mill River Disaster of 1874.  
 Haydenville, MA: Edward C.  Jacob. 
 
Kertzer, David I., Wendy Sigle, and Michael J.  White. 1999. Childhood Mortality and 
 Quality of Care Among Abandoned Children in Nineteenth-century Italy. 
 Population Studies 53 (3): 303-15. 
 
Kett, Joseph F. 1968. The Formation of the American Medical Profession: The Role of 
 Institutions, 1780-1860. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
King, Lester S. 1991. Transformations in American Medicine: From Benjamin Rush to 
 William Osler. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Kripke, Saul. 1982. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Kuczynski, Robert René. 1900 The Registration Laws in the Colonies of Massachusetts 
 Bay and New Plymouth. Publications of the American Statistical Association 7 
 (51): 1- 9. 
 
Levene, Alysa. 2006. What can Dade registers tell us about infant mortality in the later 
 eighteenth century? Local Population Studies 76: 31-42. 
 
Liptak, Delores, and Grace Bennett. 1999. Seeds of Hope: The History of the Sisters of 
 Providence, Holyoke, Massachusetts. Holyoke, MA: Sisters of Providence. 
 
Locke, John. 1996[1693]. Some Thoughts Concerning Education and of the Conduct of 
 the Understanding. edited by Ruth W. Grant and Nathan Tarcov. Indianapolis; 
 Hackett. 
 
Loudon, Irvine. 1992. Death in Childbirth: An International Study of Maternal Care and 
 Maternal Mortality, 1800-1950. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Massachusetts State Board of Health. 1877. Eighth Annual Report of the State Board of 
 Health of Massachusetts. Boston: Albert J. Wright. 
 
Maudsley, Gillian. and E. M. I.  Williams. 1996. Inaccuracy in Death Certification: 
 Where  Are We Now? Journal of Public Health Medicine 18 (1): 59-66. 
 
McKeown, Thomas H. 1976. The Modern Rise of Population. New York: Academic 
 Press. 
 
  
170 
 
Mead, George H. 1967[1834]. Mind, Self, and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social 
 Behaviorist. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.  
 
Meckel, Richard  A. 1985. Immigration, Mortality, and Population Growth in Boston, 
 1840-1880. Journal of Interdisciplinary History 15 (3): 393-417. 
 
Meigs, G. L. 1917. Maternal Mortality from all Conditions Connected with Childbirth in 
 the United States and Certain Other Countries. Washington, DC: U.S.  
 Department of Labor, Children’s Bureau. Cited in Richard A. Meckel, Save the 
 Babies: American Public Health Reform and the Prevention of Infant Mortality, 
 1850-1929 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990). 
 
Melosi, Martin V. 2000. The Sanitary City: Urban Infrastructure in America from 
 Colonial Times to the Present. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Meslé, France., and Jacques Vallin. 1996. Reconstructing Long-term Series of Causes of 
 Death. Historical Methods 29 (2): 72-87. 
 
Nutton, Vivian. 1993. Humoralism. In Companion Encyclopedia of the History of 
 Medicine, Vol. 1. edited by William F. Bynum and Roy Porter, 281-91. New York: 
 Routledge. 
 
Olby, Robert C. 1993. Constitutional and Hereditary Disorders. In Companion 
 Encyclopedia of the History of Medicine, Vol. 1. edited by William F. Bynum and 
 Roy Porter, 412-37. New York: Routledge. 
 
Omran, Abdel R. 1971. The Epidemiological Transition: A Theory of the Epidemiology 
 of Population Change. The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly 49 (4): 509-38. 
 
Ott, Katherine. 1996. Fevered Lives: Tuberculosis in American Culture since 1870. 
 Cambridge MA: Harvard university Press. 
 
Pelling, Margaret. 1978. Cholera, Fever and English Medicine 1825- 1865. Oxford:  
 Oxford University Press. 
 
_________. 1993. Contagion/Germ Theory/Specificity. In Companion Encyclopedia of 
 the History of  Medicine, Vol. 1. edited by William F. Bynum and Roy Porter, 
 309-34. New York: Routledge. 
 
Porter, Roy. 1997. The Greatest Benefit to Mankind: A Medical History of Humanity. 
 London: W. W. Norton & Company. 
 
_________. 2003. Blood and Guts: A Short History of Medicine. London: W. W. Norton 
 & Company. 
  
171 
 
 
Preston, Samuel  H., and Michael R. Haines. 1991. Fatal Years: Child Mortality in Late 
 Nineteenth-Century America. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Risse, Gunter B. 1997. Cause of Death as a Historical Problem. Continuity and Change 
 12 (2): 175-88. 
 
Rogers, John. 1999. Reporting Causes of Death in Sweden, 1750-1950. Journal of the 
 History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 54 (2): 190-209. 
 
Rosenberg, Charles E. 1987[1962]. The Cholera Years: The United States in 1832, 1849, 
 and 1866. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
 
________. 1992. Explaining Epidemics and Other Studies in the History of  Medicine. 
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Rosenkrantz, Barbara G. 1972. Public Health and the State: Changing Views in 
 Massachusetts, 1842-1936. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Rothstein, William G. 1985[1972]. American Physicians in the Nineteenth Century: 
 From Sects to Science. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Ryan, Frank. 1992. The Forgotten Plague: How the Battle Against Tuberculosis Was 
 Won – and Lost. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 
 
Searle, John R. 1997[1969]. Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. 
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Shattuck, Lemuel. 1850. Report of a General Plan for the Promotion of Public and 
 Personal Health. Boston: Dutton & Wentworth. 
 
Slater, D. N.  1993. Certifying the Cause of Death: An Audit of Wording Inaccuracies. 
 Journal of Clinical Pathology 46 (3): 232-34. 
 
Speert, Harold. 2004. Obstetrics and Gynecology: A History and Iconography. New 
 York: The Parthenon Publishing Group. 
 
Starr, Paul. 1982. The Social Transformation of American Medicine: The Rise of a 
 Sovereign Profession and the Making of a Vast Industry.  New York: Basic 
 Books. 
 
Sturdy, Steve. 2002. Introduction: Medicine, health and the public sphere. In Medicine, 
 Health and the Public Sphere in Britain, 1600-2000, edited by Steve Sturdy, 1-
 24. London: Routledge. 
  
172 
 
 
Swedlund, Alan C. 1990. Infant Mortality in Massachusetts and the United Sates in the 
 Nineteenth Century. In Disease in Populations in Transition, edited by A. C. 
 Swedlund and G. J. Armelagos, 161-82. New York: Bergin and Garvey. 
 
_________. 2010. Shadows in the Valley: A Cultural history of Illness, Death, and  Loss 
 in New England, 1840-1916. Boston: University of Massachusetts Press. 
 
Swedlund, Alan C. and Helen Ball. 1998. Nature, nurture and the determinants of 
 infant and childhood mortality in Massachusetts. In Toward a New Biocultural 
 Synthesis, edited by A. Goodman and T. Leatherman, 191-228. Ann Arbor: 
 University of Michigan Press. 
 
Szreter, Simon. 1988. The Importance of Social Intervention in Britain’s Mortality 
 Decline, c. 1850-1914: A Reinterpretation of the Role of Public Health. Social 
 History of Medicine 1 (1): 1-38. 
 
_________. 2005. Health and Wealth: Studies in History and Policy. Rochester, NY: 
 University of Rochester Press. 
 
Taylor, F. Kräupl. 1979. The Concepts of Illness, Disease and Morbus. Cambridge: 
 Cambridge University Press. 
 
Temkin, Owsei. 1974. Galenism: Rise and Decline of a Medical Philosophy. Ithaca: 
 Cornell University Press. 
 
_________. 1987. The scientific approach to disease: specific entity and individual 
 sickness. In The Double Face of Janus and Other Essays in the History of 
 Medicine, edited by Owsei Temkin, 441 -55. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
 University Press. 
 
Tissot, Samuel A. 1769. An Essay on Diseases Incident to Literary and Sedentary 
 Persons. London: J. Nourse. 
 
Tomes, Nancy. 1998. The Gospel of Germs: Men, Women, and the Microbe in American 
 Life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Tuttle, George M. 1899. A Manual for Students and Practitioners. New York: Lea. 
 
U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1902. Manual of International Classification of Causes of  
 Death. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
 
  
173 
 
_________. 1908. Mode of Statement of Cause of Death and Duration of Illness upon 
 Certificates of Death. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce and 
 Labor. 
 
_________. 1910. International Classifications of Causes of Sickness and Death. 
 Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
 
U.S. Treasury Department, United States Marine-Hospital Service. 1900. The 
 International System of Nomenclature of Diseases and Causes of Death. 
 Supplement to Public Health Reports XV (49). Washington, DC: U.S. 
 Government Printing Office. 
 
Vinten-Johansen, Peter, Howard Brody, Nigel Paneth, Stephen Rachman, and Michael 
 Rip. 2003. Cholera, Chloroform, and the Science of Medicine: A life of John 
 Snow. New York: Oxford university Press. 
 
Warner, John Harley. 1986. The Therapeutic Perspective: Medical Practice, Knowledge, 
 and Identity in America, 1820-1885. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Weisz, George. 2006. Divide and Conquer: A Comparative History of Medical 
 Specialization. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Wertz, Richard W., and Dorothy C. Wertz. 1977. Lying-In: A History of Childbirth in 
 America.  New York: Free Press. 
 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1953. Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G. E. M. 
 Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Woods, Robert. 1991. Public Health and Public Hygiene: The Urban Environment in the 
 Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries. In The Decline of Mortality in 
 Europe. edited by Roger Schofield, David Reher, and Alain Bideau, 233-47. 
 Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Worboys, Michael. 2000. Spreading Germs: Disease Theories and Medical Practice in 
 Britain, 1865-1900. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
World Health Organization. 2006. "History of the Development of the ICD." 
 http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/HistoryOfICD.pdf. 
 
Yaukey, David and Douglas L. Anderton. 2001. Demography: The Study of Human 
 Population. Long Grove, Illinois: Waveland Press. 
